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Abstract 
Based on empirical research in two of China's biggest and most important manufacturing 
sectors: Auto and Electronics, this study develops an analytical framework to understand, 
how firms in newly industrialising economies (NIEs) develop their technological 
capabilities, and how this is affected by the situation of finance and the practice of 
corporate governance (CG). Particularly, by further adaption of the theory to the Chinese 
context, it attempts to answer the questions: 1) 'What is the situation of technological 
capabilities in the firms in the Chinese Auto and Electronics Industries?'2) 'How has the 
development process of technological capabilities been?' 3) 'What is the situation of 
corporate governance and finance in Chinese Auto and Electronics firms?' and 4) 'How 
can the capabilities developed be explained from the finance/corporate governance 
aspect?' 
Two frameworks are developed on the basis of previous research on technological 
capabilities and corporate governance. Three Propositions are derived from these 
frameworks. Five case studies are conducted in both sectors, and seven hypotheses are 
then generated from the findings of case studies. They are tested through a questionnaire 
survey of 195 firms in the Chinese electronics industry. 
This thesis makes several theoretical contributions and has several policy implications. 
Primarily, this study contributes to the literature on the development of technological 
capability in NIEs by: 1) creating a better understanding of firm-level technological 
capability in the Chinese auto and (especially) electronics sectors; 2) providing a thorough 
account and explanations of how Chinese firms with typically flawed corporate 
governance (CG) fail to develop dynamic capabilities; how those with better CG succeed, 
and why there are not more of them. In addition this study has adapted the theoretical 
framework (the effect of corporate governance on technological development) to the 
Chinese situation and enriched it. It will enlighten future applications of such theory to the 
wider context of NIEs in general. For policy makers, the crucial implication is that any 
improvement in the governance factors studied in this study will significantly boost the 
development of technological capability. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This research responds to China's recent quest to build an innovative economy and develop 
'indigenous' or 'home-grown' technological capability - the ability to assimilate, adapt and 
in increasing measure create new technology!. It aims to understand, for the auto and 
electronics sectors, how the development of technological capability in Chinese firms is 
affected by the situation of finance and the practice of corporate governance. The 
analytical framework developed in this research and empirical findings generated are 
believed to have valuable implications for other newly industrialising economies (NIBs). 
China's pursuit to catch up 2 with developed countries since 1979 has followed the 
conventional wisdom of 'buy-absorb-innovate'. The government's logic was, by giving out 
some market to foreign multinationals, and through encouraging them to invest directly or 
to set up joint ventures in China, the domestic firms could acquire more advanced 
technology from these firms3, they then understand, absorb and assimilate the knowledge 
and new technology; then gradually develop their own capability to improve the imported 
technology, and finally reach the stage of generating their own product or/and process 
technology. However, many China-based scholars (Liao, 1999; Shi, 2001; Liang, 2004) 
has confirmed that Chinese firms' technological capability has not benefited much from 
the imported technology: the ratio of complete sets of equipment in technology acquisition 
I The Chinese notion of 'indigenous technological capability' is thus consistent with that of 'dynamic 
technological capability' in the literature (Teece et aI, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Winter 2003). As 
such, the term 'indigenous' will be replaced with 'dynamic' in the rest chapters of the thesis, which makes it 
more comparable to the theoretical literature. 
2 The notion of catch up should not be only viewed in a linear way. 'As long as technology is understood as a 
cumulative unidirectional process, development will be seen as a race along a fixed track, where catching up 
will be merely a question of relative speed. Speed is no doubt a relevant aspect, but history is full of 
examples of how successful overtaking has been primarily based on running in a new direction' (Perez and 
Soete, 1988, p. 460). Indeed, in many developing countries instead of making efforts to move to the 
scientific frontiers, they plan to apply the acquired knowledge in developing products that are most relevant 
to local needs. Examples in China can be found in Lu (2005). Just as Lal1 (2000, p.13) noted: 'the process of 
technological change in developing countries, is one of acquiring and improving on technological 
capabilities rather than of innovation at frontiers of knowledge. This process essentially consists of learning 
to use and to improve technologies that already exist in advanced industrial economies.' 
3 The form of acquisition varies: it can be done through tempering intel1ectual property, such as reverse 
engineering, or through capital-embedded transfer, such as purchase of plant, equipments, or through 
Foreign Direct Investment or setting up joint ventures. The last two forms of transfer are most prominent in 
China (Wang & Zhou, 1999) 
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has been increasing over the last decades (from 89% in the 1950s, 91 % in the 1960s to 
95% in the 1990s). Survey by Xu and Chen (2000) also shows that 90% of the 200 sample 
firms have not significantly improved their technology five years after the transfer, and the 
rest 10% have only 'partially' enhanced their technological capabilities. It seems that the 
vicious circle of 'acquisition-lag-reacquisition-relag' is the problem faced by most 
industries in China, where indigenous technological capability has not been substantially 
developed. 
In the literature there are two types of explanations to the unsuccessful story: one is that in 
the past Chinese authorities have unduly protected and subsidised large state firms so that 
they could survive in a competition-free environment, therefore these firms have lost 
incentive and finally the ability to effectively acquire and develop dynamic capabilities 
(Lu & Feng, 2004). They therefore argue that the Chinese government should have just left 
it to market forces to decide which firms emerged to challenge the world in higher-tech 
industry. Yet South Korean experience shows that many favoured firms, such as Samsung 
in electronics and Hyundai in motor vehicles, did extremely well - as did the 100% state-
owned firm POSCO in steel (Tylecote, 2006). The other main-stream criticism is towards 
the inconsistent industrial and technology policy that has curbed development of firms in 
mediumlhigh-tech sectors (Nolan, 2001; Qian, 2002; Lu & Feng, 2004; Xie & White, 
2004). However, in spite of general 'failure', there are a small number of 'bridge-head' 
firms that not only survived but also flourished, such as Lenovo, Huawei, Chery and 
Guizhou Tyre (Lu & Feng, 2004; Xie & White, 2004; Liu & Tylecote, 2009). In this 
context, it is pertinent to raise the following question: why has the performance of 
enterprises varied so much under similar policy and market conditions? 
Drawing on the arguments mentioned above, and the theoretical framework of corporate 
governance, finance and technological development, this research project seeks to address 
the following questions: from the finance and corporate governance angle, 1) why the 
majority of the firms failed to develop technological capability that generates technical 
change and enhance competitiveness; 2) how the minority succeeded and why there are 
not more of them. It also aims to identify and examine the elements of corporate 
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governance that have impact on a firm's technological capability; whether these effects are 
direct or indirect, and if indirect then how they are mediated. Any improvement in these 
will greatly enhance firms' technological capability development and hence general 
performance in the long run. Therefore findings from this research will help address the 
two predominant issues in China's way up - 'technological catch-up' and 'modem 
enterprise (corporate governance) system'. By the same token, such lesson and experience 
will be transferrable to other NIEs and shed light on their technological upgrading and 
reform of corporate governance and finance system. 
1.1 China's challenge in developing indigenous technological 
capability 
The spectacular growth of the Chinese economy commands global attention. From outside 
China, it is hard to see anything but rapid, remorseless transformation into a modem, high 
technology economy. Even within China, the spectacular development of parts of the 
country leads to the easy assumption that big coastal cities such as Shanghai and 
Hangzhou are simply showing the way. Yet, there is concern in China over the limited 
extent to which Chinese-owned firms have been able to innovate. Their competitiveness, 
especially in high technology sectors, has actually been declining (see Chapter 3.1 for 
detailed evidences). 
Thanks to the cheap labour, artificially undervalued currency, protectionist tariff and 
export subsidies, China's growth pattern until 2001 has apparently worked so as to 
maintain double-digit GDP growth rate. However, China has largely failed in one very 
important aspect: to have a medium and high technology industry that can boast strong 
domestic Chinese firms, which are capable of competing technologically with the best in 
the world. The tide has now changed. Following China's entry into WTO in 2001, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by multinationals from advanced countries can now entre China 
free of constraint. This means that domestic firms, private and state, are to be faced with 
fiercer competition on product and labour market. It has now made it harder for Chinese 
firms to be profitable or even survive without being innovative. Increasing constraint on IP 
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protection also prevents Chinese firms from 'copying' multinationals and not to be 
punished. WTO rules and international pressure have also made it harder for Chinese 
government to favour domestic firms through trade barriers and protectionist policies. In 
addition, demand for cheap 'Made-in-China' low-technology products diminishes as the 
economic recession sweeps across the world. Chinese firms have no time to waste, and the 
need for innovation is more urgent than ever. 
Figure 1-1 The logic of need for indigenous technological capability in China 
In fact now there is both political and strategic appreciation In China of the need to 
encourage innovation to retain the competitive advantage originally bestowed by cheap 
labour. In 2006 the Chinese government drafted the 'S&T Strategic Plan 2006-2020', 
which sets out important overarching goal of making China an 'innovation-oriented' 
society by the year 2020 and - over the longer term - one of the world's leading 
'innovation economies'. On the other hand, foreign firms that have already mastered the 
latest technology are on the doorstep, and modern management education is steadily 
infiltrating the management cadre. On the face of it, then, Chinese firms seem 
exceptionally well positioned to acquire the information and capability needed for 
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innovation. Yet, there is no evidence of Chinese finns widely succeeding in acquiring and 
improving indigenous technological capability in the way that many finns did in Japan in 
the 60s/70s and Korea early 90s (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3). Why not? What is going 
wrong? 
Reflections on industry policy and competitions rules are not sufficient to afford 
explanation to the general failure (see beginning of this chapter). The corporate 
governance and finance approach proposed by Tylecote et al has been successful in 
explaining successes and failures in the developed economies (Tylecote & Conesa, 1999; 
Tylecote & Ramirez, 2006; Tylecote & Visintin, 2008) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3 for 
detail of their theory). After being adapted to the context of developing economies, it also 
worked in the Chinese case (Tylecote & Cai, 2004; Cai & Tylecote, 2005, 2008). However, 
Cai & Tylecote's work mainly focused on the effects of ownership as a primary factor in 
shaping finns' technological capability development (see below). Our observations show 
that other elements certainly can be at least equally important and therefore demand 
investigation. Moreover, as with all new theoretical frameworks, Tylecote's theory also 
needs to be further tested, enriched and improved through empirical study. This will be the 
main theoretical contribution of this thesis. 
1.2 China's challenge in SOE reform 
It is commonly agreed that total privatisation is out of the question in China (see Chapter 3, 
section 3.1.1 for explanation), therefore argument of this thesis needs to be placed within 
the limited scope of SOB refonn - that is, to identify a mechanism that is both conductible 
for developing indigenous technological capability, and is acceptable by the Chinese 
political ideology. 
Although China's refonn and development in the past 30 years have been accompanied by 
quick rise of private sector and fast retreat of state-owned enterprises (see Chapter 3, 
section 3.1.1), the state has had cautious approach in the ownership refonn process 
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(historical review of ownership reform from 1949 to date is in Chapter 3, section 3.3.1). 
Whilst attitude towards the development of private sector has changed from suspicion and 
suppression to official approval, the Chinese government is determined to continue, and 
sometimes enhance the dominance of state ownership in sectors - mostly high-technology 
industries - that are key to the country's development and security (see Chapter 3, section 
3.1.1 for list of selected industries). Meanwhile, the state aims at restructuring SOEs by 
establishing a 'Modem Enterprise System (Xiandai Qiye Zhidu), in which corporate 
governance was the main focus. However, despite the effort to reform and enforce formal 
arrangements, some fundamental flaws in the governance of Chinese firm, especially of 
SOEs, remained, and these flaws have had an impact on firms' technological development 
(Tylecote et ai, 2010) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1 for SOE and corporate governance 
reform). Cai and Tylecote (2005; 2008) have made some progress in trying to identify the 
remedy. In their study in the Chinese telecommunications sector, they compared the firms' 
levels of technological capabilities among three different ownership types: majority state-
owned enterprises (MASOEs), minority state-owned enterprises (MISOEs), and private 
enterprises (POEs). They found that the new hybrid form - the MISOEs - combines 
advantages of both the state-owned and private firm, and has therefore out-performed 
other types of ownership. Their findings are relevant to the research aim of this thesis, and 
therefore become one of the key jumping off points of the present study. 
The situation of POEs in China is very different SOEs. Their corporate governance system, 
although flawed in other ways, tend to encourage strategies that may lead to the 
development of more dynamic capabilities (see also Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2 for their 
corporate governance). However, POEs suffer from an obvious problem that is rarely 
shared by SOEs - difficult access to finance, as well as land and other resources (Cai & 
Tylecote, 2005). Lack of funding too often prevents these private firms from technological 
learning, since return on this type of investment does not meet their need for immediate 
survival. 
To sum up, China's goal to develop dynamic technological capability needs to be pursued 
in conjunction with the construction of a 'modem, healthy CGFS system'. As such, in 
6 
Chapter 1.' Introduction 
many other NIEs, firms' technological capability development should also be reviewed 
with their CGFS in mind. This hence strengthened the practicality and validity of this 
thesis, as it aims to do just that. 
1.3 Scope of this research 
Technological capability can be studied from different levels - firm level, sector level and 
country level (Lall, 1990). The technological capability of countries ultimately depends on 
the technological capability of firms, and because firms are the core of any market 
economy, which China now is, predominantly. This research thus examines technological 
capability on a firm-by-firm basis. Semi-structured interview-based case studies will be 
first conducted to facilitate in-depth examination of individual instances to gain a 
sharpened understanding of the subject matter, and to shape testable hypotheses. 
Questionnaire survey will then be carried out to reach a wider population and draw more 
generalisable conclusions. Finally the survey data will be aggregated and analysed at the 
industry level, which is necessary for hypothesis testing and will improve the general 
applicability of the findings. (For details of how the two phases of empirical research 
address our research questions, see next section; for details of methodology and techniques 
adopted in this thesis, see Chapter 5). 
In this project the Chinese auto industry and electronics industry (broadly defined) have 
been selected for empirical research. Such selection is based on the special features in 
these two sectors: large, varied in ownership type, finance and corporate governance, and 
technological capability, and both top-priority sectors for government (NDRC, 2006). It is 
hoped that through the study of the two biggest and most important manufacturing 
industries, experiences and conclusions can spill over to at least other high-tech industries. 
More specifically, the possible difference among firms in finance and corporate 
governance and capability development pattern, and the mechanism at work would shed 
new light on the endeavour of Chinese firms to develop indigenous technological 
capability. 
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Our empirical work in the auto industry is limited to 'Companies that manufacture and 
distribute passenger cars, and suppliers of key parts and components, such as engines, 
tyres and bodies4, (according to National Bureau of Statistics' [NBS] classification). The 
choice of passenger car sector is because it is presumably the largest auto sector, and has 
the highest technology demand in all vehicle sectors, and is also the most interesting sector 
in terms of evolution (see Chapter 3, introduction of the Chinese auto industry [section 
3.4]). In the past 20 years the Chinese passenger car sector has had very controversial 
industrial policies and consequently staggered on the road to development (see also 
Chapter 3 section 3.4). It has thus become the state's determination as well as a nationalist 
ambition to build China's own-brand car with China's own intellectual property (IP). Since 
late 2004 the Chinese passenger car industry seemed to have achieved significant 
improvement. However the notion that the recent success is entirely due to a healthier 
development environment (the relaxed industrial policy) needs to be challenged; and in 
turn provides rich soil for empirical study. As for the auto parts sector, the reason for 
selection is straightforward: it is the up-stream sector of automobile industry. Although not 
necessary high-technology itself, it lends the researcher a unique lens to study China's 
medium- and medium-high technology sectors5 without deviating to an entirely different 
industry. More importantly, during the search for case study samples in the empirical work, 
high quality access was provided by a Chinese tyre company, which has proved 
instrumental in enhancing our insights. 
In this study the 'electronics industry' is defined according to the United Nation's 
'International Standard Industry Classification of all Economic Activities' (ISIC Rev. 3.1: 
http://unstats.un.orglunsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?CI= 17 &Lg= I ). It includes: 1) 
manufactures of office, accounting and computing machinery (sector 30); 2) low-voltage 
electrical machinery and apparatus (31), 3) radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus (32), 4) electronic domestic appliances (2930), and electronic general-
purpose appliances (2919). We checked the compatibility of such definition with the 
industrial classification of NBS, of which many aggregate data was used in our study. In 
4 Suppliers of electronic parts and components are categorised as electronics firms. 
5 The whole of automotive industry is classified as medium-high technology industry by the Chinese 
standard, see NBS' definition: www.stats.gov.cn/industrydefinition.htm (accessed in April 2006). 
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Chinese terms it refers to a two-digit industry codified 40 in the industrial classification, 
plus some consumer electronics industries, which are in the scope of 'household electronic 
appliances' industry (code 395) within the 'electric equipment and machinery' industry 
(code39). 
1.4 Research questions 
1.4.1 Aims 
This research aims to: 
1. From the perspective of corporate governance and finance, why have the majority 
of Chinese firms failed to develop technological capability that such that would 
enhance their competitiveness in medium and high technology industries; 
2. Explain how the minority succeeded and why there are not more of them. 
3. Identify elements of corporate governance and finance which influence firms' 
technological capability; and how these elements take effect. 
1.3.2 Research questions and objectives 
In order to achieve the above, four research questions with corresponding objectives are 
developed (see Table 1-1 below). In particular, case studies are used to develop in-depth 
answers to all of the research questions. Based on findings from the case studies, focuses 
on the elements of corporate governance are narrowed down to those most relevant to 
China's situation so that testable hypotheses can be developed for generalisation. It is then 
followed by questionnaire survey, through which hypotheses are tested to address 
Research Question 1 (measurement of technological capabilities in a systematic manner); 
Question 3 (corporate governance and finance of firms); and Question 4 (the effect of 
corporate governance and finance on technological capabilities). 
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Table 1-1 Research Questions and sub-questions 
Research Questiolls Sub-questiolls 
What is the situation of technological 
capabi lities developed in the finns in 
Chinese Auto and Electronics Industry? 
How has the development process of 
technological capabilities been? 
What is the situation of corporate 
• How is the dynamism of the finns' technological 
capabi lities?6 
• How is the initial technology acquired? 
• How have strategic decisions regarding technological 
capability development been reached? 
• How are the strategies managed and implemented? 
• According to the existing theoretical framework', how is 
governance and finance in the finns in stakeholder inclusion practised in the process of 
Chinese Auto and Electronics Industry? technological change? 
How can the capabilities developed be 
explained from the finance/corporate 
governance point of view? 
• How closely do shareholders engage with management? 
And how much expertise do they have regarding the 
technologies and markets relevant to the finn? 
• How much pressure do shareholders or their representatives 
exert for shareholder value, i.e. increased profit? (And do 
state shareholders exert pressure for other goals: for 
example technological change or against job losses?) 
• To what extent does ownership structure detennine 
corporate govemance? 
• To what extent does ownership structure detennine ease of 
access to finance for technological capability development? 
• To what extent can the situation of technological capability 
in a finn be explained by the finn's technological strategy / 
behaviour? 
6 For the definition of technological capability, see chapter 2, section 2.1 . The framework of technological 
capabilities used in this thesis is explained in chapter 4, section 4.1. Also, a summary of variables used in the 
quantitative stage of research can be found in chapter 8. 
7 For detailed explanation of the terms stakeholder inclusion, engagement, expertise and pressure for 
shareholder value and their relevance to technological capability development, see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2) 
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1.5 Significance and Contribution 
This study will potentially make the following four contributions: 
• Theoretically, it will add to the growing literature on management of technology in 
general, and on industry development in Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) 
in particular. Specifically, it will improve the theoretical framework of the effect of 
corporate governance and finance system (CGFS) on technological development. 
The association between CGFS and technological capabilities is an organic instead 
of mechanical one; however empirical studies in the past have not successfully 
explained the intricate effects and mechanism at work. Rather than establishing 
direct correlations between CGFS and the dependent variable - technological 
capabilities, this research aims to illustrate in detail, how different strategies and 
behaviour have influenced the firms' technological capability development; and 
how specific elements of corporate governance and finance have shaped these 
strategies and behaviour. Thus, it will achieve a much deepened understanding of 
the framework, and in the future will provide guidance for confident and skilled 
applications of such theories to other contexts. 
• Combined investigation of the China's two biggest and most important industries 
(auto and electronics) has rarely been done in the same piece of research before, 
except by Liang (2004). However his work (on foreign direct investment [FDI] and 
industrial development) had different focuses and theoretical stance. In such 
respect, this thesis will be the first of its kind, and will provide new and valuable 
insights into understanding of these two industries, and of other manufacturing 
industries in NIEs in future research. 
• By applying both qualitative and quantitative methods, this thesis will make 
contribution to the research methodology. Qualitative case study method is used to 
enhance the researcher's understanding of the subject matters, and to generate 
hypotheses; while quantitative questionnaire survey gathers data which is used to 
test the hypotheses, and improve applicability of the findings8• 
8 Although combined methods were also adopted before by Cai (2005), who sets out to consider a number of 
external factors that are possible determinants of technological development in the Chinese context. The 
importance of the role of CGFS then emerged at a later stage of her analysis - whereas this research, after 
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• This thesis will also propose a conceptual framework to measure technological 
capabilities. By adopting the 'dynamic capability' approach, this research will 
measure the degree of 'dynamism' in the firms' capabilities, and therefore will 
develop a generally applicable framework for measuring capabilities in 
manufacturing sectors. In addition to measuring the capabilities of firms, this 
research will also measure the innovative performance of firms to gain a 
triangulated insight into the subject matters. 
For companies, this study will again provide them with a greater understanding of how 
finance and governance have impact on, and even determine their strategic decisions 
regarding technology development and how these decisions can shape the development 
patterns of their technological capabilities. Last but not least, this research will contribute 
to the policy debate, particularly in China and other NIEs, on how best the institutional 
arrangements and practices can foster technical change and what should be done about the 
corporate governance and financial system. 
1.6 Structure of this thesis 
This thesis is organised in the following way (see also Figure 1-2): 
Chapter 2 reviews the most relevant prior studies on technological capability. The main 
issues discussed in this chapter are the definition of technological capabilities, frameworks 
of technological capabilities and streams of literature about technological capability 
upgrading in emerging economies. Specifically, it links the array of literature on 
technological development in developing countries to those on influences of CGFS on 
technological capability. Chapter 3 describes the Chinese automotive and electronics 
industry in the context of China's transition. This chapter starts with a review of the 
general characteristics of China's economic growth and its national system of innovation. 
drawing on her findings and arguments in other literature, will put the analysis of CGFS at centre stage. 
Therefore analysis of data (qualitative and quantitative) is much more focused and detailed. 
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Issues directly related to this research are also closely examined - the corporate 
governance and finance of Chinese SOEs and POEs. Finally it gives background 
information about the Chinese automotive and electronics industries where empirical work 
is conducted. Chapter 4 explains the framework of measuring technological capability in 
this thesis, and how theories about corporate governance/finance and technological 
capability (from Chapter 2) can be adapted to the Chinese reality (from Chapter 3), and 
generates 3 propositions for the empirical study. Chapter 5 describes research 
methodologies used in this study. The philosophical perspectives of positive, interpretivist 
and relativist approaches are first discussed, followed by the description of the methods of 
data collection and analysis. Chapter 6 discusses findings from the qualitative phase of the 
empirical research in the auto and electronics sectors (interview-based case studies), where 
the existing theory is enriched, and new theories start to emerge. 7 hypotheses are 
generated from those findings. Chapter 7 and 8 present findings from the quantitative 
phase of the empirical studies: the evaluation of corporate governance and finance of 
Chinese electronics firms, and their technological capabilities. Hypotheses are also tested 
to check the applicability and vigour of new theories developed in the qualitative study. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis, which includes the overall findings, policy implications, 
contributions and limitations of this study. 
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Chapter 2 Prior Studies in Technological Capability 
Development 
This chapter provides a review of literature on the subject of technological capability 
development, especially in NIBs. The main issues discussed in section 1 are the 
definition of technological capabilities and frameworks of technological capabilities, 
i.e. how is technological capability categorised and benchmarked. Section 2 examines 
what the existing literature would tell us about technological capability development 
for firms in NIBs and how the existing literature would contribute to the understanding 
of the questions studied in this thesis. Three streams of literature are reviewed: 1) 
technological trajectory, 2) learning process, and 3) national system of innovation. 
Section 3 is dedicated to the relatively new theory of corporate governance, finance and 
technological development, which is particularly understudied in the NIE context. 
After defining the system of corporate governance and finance, dimensions of 
technological regimes and their demand for corporate governance/ finance systems are 
examined. Since most empirical applications of such theory are undertaken in 
developed countries, where there are very different technological regimes and agendas 
of innovation than in most NIEs, the theory needs to be adapted to fit the Chinese 
context. This will be done in Chapter 4 after China's reality is examined in Chapter 3. 
In order to proceed to study technological capability, the concept of technology used in 
this thesis needs to be clarified and specified. The broad definition of technology can 
be in general terms as 'skills, knowledge and procedures for making, using and doing 
useful things' (Merrill, 1971, p. 15). In the thesis a more comprehensive understanding 
of technology has been reached which encompasses at least four components: physical 
artefacts, information, people-embodied knowledge and organisational knowledge 
(Hall & Johnson, 1970; Dahlman & Westphal, 1981; Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Orlikowski & Robey, 1991).9 
9 Physical artefacts: such as material, products, machinery, equipment, facilities etc. this component was 
once regarded as the most important part of the technology, since the intangible part of the technology 
had not been recognised by then. 
Information: such as specification, document, instruction, manual, etc. it refers to all kinds of knowledge 
embedded either in physical equipment or a series of processes which transform inputs into outputs (Hall 
& Johnson, 1970). Dahlman and Westphal (1981) described this type of information as underlying 
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Prior to the 1950s, microeconomic analysis of orthodox neoclassical economIcs 
assumed that technologies were exogenous factors and were readily available for 
public use. When considering generating technology, firms compared the cost of the 
technology with its expected returns; and decisions were mostly influenced by price 
factors. Once purchased it was assumed that firms would naturally master those 
technology acquired (UNCTAD, 1996). 
From 1950s, different schools of economics have diverged from the mainstream of 
neoclassical economics. 'Institutional economics' has recognised the important role 
played by institutions in the process of technological change (Hodgson, 1994). 
'Structuralism' has proposed the idea that technology does not occur in isolation, but 
instead occur in relation to other phenomena which are as a whole defined by structure 
(UNCT AD, 1996). During the late 1960s and 1970s, the 'development school' or 
'evolutionary school' began to treat technology as an endogenous factor and analysed 
technological changes within a political economy context (UNCT AD, 1996). However 
the main focus was on the developed countries. Developing countries had been taken 
as merely passive importers of technology: ' ... in the highly simplified models ... there is 
no problem in assimilating the transferred technology; there is no adaptation required; 
all firms remain equally efficient; firm-specific learning or technical efforts are 
unnecessary and irrelevant ... ' (Nelson 1987 cited in Lall 1992). 
From the late 1970s a number of studies started to emphasise strongly the success of 
the Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) on the development of indigenous 
technological capabilities. Many firms in developing countries are able to undergo 
major technological transformations, from imitator to innovator. They did it by making 
incremental, continuous improvements that adapt new technologies to meet specific 
physical artefacts and giving expression in the technology. This component gives a new meaning to 
technology transfer and adaptation. 
People-embodied knowledge: people play an extremely important role in technology. Their levels of 
education and technological skills, and their attitudes towards work (such as persistence, diligence, 
creativity etc.) will largely determine their ability to utilise, modify or improve the existing technologies. 
Organisational knowledge: Nelson and Winter (1982) described organisational knowledge as routines. 
Routines are those norms, regulations and cultures by which organisations carry out day-t-day 
management and production-associated activities. Organisational routines decide what types of 
knowledge are legitimate, what kinds of problem-solving methods or tools are used in the creation of 
new knowledge, or what stocks of knowledge humans draw upon to interpret behaviour and evens 
(Orlikowski & Robey, 1991). Therefore much of the knowledge that underlies routine behaviour is what 
might be considered as the 'tacit' knowledge of the organisation, not consciously known or articulated by 
anyone in particular. 
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demands (Dosi, 1988; Bell and Pavitt, 1993 b; 1995). Incremental changes at the firm 
level can generate technological capabilities, and the appropriate macro environment 
(regulation system, financial system, industrial policies etc) could help to expedite the 
speed of firms' technological accumulation (Lundvall and Ernst, 2000; Costa, 2001). 
Technological capabilities could also vary widely among firms even in the same 
industry under the same circumstance. This is because the effort made to learn new 
technologies strongly influences the effectiveness with which technologies are 
assimilated, diffused, and improved. 
What are then technological capabilities? 
2.1 Technological capability 
2.1.1 The definition of technological capability, dynamic capability, 
and innovation 
1) Technological capability 
Technological capabilities are the major determinant of industrial competitiveness and 
also the main source of innovation (aECD 1996; Schacht 1997; Kim 1997, 1999). 
Study of technological capability in an industry of nation must start from firm level. 
This is because that firms' are the main locus of technological change in any market 
economy (Cooper, 1992), and are at the centre of a nation's technological capabilities 
development. Depending on the aims of the research, definition of technological 
capability varies in perspective. Lall (1990, p.17) defines technological capability (TC) 
broadly as 'the entire complex of human skills (entrepreneurial, managerial and 
technical) needed to set up and operate industries efficiently over time'. Westphal et al. 
(1985) and Kim (1997) define the term from the aspect of corporate development. 
According to them, technological capability refers to the ability to effectively use 
technological knowledge to achieve assimilation, use, adaptation, and change of 
existing technologies. Probably more importantly, it enables one to develop new 
products and processes an to create new technologies to survive and compete in a 
changing environment (Westphal et al., 1985; Kim, 1997). Based on East Asian studies, 
several scholars recognized the fact that for the bulk of the developing countries: 'it is 
17 
Chapter 2: Prior Studies in Technological Capability Development 
the ability to efficiently absorb, use and adapt technologies that matters' (Lall, 2001 ,po 
1501). In the thesis we therefore use the concept of technological capability as below: 
Technological capability refers to the capability of a firm to identify. acquire, 
assimilate. adapt and make effective use of technical knowledge and skills, and then to 
generate new knowledge and skills. We further distinguish between static capability -
capability to make effective use of technological knowledge and skills - and dynamic 
technological capability - the rest of the capabilities set above. i.e. identify. acquire. 
assimilate. adapt. and then to generate new knowledge and skills. 
It is a broad consensus that 'dynamic capabilities' contrast with 'static (or ordinary) 
capabilities' by being concerned with change (Winter, 2003). It is also argued that 
dynamic capabilities are to some degree needed for innovation, at least at the firm level 
(Collis, 1990; Bell & Pavitt, 1993a). As it is at the very centre of this thesis, the 
concept of dynamic capability will be clarified below. We will then review the notion 
of innovation, and how innovation is associated with dynamic capabilities. 
2) Dynamic capability 
Innovation depends heavily on dynamic capability, in other words, moving quickly to 
sophisticated levels of capability (Bell & Pavitt, 1995). The most cited definition of 
dynamic capability is by Teece, Pisano, & Shuen (1997), which is quite similar to ours 
(see above) - the firm's ability to 'appropriately adapt, integrate, build, and reconfigure 
internal and external skills and functional competences toward changing environment' 
(Teece et a/., 1997, p.515). Pisano (1994) and Grant (1996) address dynamic capability 
from a resource-based viewpoint, they emphasize the nature of dynamic capabilities as 
the organisational and strategic routines by which managers alter their resource base 
to generate new value-creating strategies, and this can be done through processes such 
as resources acquisition, integration and recombination 
Pisano and Grant are not alone in founding the concept of dynamic capability on the 
broader concept of routines. Nelson and Winter's work in 1982 is among the pioneering 
efforts, where they define 'routine' as behaviour that is ' .. .learned, highly patterned. 
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repetitious, or quasi-repetitious, founded in part in tacit knowledge' (p. 12). Their 
definition therefore excludes the phenomenon of brilliant improvisation, or 'general-
purpose routines' (Winter, 2000, p. 991) The exclusion of the latter becomes 
particularly evident when Winter and colleagues define dynamic capabilities not as 
routines per se, but as ' ... collective activity through which the organisation 
systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved 
effectiveness.' (Zollo & Winter, 2002, p.340; italics added). Clearly, distinction needs 
to be made between those routines that are repositories of dynamic capabilities 
(organisational and strategic routines, as Pisano and Grant's define it), and those that 
are not. The second type of routine (operating routine, by Winter et al. 's definition) 
involves the execution of known procedures for the purpose of ensuring smooth 
operation for current revenue and profit!o. It can be brought about by dynamic 
capabilities, as argued by Zollo and Winter, or in some cases be physically transferred 
in through purchase of capital goods (Bell & Pavitt, 1993b). In contrast, the first type 
of routine seeks to generate desirable changes in the existing operating routines to 
enhance effectiveness in the future!!. In other words, routines that encapsulate dynamic 
capabilities do not just preserve the past, but also pave the way for deliberate learning 
within the firm, hence shaping the firm's future development (Dosi et al., 2000; 
Bottazzi et al., 2002; Zollo & Winter, 2002; Winter, 2000; 2004). 
We incorporate this view in our discussion here; in addition, we use the terms dynamic 
and static routines, to indicate their corresponding relationship with dynamic and static 
capabilities. Dynamic capabilities can be therefore be understood as learned pattern of 
collective activities embedded in dynamic routines, through which they govern the rate 
of change of static routines, when the latter manifests the finn's static capabilities. This 
clarification of terminology is necessary, particularly for developing countries, where 
gaps of static routines among firms - although more significant in these countries than 
ditto developed countries - do not necessarily reflect the difference in dynamic 
capabilities. It is already noted that firms with state-of-the-art operating routines do not 
necessarily possess capabilities that are more dynamic than their smaller, less 
glamorous competitors (see the cases of SAIC and Chery in Chapter 6; see also Liu & 
10 Examples include manufacturing routine, shipping of the ordered goods, and receipt of corresponding 
~ayment, etc 
I Examples include knowledge creation routines whereby managers and others build new thinking 
within the firm, product development routine, alliance and acquisition routines, etc. 
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Tylecote, 2009). The distinction of static routine/capability and dynamic 
routine/capability will thus enable us to identify firms' true levels of static/dynamic 
capabilities according to their types of routines. 
There are two more issues that need to be addressed regarding dynamic capabilities. 
First, as mentioned above, dynamic capabilities are a combination of highly patterned, 
structured vehicles of change12• Just as cars have different engine sizes and purposes, 
dynamic capabilities differ amongst each other by the rate of change they govern and 
the type of functions. Examples of such typology in past research are: Investment 
Capability by Lall (1992), Strategic Capability by Arnold and Thuriaus (1997); 
Alliance and Acquisition Capability by Zollo and Singh (1998); and Product 
Development Capability by Winter (2003) (for details about their frameworks see 
section 2.1.2). On the other hand, while these capabilities may be distinctively different 
in details, they do share common features that can be associated with effective 
processes across firms (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Again, just like driving cars, there 
are more and less effective ways to execute particular dynamic capabilities. Therefore, 
for most firms, the competitive advantage does not only lie in a single type of dynamic 
capability, nor is it a matter of whether these firms have or have not dynamic 
capabilities, but how 'effective' (quoting Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) their portfolio of 
dynamic capabilities are. 
Based on the above argument, study of dynamic capability development at firm level 
should reflect knowledge of its key characteristics. In particular, assessment of 
dynamic capabilities should be oriented towards measuring 'dynamism' (effectiveness) 
of dynamic capabilities, and incorporate a combination of routines. 
12 It is quite possible to change without having a dynamic capability. For example. Winter (2003) 
mentioned 'Ad hoc problem-solving' behaviour under ftre-ftghting circumstances which may also bring 
about change. It however is not routine, neither is it dynamic capability. However this is beyond the 
scope of our research in this thesis. 
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3) Innovation 
Innovation is widely believed to be a major driving force of modem capitalism and 
growth (Nelson & Nelson, 2002). In the 1930s Joseph Schumpeter defined five types 
of innovation, and is often regarded as the first modem economist to draw attention to 
the importance of innovation (Rogers, 1998): 
• 'Introduction of a new product or a qualitative change in an existing product 
• Process innovation new to an industry 
• The opening of a new market 
• Development of new sources of supply for raw materials or other inputs 
• Change in industrial organisation' (OECD, 1997, p. 28) 
Schumpeter's definition reveals the complex nature of innovation. It varies enormously 
by industry (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Pavitt, 1998), by degree of novelty and cost 
(whether it is new to the firm, new to the country or new to the world) (OECD, 1996), 
by technology (Dosi, 1982) and by type (product, process, organisational, system, 
Freeman, 1992). There have been some attempts to distinguish different types of 
innovations. For example, Freeman (1971) ranks innovations on a five-point scale from 
'systemic' to 'major', 'minor', 'incremental' and 'unrecorded'. Many authors make a two-
fold distinction between 'radical' (or 'major') innovations and 'incremental' (or 'minor') 
(e.g. Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Stobaugh, 1988). Taxonomy of innovations is difficult, 
but nevertheless important. Since different types of innovation not only have very 
different consequences for the economy and the firms which make them, but also 
embody a very different mix of knowledge and skill (Utterback, 1993). Moreover, to a 
significant extent the properties of innovation processes vary across countries and 
specific to technologies or industrial sectors (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). 
For NIEs, although one does not rule out the possibility of cutting-edge technologies or 
'state-of-the-art' products being created, systemic or major innovation is still not a 
central issue to these countries. For the bulk of developing countries, innovations that 
are most relevant are innovations that are new to the firm, to the region, or to the 
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country. Consequently, dynamic capabilities that are required, are those that enable 
them to achieve these goals. 
To sum up, there is a hierarchy of technological capabilities - there are capabilities that 
can operate existing technology (static capability), and capabilities that can generate 
minor and major technical change (dynamic capability). Dynamic technological 
capability is normally needed for innovation 13. It is complex, structured and 
multidimensional. It is sticky - hard to change in short-term (static capability on the 
other hand, could be enhanced rather quickly, through acquisition of state-of-the-art 
equipments, for example). However dynamic capability is also fluid - the dynamism of 
technological capability - the ability of the capability to generate change, to enhance 
competitiveness in response to the competitive environment, changes over time 
(Winter, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Dynamic capabilities can be categorised 
according to their functions (Lall, 1992), and firms' competitive advantage may rest in 
a combination of dynamic capabilities, and their innovation performance is influenced 
by how effective these capabilities are executed. Finally, dynamic capability in NIBs 
that are required, are those that enable them to achieve innovations that are relevant to 
NIBs. 
\3 In some rare circumstances, fIrms with very limited dynamic capabilities may still be able to innovate 
through total reliance on infusion of technology. However this is beyond our scope of discussion here. 
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2.1.2 Measurement of technological capabilities 
The section above theorises technological capability, especially dynamic capability. 
This section expands the topic on an empirical stance. In this thesis, technological 
capability is studied as an outcome of combined detenninants: 1) institutional 
environment (especially corporate governance and finance), 2) strategic decision and 
technological activities (technological choices and endeavour). As such, technological 
capabilities cannot be rigorously studied in an industry or country if it is not 
taxonomized. Taxonomy of corporate technological capability can vary depending on 
the research purpose, and one of the usual approaches is to place technological 
capabilities in functional categories (Bell & Albu, 1999). Drawing upon Fransman 
(1986), Dahlman et at (1987) and Lall (1987). Lall (1992) categorizes technological 
capabilities according to the kind of activities which they facilitate: investment 
technological capability, production technological capability, and linkage technological 
capability (see Table 2-1). 
In Lall's framework, Investment Capabilities contain skills necessary for identifying, 
obtaining technology for design, construction and commission of new products/ 
facilities (Lall, 1992). Investment capabilities have two elements: pre-investment and 
project execution. Under each element there are sub-elements to measure those ranging 
from routine to innovative activities. 
Production Capabilities decide the productivity of labour and capital as well as 
efficiency in material and energy used. They have three elements: process engineering, 
product engineering and industrial engineering. Process engineering includes necessary 
activities from production. Product engineering are those necessary for production or 
improving product specifications, such as assimilation of product design, improvement 
in product quality, and basic research. Industrial engineering involves monitoring and 
control functions for process and product engineering. 
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Linkages within the economy involve abilities to organize procurement of goods and 
services, knowledge and technology transfer with suppliers and S&T links with 
research institutes, universities and other organizations. 
Lall recognized that for most functions, capability may range from doing simple 
activities to intermediary duplicative, and then to advanced innovative activities (Bell 
& Albu, 1999). Therefore he also vertically categorized the capabilities into three 
levels, basic, intermediary and advanced. 
Lall's framework allows benchmarking of technological capabilities in a progressive 
and categorized manner. However, there are some inadequacies in Lall's matrix. The 
elements included in his framework are only designed to measure intangible 
technological capabilities e.g. skills, experiences. There are tangible elements of 
technological capabilities such as plant and equipment etc that need to be taken into 
consideration. In addition, some elements are not compatible with the definition of 
functions. For example, I) training and recruitment of skilled personnel are not only 
required by project execution, but by all kinds of capabilities; basic process and 
equipment design are process rather than investment capabilities. 2) As Cai (2005) 
points out, debugging equipment or process problems sometimes involves highly 
skilled capability of design or research. Therefore not all trouble-shooting activities are 
routine or basic. Likewise, assimilation of process technology can vary along a wide 
range of abilities. 
In Lall's framework, firms' linkages only covered external ones, such as with suppliers 
and S&T links. In fact internal contacts between or among firms' departments (R&D 
department with production department or with marketing department) are good 
indicators of their linkage capability. More importantly, a firm's linkage, or networking 
activities, should not be seen purely as a type of technological capability but also a 
mediating factor - as it affects the quality and speed of information and knowledge 
flow, which is key to the development of other technological capabilities (Freeman, 
1987; Lundvall, 1992, p.l4; Ariffin & Bell, 1999). Therefore treatment of 
linkage/networking activates should reflect awareness of their mediating effects. For 
such reason, in this study necessary distinctions are made between firm's internal and 
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external (organisational) capabilities and their linkage/networking activities (see 
Chapter 4, section 4.1). 
Despite the imperfections, LaB's framework does highlight the process of capability 
generation (from basic to more advanced capabilities) and functions: investment, 
production and linkages) of firms' operation activities. His classification also makes it 
possible to further breakdown individual capability, and distinguish basic or routine 
capabilities from more advanced or more dynamic innovative capabilities. As a result, 
in this thesis the framework of technological capability will follow the basic notion of 
classification of LaB's, i.e. according to function and degree of efficiency. 
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Table 2-1 Illustrative matrix of technological capabilities by Lall (1992) 
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Arnold and Thuriaus (1997) in their technological capability model defined three types of 
capabilities: Strategic, Internal and External (see Figure 2-1). 
Strategic Clpabilities 
• Search for market opportunities 
• Understand and manage the fit beh-veen the finn's capabilities 
and market needs 
t t 
Internal Capabilities External Capabilities (Networking) 
Manage tangible technology base Access external knowledge 
• Products • Science 
• R&D facilities • Tec1Ulo\ogy, tec1uLiques 
• Appropriate plant and equipment • Artifacts, practices 
• Know-how, tacit knowledge 
Develop and manage appropriate • Information resources 
intangible resources 
• Codified intellectual capital .. Manage producer/user relations 
• Qualification and skills profile 
adapted to the needs of the firm Access partners with needed 
• Tacit knowledge complementary assets 
• Complementary knowledge 
Create needed organisation • Complementary production 
• T edUlology management • Complementary supply-chain role 
capabilities 
• Change-management capabilities 
• Coordination among internal 
, owners' of capabilities 
Source: Arnold and Thuriaus (1997) 
The strategic capabilities provide the control mechanism with which firms manage its 
capabilities and exploit them via the market. The internal capabilities consist of three sub-
capabilities: capabilities to manage tangible technology base, intangible resources and to 
create needed organization. The external capabilities concern the relationship between the 
firm and its outside resources. 
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One of the Arnold and Thuriaus (A&T) model's contribution is that it recognizes both 
tangible and intangible capabilities. It also recognizes the importance of Organizational 
Capabilities in firms' technological capability generation. OECD (1992, p.262) stresses 
that the notion of technological capability' .. . goes well beyond engineering and technical 
know-how to include knowledge of organizational structures and procedures as much as 
knowledge of behavioural patterns, e.g. of workers and customers. Firms need certain 
complementary assets and capabilities in order to create, mobilize and improve their 
technological capabilities, among which may be noted organizational flexibility, finance, 
quality of human resources, sophistication of the support services and of the information 
management and coordination capabilities.' Therefore organizational capability is also 
incorporated by this study (see Chapter 4, section 4.1.1). 
However A&T's model does not address the issue of levels of complexity and dynamism 
of technological capabilities. Thus, without showing a progressive perspective of 
capability development, the usefulness of the model is largely limited, as it tends to 
measure capabilities as sporadic points in time. 
Drawing upon Lall's classification and Bell and Pavitt's (1995) framework, in their 
research into the Brazilian and Malaysian steel and electronics industries, Ariffin and 
Figueiredo (2001; 2004) (A&F) developed a relatively fine taxonomy of technological 
capability (Table 2-2). 
Their framework sets apart 'routine' production capability and 'innovative' production 
capability. 'Routine' production capability is the capability to produce goods at a certain 
levels of input requirements and efficiency; it may be seen as technology-using skills, or 
those to achieve organisational arrangements and knowledge. 'Innovative' technological 
capability is described as the capability to 'improve, change or create products, processes 
and production organisation, or equipment' (p. 561). Therefore it may also be regarded as 
capability to generate change. Different levels, or 'depths', are attributed to innovative 
capability, which can vary from fairly 'basic' levels to 'intermediate' levels and then to 
more 'advanced' and 'research-based' levels (Arnold and Thuriaus, 200 I). 
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A & F's framework provides a perspective and link to total technological activity 
particularly in the steel industries in developing countries. As a result, some elements used 
in their research are also adopted for this project. However, since the objects of 
investigation in this research range through a wider spectrum of scales and technology 
types than A & F's (from high-tech telecommunication equipment to medium-tech 
electronic components and parts, for example), it is not appropriate to measure firms' 
capabilities with unanimous benchmarking activities. As a result, the framework used in 
this research adopted a less activity-specific approach, but a more strategy-oriented one 
(again, for details see chapter 4, section 4.2). 
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Table 2-2 Selected elements from Ariffin and Fi2ueiredo's capability framework 
Types of 
capability 
Process and Levels f Project 
capabilit Management Equipment Production Product management 
Routine 
Basic operation Construction of Basic maintenance SKD (semi-knocked Routine QC to 
Levell basic civil works; down): parts assembly, maintain basic 
Purchase equipment only final assembly. standards 
Recruitment Production planning 
and control. 
Basic operation Simple customizing Routine Process flow, line Replication of 
Level 2 of existing systems maintenance balancing. fixed 
Total preventative CKD (complete speci fications 
maintenance knocked down): 
complete assembly 
Innovative 
Basic innovative Systems Repair & trouble- layout & debugging to cost-effective, 
capability integration. shooting equipment optimise production incremental 
Level 3 Providing problems. ISO quality control product 
customised system, MRP or JlT development for 
software solutions systems local or 
different 
markets 
Intermediate Software Develop automated Automation of Own product 
innovative development. equipment. processes, Flexible & design for local 
capability Project multi-skilled production or regional 
Level 4 management of markets. 
large-scale 
investment projects 
Advanced Projects R&D for Radical innovation in Upgraded to 
Innovative management on a specifications and organisation . regional or 
capability global scale. designs of complex In-depth Failure worldwide 
LevelS Recognised training automated Analysis. Design Centres 
& service centres to equipment or Patents. or world 
TNC Group, production system product 
customers or mandates. 
suppliers. 
Source: Anffin and Figueiredo (2001; 2004) 
The array of empirical research discussed above and many others (Dahlman et ai, 1987; 
Lall, 1994; Panda & Ramanathan, 1996; Aw & Batra, 1998; Archihugi & Coco, 2005) 
have been reviewed and synthesized to form the measurement framework for the current 
research. Moreover, it is noticed that the above-mentioned also shared a common flaw: 
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while concentrating on the process of the firms' technological activities, they ignored the 
importance of performance measurement - The ultimate purpose of technological 
capability development as a process is to serve the end of developing unique or superior 
advantages; and such advantage is best manifested by the firm's product (in the 
manufacturing sector) competitiveness. Chiesa et al.(1996) use a combination of two 
methods to measure both the process and the performance of innovation capability. The 
process is measured by focusing on the processes through which innovations are achieved. 
Performance is measured by looking at the effectiveness of the processes, with a focus on 
their impact on firms' competitiveness. Similar to Chiesa's approach, this study performs 
a complementary triangulation of capabilities, by measuring firms' technology-related 
performances (sales growth, innovative performance and product competitiveness). The 
details are elaborated in Chapter 4. 
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2.2 Development of corporate technological capability in HIEs -
conceptual and theoretical building blocks 
This section critically reviews three analytical frameworks that have been used to examine 
the process of corporate technological capability development in the NIB context -
technological trajectory, learning process, and national system of innovation. In spite of 
their limitations which are discussed below, these frameworks helped to form the 
theoretical underpinning of this thesis. 
2.2.1 NIEls three-stage technological trajectory theory 
It is argued in a wide range of research that developing countries take the opposite 
technological direction from advanced countries, moving from mature technology, through 
intermediate technology, to emerging technology (Kim, 1980; Westphal et al., 1985; Lee 
& Bae, 1988; Lall, 1990; 1993; OECD, 1997; Hobday, 1995; Kumar et al., 1999; 2002) 
1. Domestic companies in NIBs acquire mature technology from multinational 
companies (duplicative imitation); 
2. Then they absorb the transferred technology, make effective use of it, adapt it 
and modify, and possibly making incremental improvement to it (creative 
imitation); 
3. They eventually develop their own technology (innovation). 
By using his three-stage model (1980), Kim describes the TC development process and 
analyzes the process of building technological capability in emerging countries (1997). 
Figure 2-2 illustrates Kim's theory on technological development trajectories in both 
developed and NIBs. 
According to Kim's theory, during the early stage of their Te upgrading, companies in 
NIBs acquire product design and production technologies from overseas. Production at this 
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stage was mainly concerned with assembly operation of imported components and parts, 
and the technological focus by the firm was essentially to realise mastery of a production 
operation. Due to the lack of both technological capability and market incentives, there is 
hardly any indigenous attempt of technological change in products and processes. 
As some firms manage to implement transferred design and production technologies from 
abroad, diffusion of technical know-how quickly take place within the country, resulting in 
higher number of firms competing in the same market. Accumulated experience in product 
design and production accumulates then provides a basis for limited indigenous efforts for 
the assimilation of foreign technologies. 
Finally, a combined force of: 1) assimilated foreign technology; 2) higher competency of 
local scientific and engineering personnel together with 3) increased market competition; -
would lead to gradual improvement of foreign technology. Product improvement and 
productivity enhancement based on indigenous efforts became more central to competition, 
leading to a relatively more integrated and developed production system. If they succeed in 
improving technology, some companies may even eventually develop the technological 
capabilities to generate the emerging technologies independently, and compete with 
companies in advanced countries on leading-edge innovation (Kim, 1980; 1997). 
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Figure 2-2 Kim's theory on technological trajectories in developed and catching-up countries 
Source: Kim, L. (J 997), p.89 
Kim's trajectory theory clarifies the essential differences of technological development and 
innovation between developed and developing countries. It also offers a plausible 
explanation of the victorious cases: the rapid growth of dynamic technological capability 
in industries such as automobile and electronics industries in Japan after World War II and 
in Korean and Taiwan since the 1960s. However, we shall argue that Kim's model over-
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simplifies the process of technology acquisition / technology transfer in the NIBs. It fails 
to illustrate the differences among countries and finns in the process of technological 
acquisition/learning; in tum it does not explain why only few companies in other emerging 
countries, such as in Brazil, Indonesia, Thailand, South Africa and China, reached the 
stage of dynamic technological capability (Dahlman et al., 1987; Kumar et al., 1999; 
Ariffin & Figueiredo, 2001; Cai, 2005 ). 
2.2.2 The learning process framework 
The learning process framework compensates the conventional three-stage model of 
technological capability development in finns from NIEs by understanding the process of 
technological learning. Technological capability is acquired through technological learning, 
which is a process in which the finn acquires, creates and diffuse new skills and 
knowledge (Hobday, 1995; Kim & Nelson, 2000). Learning in the fonn of fonnal 
education and searching through research and development (R&D) is widely accepted to 
bring about much technological capability development and innovation. However, in many 
cases technological capability development is based on various kinds oflearning processes, 
which evolve around ordinary economic activities (Edquist, 1997, italics added). Learning 
process often involve many different parties, such as daily routines of engineers, sales 
representatives, and other employees, which matter a lot. In the words of Lundvall: 
'Such activities involve learning-by-doing, increaSing the efficiency of production operations 
(Arrow, 1962), learning-by-using, increasing the efficiency of complex systems (Rosenberg, 
1982), and learning-by-interacting, involving users and producers in an interaction resulting in 
product innovations (Lundvall, 1988)'. (Lundvall, 1992, p.9) 
To learn effectively, a finn has to have absorptive capacity, and for that it needs an 
existing knowledge base and sufficient effort (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 1997). The 
processes of learning start from and are influenced by its existing knowledge base. Finns 
can increase their ability to understand, assimilate and use new knowledge by increasing 
their existing knowledge base (Kim, 1999). In developing countries, knowledge base can 
be increased through technology transfer from advanced countries, or through hiring 
personnel who already possess the knowledge (Bell & Albu, 1999). However, as argued in 
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the technological learning literature it is nearly impossible for the firms to enhance their 
knowledge base without exerting effort to internalize the relevant external knowledge 
(Kim, 1999) 
Firm-level effort ofleaming can have two dimensions for analysis: according to its level of 
visibility (Tylecote & Conesa, 1999; Cai & Tylecote, 2008; Tylecote & Visintin, 2008; Liu 
& Tylecote, 2009) and according to its degree of activeness (Viotti, 1997; 2001) 14. Formal, 
explicit efforts such as in-house R&D, formal training or systematic experimentation have 
high visibility to anyone not involved in the process of learning; and the informal, semi-
explicit or implicit efforts such as observation of routine production, repair, maintenance 
or reconditioning of equipment, are much less visible. Efforts of higher visibility are 
normally well documented and recorded, and can be relatively easily accredited for the 
success of a firm's technological development. Whereas efforts of low visibility is much 
harder to track and understand, especially by those not closely attached to the process and 
the organization. Such distinctions have significant implications and challenges for the 
corporate governance and finance system, which will be dwelled on now and revisited in 
detail in section 2.3.2. 
The second dimension to analyse learning efforts by its activeness is widely adopted by 
scholars such as Amsden (1989), Bell and Pavitt (1993a, 1995), Viotti (1997) and Freeman 
(2002). Through empirical study of South Korea and Brazil, Viotti (1997; 2001) makes a 
distinction between active learning systems and passive learning systems. According to his 
definition, active learning strategy aims at mastering production capability and the 
capability to improve, whereas passive learning strategy is essentially aimed at the simple 
absorption of production capability (Viotti, 2002). 
The above two dimensions of analysis can be integrated, as shown in the graph shown as 
Figure 2-3. As it indicates, technological learning activities can be located at any point on 
the two-dimensional graph, ranging from high-visibility and active, to low-visibility and 
14 Finns can also learn through external technological activities, such as interaction with the outside world 
or deliberate exchange of information and knowledge, etc (Bell & Albu, 1999). Such interactive methods ~f 
learning demands a system approach of analysis, such as system of innovation .. See 2.2.33. 
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passive. Caution has to be taken when one classifies these efforts - it is important to 
recognize the complexity and context-specific nature of such learning mechanisms. For 
example, a passive form of learning strategy may be accompanied by an active endeavour 
to master the technology (though it cannot be assumed to be widespread), therefore 
becoming the initial stage of a generally active learning processJ5• Therefore examples of 
learning efforts illustrated in Figure 2-3, such as reverse engineering and formal training, 
can themselves range across deferent degrees of activeness. On the other hand, the 
suitability of a learning strategy does not necessarily depend on the level of its visibility; 
rather, it depends on the nature of the technology regime the firm operates in, i.e. the 
learning and knowledge environment faced at a given time by firms in a particular sector 
or sub-sector (Nelson & Winter, 1982). (See explanation in section 2.3 and Chapter 4 for 
an illustration of Chinese electronics and auto industry). 
IS This seems to be the case, for instance, of some large Korean conglomerates that deliberately utilized 
OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) agreements as just an initial step in an aggressive and active 
pathway towards technological learning, as described in Amsden (1989) and Viotti (200 I). 
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Figure 2-3Technologicallearning framework - the integrated Model 
Active 
Source: Own formulation with some examples drawn from Viotti (1997); Bell and Albu (1999) 
The learning process approach helps to explain the general failure of most NIEs in 
developing dynamic technological capabilities - that 'active learning ' (as Viotti defines it) 
could not be regarded as a natural common feature of firms from these countries (Cooper, 
1992, p.IS): 'The failure of learning processes in developing countries is in fact quite 
common. It is reflected in what is often called a 'black-box' approach to production 
technology encountered quite often in developing country firms which receive technology 
via license agreements: firms may be unconcerned about how the technology works, 
provided only that they are able to produce with it'. Freeman (2002) believes that an active 
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learning strategy proposed by Viottie, Bell and Albu may lie at the centre of a late-corner's 
approach to addressing its disadvantages. 
However, learning process framework on its own does not explain why NIEs including 
China have not chosen active learning policies, or have failed to make these strategies 
work. This is because that, technological capability development, which revolves around 
learning, is 'predominantly an interactive and therefore socially embedded process which 
cannot be understood without taking into consideration its institutional and cultural 
context' (Lundvall, 1992, p.l). In other words, firms do not operate and learn in isolation, 
and their build-up of technological capabilities would often only occur if the institutional 
environment works effectively. Moreover, learning approaches are not to be selected 
freely by firms. Depending on who controls the firms and how, and the financing situation, 
firms often do not have the incentive, or ability to 'choose' the appropriate learning strategy. 
Therefore, learning approach in firms should be considered alongside: 1) the system of 
learning and innovation which incorporates other institutions and relationships; 2) the 
perspective of 'technological regimes and corporate governance/finance. These 2 issues are 
discussed in the next 2 sections. 
2.2.3 The National System of Innovation framework 
From the geographical perspective, the National System of Innovation (NSI) approach has 
been widely accepted in examining a country's innovative activities (Lundvall 1988, 1992; 
Nelson 1988, 1993; Niosi et al. 2000). The concept, emerged since the early 1980s, was 
intended to help develop an alternative analytical framework to static standard economics 
and to criticize its neglect of dynamic process related to innovation, learning and 
technological development (Lundvall, 2007). One of the general accepted definitions is by 
Freeman: 'the network of institutions in the private and public sector whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import and diffuse new technologies' (1987, p.1). Freeman's definition 
indicates that NSI involves not only institutions and activities in innovation, but also 
interactions amongst these institutions. Universities and research institutes are important 
components in the NSI; so is government, partly because it mostly funds and largely 
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directs these institutions (e.g., Nelson, 1993). However since finns are at the centre of any 
market economy, they are also at the centre ofNSIs. Interaction among these units is also 
important component of the system. According to Niosi et al., the interaction may be 
, ... technical, commercial, legal, social and financial as much as the goal of the 
interaction may be development. protection. financing or regulation of innovation' (1993, 
p.139). 
An array of academic work about NSI has been produced since the beginning of the 90s. 
However there does not exist a consensus as to what is to be taken into account when 
describing a nation's NSI; and the large majority ofNSI's studies are focused primarily on 
innovation based on scientific and technical activities, especially, on R&D (Bell, 2008). 
This is also true even with the most prominent scholars. In the studies of 15 national 
systems of innovation co-ordinated by Nelson (1993) - including developing as well as 
developed economies - he acknowledges that there exists a notional dichotomy of narrow 
and broad understanding of NSI, whilst the latter, in few studies on the subject, embrace 
institutions (and relationships) that directly and indirectly influence the innovation and 
learning process. Narrowly conceptualized NSI has also to a large extent misled policy 
practice in developing countries, as Bell (2008) puts it: 
'Bodies responsible for science. technology and innovation policy in developing countries 
inherited from the advanced countries a preoccupation with R&D as the core focus for policy. 
This remained the case when concepts of'innovation system' were wrapped around existing 
policy approaches and interests over the last decade or so. ' 
Therefore, the narrowly-defined NSI framework, which mainly focuses on R&D- and S&T 
- based activities and institutions, is not sufficient for dealing with the processes of 
technical change, especially those in developing countries, where R&D and S&T activities 
have not been, and should not be, the only driving force of innovation. As Lundvall 
stresses (2007), it is important to rebalance the S&T -based type of innovation (STI), and 
another important mode of innovation: learning by doing, using and interacting (DUI). 
Given that innovation in most NIEs display high levels of path-dependence and 
technological cumulativeness (Bell & Pavitt, 1993b), NSI should be broadly understood, 
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in the context of these countries, essentially as a system oflearning (Viotti, 2002). Hence a 
much more broadly-defined framework needs to be used; it should incorporate any 
institutions and relationships that are key to the process of innovation as well as learning. 
Moreover, the research of NSI should be more careful with its normative function. Earlier 
work by Freeman (1987) on Japan and more recent works by OECD on South Africa and 
Hungary (OECD, 1997; 2005) acknowledge that regarding NSI, some ways appear to be 
better than others. However it is believed that more should be done in this direction from 
developing countries' perspective: to avoid copying or just following the latest policy 
fashion. For example, a country-specific 'best practice' can be identified through the 
suggestion of an NSI that meets the requirements of the technological regime its firms 
operate in. 
Last but not least, 'the failure to recognise the firm as the central player in the 
accumulation oj technology has been a major shortcoming oj technology policy.' (Bell & 
Pavitt, 1992, p.271) This is because countries do not innovate themselves, and it is the firm 
that can be said to innovate in a capitalist economy (Tylecote & Visintin, 2008). The 
interaction between capability accumulation and firm development should be seen as a 
mutual one. In other words, firms do not simply passively receive the benefits from the 
accumulation of technological capabilities,: they also shape the accumulation process. 
Therefore policy intended to enhance technological capability has to recognise the central 
role of firms in industrial upgrading and innovation to effectively enhance technological 
capability (Juma & Clark, 2002). (A case in point is the car industry in China in the 90s 
and early 2000s; see chapter 3, section 3.4). 
We therefore argue that NSI should encompass institutions, organizations involved in the 
process of both STI and DUI, and the interactions among them. Moreover, study of a 
nation's system of innovation should put firms at the centre (see Figure 2-4). 
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2.3 The system of corporate governance & finance and 
technological capability development 
The National System of Innovation framework proposes an approach to analyzing 
innovation and learning at the national level. However the conventional NSI approach 
which mainly focuses on S&T/R&D-based innovation needs to be critically revised, 
particularly for newly industrializing economics. Particularly, there needs to be a much 
more broadly defined approach nested within, or alongside the NSI framework, which 
encompasses the socio-economical characteristics of developing countries. In particular, it 
should incorporate the system of finance and corporate governance (see Figure 2-4), since 
firms are central actors in innovation, and it is impossible to understand their innovation 
activity without knowledge of their corporate governance and the finance available 
(O'Sullivan, 2000; Tylecote, 2007). Moreover, inclusion of corporate governance and 
finance systems should also help address the power aspect of innovation and learning - an 
issue unduly neglected in most empirical NSI studies (Lundvall, 2007). 
Over the past decade, a growing number of researches have recognized that analysis of 
innovation systems should incorporate systems of finance and corporate governance. For 
instance, in Lundvall's edited book on NSI (1992), Christensen discussed the role of 
finance in innovation. Pavitt (1999) argued that the manner and outcome of innovation has 
been decidedly different between the US and UK on one hand and Japan and Germany on 
the other, because of radical differences in their systems of finance and corporate 
governance (Tidd et al. 2001: 93). Lazonick and O'Sullivan have also written extensively 
about the role of finance and corporate governance in industrial development (Lazonick, 
1991; 2004; O'Sullivan, 2000; 2004; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1996; 2000; 2002). 
Lazonick and O'Sullivan's research on corporate governance, innovation and economic 
performance in the EU countries, US and Japan conceptualised a model of 'social 
conditions of innovative enterprise'. Their theoretical starting point is the proposition that 
learning process required for innovation is uncertain, cumulative and collective, it 
'requires the collaboration of different people with different capabilities, and the 
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integration of the work of these people into an organisation': organisational integration' 
(Lazonick, 2004: 30). 'The essence of the innovative firm is the organisational integration 
of a skill base that can engage in collective and cumulative learning' (Lazonick, 2004, 
p.34). Moreover, Lazonick and O'Sullivan also proposed that firms need industrial 
expertise to choose the product market to compete in, and the technologies competitive 
with. Those who exercise strategic control need to ' ... be able to recognise the competitive 
strengths and weaknesses of their firm's existing skill base and. hence. the changes in that 
skill base that will be necessary' (Lazonick, 2004, p.34). It can be hence inferred that 
providers of finance (shareholders) and venture capitalists, who are treated as sharing in 
strategic control by Lazonick and O'Sullivan, are required to possess the necessary 
knowledge and understanding of resources allocation in the innovation process. 
Lazonick and O'Sullivan's perspective offered a generic understanding of the connection 
between the system of corporate governance/finance (CGFS) and technological 
development /innovation. That is, they are saying that innovation always requires x,y, or z 
from the CGFS. Although they do differentiate sectors according to the type of skill base 
that needs to be integrated - but as what we show below, higher degree of differentiation is 
needed to address the issue of innovation in different sectors, and the level of development 
of the countries. Just as Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) argued, innovation processes often 
vary across countries and specific to technologies or industrial sectors, which have varied 
demands on different aspects of finance and corporate governance system. Therefore at the 
firm level, the technological regime this firm operates in needs to be identified, so do its 
corresponding demands on CGFS, that improvement in the latter could generate desired 
positive effects on the former. The part below is going to show that sectors vary in their 
technological regime (section 2.3.1), and that this affects their demands on the CGFS 
(section 2.3.2). Moreover the technological regime for a given sector is not necessarily the 
same in a developing country to what it is in a developed country. Hence Section 2.3.3 
adapts the framework mainly developed from experiences in developed countries to the 
context ofNIEs. 
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2.3.1 Technological regime and its dimensions 
A 'technological regime' (Nelson & Winter, 1982) or 'technological paradigm' (Dosi, 1982) 
defines the particular learning and knowledge environment in which firms operate (Winter, 
1984). Technological regimes are important because they shape the pattern of innovation 
in an industry or sector. Generally speaking, there are two opposite types of regimes 
identified in the literature. An entrepreneurial regime enables entry of new innovative 
firms or entry of new paradigm of innovation by incumbent firms where competence-
destroying is often involved, while a routinised regime facilitates innovation firms 
progressing within an established paradigm (Winter, 1984). This distinction is derived 
from Schumpeter's innovation theory, which is a result of observation of economic 
development at different historical phases (Schumpeter, 1934; 1942). Another way of 
defining these regimes is as, respectively, Schumpeter Mark I, and Schumpeter Mark II 
(Freeman 1982: Malerba & Orsenigo 1996; Malerba, 2004). 
In the Schumpeter Mark I regime, the structure of innovative activities is often disruptive 
and turbulent, and is often observed in nonelectrical machinery, instruments and traditional 
technologies (Malerba et ai, 1997). The Schumpeter Mark II pattern of innovation, on the 
other hand, may be associated with a structure of innovative activities that is concentrated 
and stable, as observed in chemical and electrical-electronic (Dosi, 1982). These different 
patterns of innovation among technologies and sectors can be explained by differences in 
the nature of technological regimes (Malerba & Orsenigo, 1996). 
The characteristics of learning play an important part in helping to define a technological 
regime (Tylecote, 2007). Malerba and Orsenigo (M&O) identify three different properties 
in learning: cumulativeness of learning; appropriability conditions; and technological 
opportunity conditions, (Dosi & Orsenigo, 1988; Malerba & Orsenigo, 1996). 
Technological opportunity determines the available technological solutions for firms to 
solve problems, and how easily such solutions may be attained. The appropriability 
conditions are concerned about how easily the benefits of innovation can be protected 
from imitators (competitors), and the measures of appropriation used by firms. The degree 
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of cumulativeness of innovation describes to what extent the processes of achieving 
technical solutions by a firm are incremental. 
2.3.2 Properties of learning in technological regime, and their 
demands for corporate governance and finance 
Tylecote and Visintin (2008) argued that, in addition to the above three properties 
proposed by Malerba et al., p.l) degree of cumulativeness of innovation (or in their term: 
the extent of competence destruction); 2) degree of technological opportunity; 3) 
appropriability (enriched by Tylecote and colleagues as stakeholder spill-over) of 
innovation; there is a fourth property of learning which defines technological regime: 4) 
visibility of innovation and learning (explanation of this concept can be found in section 
2.2.2). It is argued by them that the above dimensions have significant indications for 
finance and corporate governance. Below the corporate governance and finance system 
will be defined, and the way it influences innovation will be examined according to 
learning properties of technological regime. 
1} System 0/ corporate governance and finance (CGFS) -definition and scope 
The term 'corporate governance' came out of a seminal analysis in the 1920s (Berle & 
Means, 1933), which looked at the increasing separation of ownership and control in 
modem firms (Monks & Minnow, 2001). When ownership takes the form of dispersed 
shareholding, and when management structures once dominated by family owners or 
government are increasingly replaced by professional managers, it is believed that such a 
separation allows - if it does not actually encourage - the firm's behaviour to diverge from 
the ideal of profit maximizing (Keasey et al. 1997), hence there needs to be a system of 
control over those managers to ensure that the company is run in the interests of the 
shareholders and society at large. Therefore in its most commonly referred form, corporate 
governance studies the structure through which 'suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment' (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
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Shleifer and Vishny's definition of corporate governance fits into a simpler and broader 
conceptualization of governance in general, that of Prakash and Hart (1999): 'organising 
collective action'. Von Tunzelman (2003) proposes that the scope of 'governance' should 
include issues of structure, control and process. For him, 'structure' relates to the forms 
through which decisions are made, 'control' to the power to make them, within the 
structures, and through 'process', structure and control are implemented. 
We welcome Prakash & Hart and von Tunzelman's broader definition of governance, and 
argue that the system of corporate governance and finance hence deals with the two 
fundamental issues in any capitalist economies: capital and capitalists. The system of 
finance is about how is the capital provided and allocated. Corporate governance is about 
who controls the firm and how. In particular, we study the firm's 'structure' of control 
(formal as well as de facto) and its dynamism of 'power' in the 'process' of corporate 
decision-making and implementation. For the purpose of this research, corporate decisions 
mainly refer to those technological ones. However due to the intrinsic nature of any profit-
oriented corporations, economic decisions /- investment, production, distribution and 
exchange - that are inseparable to this issue are also included. 
A dominant and important aspect of corporate governance is referred to as 'the agency 
perspective', or as 'finance perspective' (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen,1983). 
A basic assumption of agency model is that due to human's opportunistic nature, managers 
of firms will act to further their own interests before shareholders. An overview of agency 
theory is given by Eisenhardt (1989, p.59), which is presented in Table 2-3: 
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Table 2-3 Overview of agency theory 
Agency Theory OvervIew 
Key idea 
Unit of 
analysis 
Human 
assumptions 
Orgamzational 
assumptions 
Information 
assumption 
Contracting 
problems 
Problem 
domain 
Principal -agent relationships should 
reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs 
Contract bQtwOOI'l principal and agent 
Self- interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
Partial gool conflict among partlcipants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
In iormfl tiQn 'lsymmp.trY tw?lw~n prinr.lpol 
and agent 
Information as a purchasable commodity 
Agency (moral hazard and adverse 
selection) 
Risk sharing 
ReJat onships In wh ch the principal and 
agent have partiy diffenng goals and 
risk preferences (e_g .. compensation. 
regulation. leadership. impression 
management. whistle-blowing. vertical 
integration, transfer pricing) 
Source: Eisenhardt, K. (1989) 'Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review' , 171e Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), p.59, 
The problem long associated with agency problem is information asymmetry - between 
receivers and providers (of finance), and between agent and principal (in corporate 
governance). The issues is particularly pronounced when the governance mechanism is 
characterised by 'outside' shareholders or the state, as in such cases management can be 
assumed to know much more about what is behind the closed door (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Agrawal and Mandelkar, 1987; Cai & Tylecote, 2006). 
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2) CGFS and technological innovation - the Iinkage16 
Tylecote and Visintin (2008) identified four dimensions of technological regime, which 
define the pattern and balance of the demands made upon the corporate governance and 
finance system - the characteristics it needs to have to control and finance innovation 
within that regime properly. (See Table 2-4). Below they will be explained one by one, 
showing what they demand from the CGFS. 
Table 2-4 Dimensions of technological regimes and financial and corporate governance systems 
Dimension : Technological regime : Finance and corporate governance 
, , 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 , " : : Finance: : 
! Extent of competence ! Availability of ! 
, destruction and consequent : expert finance for 1 
need for reconfiguration of firm new firms in areas : 
structure. affected by radical ; 
, : innovation : 
CG: Pressure 
from expert 
owners for higher 
value-added in 
such areas 
.-----------------~-------------------------------------------~--------------------------~--------------------------
2 : Availability and acceptability of expert 
, Technological opportunity i risk capital; management autonomy 
-------------------:-------------------------------------------r-----------------------------------------------------3: : i Low visibility/slow pay-off of i Shareholder/ financier engagement; 
: innovation : management autonomy 
, , 
, , 
, , •••••• _____________ 1 ___________________________________________ 1. ___________________________________________ ________ _ 
4 : Stakeholder spill-overs in: Stak h ld . I . 
: . t' : e 0 er mc USlon 
: Innova IOn : 
Source: Tylecote and Visintin (2008, p. 15, Table 1.2) 
1) If positing innovations of all types on a spectrum of cumulativeness (see Malerba's 
explanation in section 2.3.1), at the lowest end would be a move to a new technological 
paradigm which is competence-destroying. In contrast to competence-enhancing change 
which is paradigmatic, path-dependent and cumulative (Malerba & Orsenigo 1997; 
Malerba, 2004), competence-destroying change involves radical shifts in direction. To 
succeed in that, reconfiguration is needed: the firm has to reconfigure its organisation and 
change its methods, technologies and/or workforce (Tylecote & Visintin, 2008). Most 
firms, especially those successful incumbent ones, would have to push the process through 
16 This section has been largely drawn from Chapter I, Tylecote and Visintin (2008) 
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resistance from within their organisation. Empirical evidences have shown two effective 
ways to overcome such resistance: one obvious way is to set up a new firm, in which case 
strong and very well-informed venture capital will be very helpful (examples include Pixar 
in digital animated cartoon, and Canon in digital camera); on the other hand, for existing 
firms to succeed in reconfiguration, it requires pressure for higher value-added from 
owners or financiers. They too need to be well-informed, especially about the industry as a 
whole. 
2) The second dimension is technological opportunity. It is widely recognised that the 
development potential of a particular area of industrial activity - how far and how fast it 
proceeds - is partly down to the technological opportunities that lie before it (Teece & 
Pisano, 1997). In other words, technological opportunity represents the likelihood of 
innovating successfully - profitably - for any given amount of money invested in search. 
Where technological capability is high, there is often need for high R&D spending and 
other innovative activities. Consequently, high technological opportunity requires high 
level of financial input from the CGFS. Moreover, since high level of opportunity is often 
associated with high level of risk, the provider of finance needs to be prepared to provide 
generous amount of risk capital. On the other hand, sectors of high technological 
capabilities often does not require the same level of industry-wide expertise as for radical 
reconfiguration, however management autonomy may be sufficient as managers would 
probably be glad to finance a high level of innovative expenditures with the firm's own 
cash flow. 
The third of 'regime dimensions' is visibility (Tylecote & Demirag, 1992; Tylecote & 
Conesa, 1999). When the visibility of innovation is low (for example, investment of time 
and money in low-visibility learning activities, see Section 2.2.2), shareholders would only 
accept heavy spending on innovation and consequent lower profits (possibly for some 
years) if they had a clear understanding of the inputs and likely outputs of innovation. To 
achieve that owners and financiers need to engage closely with the firm, to develop firm-
specific understanding - so as to be able to see below the surface to what is really being 
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done for future innovative success. Failing that, a good second best is high management 
autonomy: managers being able to spend more or less as they choose on innovation. 
The last of the four dimensions is stakeholder spill-overs, which is referable to Malerba et 
afs appropriability dimension. It is concerned about the extent to which employees and 
related external stake holders (notably customers and suppliers) benefit from and are able 
to contribute to the finn's technological changes. In some sectors this is of particularly 
great importance. Von Hippel' s (1988; 2005) account of user-led innovation and the 
situation in 'specialised suppliers' described by Malerba are some of the examples in sight. 
Clearly for such firms, close and constructive relationships with stakeholders, such as 
skilled employees and 'lead' industrial customers, are vital. Tylecote et al summed up such 
relationships, with employees and other firms, as 'stakeholder inclusion'. 
Stakeholder inclusion is relevant not only to the generation of innovations, but also to the 
protecting of them, or appropriation. Teece (1986; 1998) developed four ways of 
protecting innovation returns: 1) inherent difficulty in replicating the innovation (for 
example, those types of innovation where tacit knowledge is heavily involved); 2) 
intellectual property protection (patents, copyrights, etc); 3) investment in complementary 
assets and technologies such as manufacturing and marketing facilities; and 4) dynamic 
capabilities, which enables the firm to generate a stream of further innovations, making it 
hard to competitors to catch up. Tylecote (2007) inserted stakeholder inclusion into 
Teece's argument: i) trusted employees can make knowledge tacit, and therefore less 
replicable by rivals. ii) When codification of innovation is necessary, such as formula for a 
chemical, patenting can be delayed if employees can be trusted to keep the secret, 
therefore increasing the life of the patent after launch (Tylecote & Visintin, 2008). iii) As 
with dynamic capabilities, employee inclusion can also help the firm maintain its 
competitive edge: with trustworthy employees and well-kept secret, rivals will not be able 
to find out the firm's innovation in the pipeline. iv) Finally, one can see a relationship of 
mutual loyalty with suppliers and lead customers as a way of getting by without 
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investment in complementary assets and technologies. Again, secrecy is more easily 
maintained if suppliers and customers are loyal 17 • 
The whole discussion so far in this subsection has been with reference to developed 
countries in which 'innovation' is the 'new to the world' variety. As promised earlier in this 
subsection (before the start of 2.3.1), I will next show that in a given sector, the 
technological regime that firms face in a developing countrylNIE (like China) is likely to 
be quite different, and therefore adaption of the framework is made accordingly, to address 
innovation and technological capability development in these countries. 
2.3.3 Adaptation of CGFS and technological capability development to 
the context of NIEs 
For NIEs, regardless of sectors, Visibility is a central issue in technological development. 
As argued earlier, for the majority of NIEs, the main objective of technological change is 
to catch up with the advanced countries. The process of catching-up - of mastering 
increasingly advanced products and processes and at the same time gaining increasing self-
reliance in each successive advance - demands small but complex arrangements of time 
and money to conduct organisational learning. Technological catch-up takes time, and 
sometimes there is nothing to show for a firm's effort for as long as a decade (Hobday's 
[1995] description of Anam is such a case in point). Moreover, the key investments in 
learning require more effort than money - and the money may have to be spent in a rather 
low-visibility way. Examples include money spent on adaptation and modification of 
second-hand equipments, and cost of materials during trial and error for a more efficient 
production process, etc. Appreciation of the importance of such low-visibility activities 
could only be possible for those financiers who take a great interest in the process - who 
are engaged to understand what really is happening below the surface of operations. 
17 The extent to which finns can or need to take advantage of stakeholder inclusion varies greatly by sector. 
For sectors such as phannaceuticals, the role of stakeholder inclusion is much less important, since a product 
innovation, is extremely easy to replicate but can be exceptionally well defended by patents. 
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Spill-overs. For finns in NIEs, employees often benefit the most from spillover: their jobs 
are more secure and salaries may be higher when product innovation takes place. For finns 
from less developed regions, where management takes in account of employee interests, it 
greatly enhances retention of staff and ensures a more stable base of employees, which in 
tum makes it easier to keep the organizational knowledge tacit. More importantly, if 
employees reciprocate they will put their energy into the development of new ideas and 
new products. On the other hand, a relationship of trust and cooperation with local 
suppliers may not only lead to easier (and often cheaper) facilitation of technical change, 
but also trigger flow of crucial infonnation for innovation. 
The majority of innovations in NIEs feature more cumulative nature of technological 
change and learning (Bell & Pavitt, 1993a). This means that radical innovation in NIE 
finns is often along a trajectory experienced by early industrialized economies, but has not 
happened in the organisations before, therefore they may have competences to destroy to 
make innovation happen, and the need for competence-destruction in NIEs is about 
accepting new things to the finns. Consequently, in order to achieve innovation that is 
radical by NIE standard, there is need for shareholder pressure for value and (decent) 
level of industrial expertise. 
Finally, technology opportunity - for developing countries, it's not about how fast and how 
far the state of the art move forward, but how much behind they are, and how fast they can 
catch up. 'The most essential aspect of the catching-up process is the rate at which a 
follower is able to undertake technological imitation' (Juma & Clark, 2002, p.5). The 
process of technological imitation is easily intuitively linked to pursuing the same path of 
development. However technological imitation has a layer of meaning that is beyond 
simple repetition of the same path taken by industrialized countries (Juma & Clark, 2002). 
Japanese finns in the 1960s and 70s showed very well how technological imitation works, 
in a complex series of processes, through recycling traditional ideas, exploring new ideas, 
nurturing creativity, generating breakthroughs and refining existing ideas (Freeman, 1987). 
The government of the imitating country must have conscious policies to guide the 
imitation. At the industry and finn level, the rate at which it takes place depends very 
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much on existing technological capabilities, and institutions. It also greatly challenges 
CGFS. For poorer developing countries, the challenge mainly lies in the availability of 
finance. For firms (especially well-financed ones) in more industrialized developing 
countries like China, finance availability becomes less of a constraint 1 8. Therefore it is 
more relevant that decision-makers/financiers of innovative activities possess the 
necessary expertise to choose wisely among competing technological options - often 
between import of most advanced technology embodied in the stock of capital goods 
(given sufficient funds), and technology that is appropriate for the current stock of 
capabilities in the firm. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter reviews the literature related to main topics studied in this thesis. The concept 
of technological capability used in this thesis is defined as the capability of a firm to 
identify, acquire, assimilate, adapt and make effective use of technical knowledge and 
skills, and then to generate new knowledge and skills. It combines various definitions in 
the innovation literature, with the nature of innovation in NIEs in mind. We further 
distinguish between static and dynamic technology capability in a way that is similar to 
that of Teece et al and Pisano's, i.e. dynamic capabilities are associated with change - with 
which firm resources can be acquired, shed, integrated and recombined to generate new 
value-creating capabilities. Whereas static capabilities are concerned with the ability to 
make effective use of current knowledge and skills - they are firm's given capabilities at a 
point in time. The concept of dynamic capability inspires the empirical stage of the 
research, where firms' technological capabilities are to be measured based on critical 
review of popular measurement frameworks (see Section 2.1.2). 
18 As of 2008. the total capital stock of Central Enterprises supervised by SASAC (State Asset Supervision 
and Administration Committee) has amounted to 25 trillion. 
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As for the process of technological capability development in the NIE context, three 
analytical frameworks in the literature have been examined. Particularly, Kim's trajectory 
theory clarifies the essential differences of technological development and innovation 
between developed and developing countries, which the latter often reverses the direction 
of technology trajectory in advanced countries. Therefore innovation in these countries are 
not mainly concerned with the introduction of ground-breaking new science and 
technology, but about generating things that are new to the finn, the region, and the 
country. Furthennore, in order to understand the mechanism behind success and failure of 
innovation in NIEs, the instrumental role of learning is reviewed in the learning process 
framework. Learning can be done in both fonnal and infonnal manners, and many 
different kinds of actors and agents are involved in these learning processes. Moreover, we 
propose analysis of learning in NIEs in two dimensions: activeness and visibility of 
learning efforts. Although they are at the centre of innovation, finns do not operate and 
learn in isolation. This chapter hence reviews the National System of Innovation 
framework. We argue that a system of innovation should be understood essentially as a 
system of learning, which not only includes R&D and S&T activities and institutions, but 
also those institutions and relationships key to finns' innovation. Particularly, it should 
incorporate the system of corporate governance and finance (CGFS). 
In the rest of this chapter, the properties of learning in technological regime and their 
demands for corporate governance and finance are analysed based on Malerba and 
Tylecote's framework. Specifically, four properties of learning and four corresponding 
challenges to the CGFS are reviewed, namely: 1) the extent of competence destruction and 
the demand for shareholder pressure (and expert finance); 2) degree of technological 
opportunity and the demand for expert risk capital and management autonomy; 3) low-
visibility of innovation and shareholder/financier engagement; and 4) stakeholder spill-
overs in innovation and the demand for stakeholder inclusion. Further, we adapt the theory 
to the context ofNIEs according to the nature of innovation in these countries. 
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Industries in the Context of Transition 
This chapter reviews the empirical reality of China, especially those aspects, as argued 
in Chapter 2, which are important to China's technological capability development. It 
starts with a general description of the Chinese economic transition - the macro-
environment in which the Chinese electronics and automotive industries evolve and 
operate. Section 1 tries to map out the major characteristics of China's general 
economic condition: 1) partial privatisation with persistent state ownership; 2) FDI-
pulled and export-led growth; and 3) slow competitiveness upgrading. Section 2 
describes China's national system of innovation (NSI). China, which is in transition 
toward a market-oriented economy, particularly requires examination on how its 
technological performance is affected by its institutional context, where the 
government is still playing a crucial role. Section 3 is dedicated to the corporate 
governance and finance of Chinese firms, particularly of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and private-owned enterprises (POEs). Sections 4 and 5 introduce the two 
selected industries, namely, the electronics and automotive industries, in which the 
empirical study was undertaken. Section 6 summarises the chapter. 
3. 1 Characteristics of China's economic transition and 
technological development 
In less than three decades, China has transformed itself from a centrally planned poor 
economy into a lower-middle income emerging market one, and has become one of the 
fastest-growing economies in the world. Between 1979 and 2006, China's per capita 
GDP has more than quadrupled. Both China's growth rates in Real GDP and GDP per 
capita are higher than the global average for the past 15 years (see Figure 3-1). The 
number of people living in absolute poverty has reduced by 235 million in the past 30 
years (People's Daily, 05/1112008). 
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-+-Growh GOP per Capita (PPP) _ real GOP growh --.- GOP (PPP) share of world total 
Figure 3-1 Growth Rate of China's Transformation Economy 
Source: Data calculated according to the IMF World Economic Outlook Database: 
http://www.imf.org!externaVpubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodataiindex.asp x (September 2008) 
Note: All growth figures are based on data quoted in US$. 
China however is not simply another 'East-Asian Miracle'. As the largest developing 
economy, its transition features distinctive patterns: 1) partial privatisation alongside 
the persistence of state ownership; 2) export-led growth; and 3) reliance on foreign 
technology transfer and slow competitiveness upgrading. 
3.1.1 Growth of private sector and the persistence of state 
ownership 
The general opinion is that, to a very large extent the driving force behind China's 
spectacular economic growth has been the emergence of non-state-owned sectors, 
especially of an active private sector (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2003). Partly 
through privatization, and largely through organic expansion, the private sector has 
become a significant and still fast growing proportion of China's economy. China's 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reports data for 7 different classes of enterprise 
ownership: from individual ownership, private ownership to state ownership, (see 
Table 3-1). (The evolution of ownership types is explained in section 3.3.1) Although 
the information is not uniformly available about all of the indicators of these 
classifications, it has been generally agreed that the non-state-owned sector has 
increasingly become an important source of the dynamics of the Chinese economyl9 
(Cao e/ ai, 1999; Qian, 2002). 
19 The term 'non-state' in China denotes a larger category than 'private,' since the former category 
encompasses urban and rural collectively owned enterprises, known famously as the township and 
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Wholly Domestically Invested Foreign-invested* 
f-------------.-
-:--=---------
State-owned enterprises Joint ventures with domestic firms 
Collectively owned enterprises Cooperatives with domestic firms 
- Shareh-o Iding-e-nterpri ses-based-o;a--------Sha~eholding co-rporatio~·s"withdo~estic 
collective system firms 
-.-.-------------.---------f 
Limited liability companies 
Joint ventures of domestically owned 
firms 
Shareholding corporations 
Private-owned enterprise 
Other 
Wholly foreign owned 
*These include enterprise invested by foreign investors and investors from Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan. Although the regulation makes this distinction between these two groups of investors, for all 
practical purposes, these firms face similar policies and regulations and share many common 
characteristics. Source: (F ei, 2004) 
Since 1985, the non-state-owned sector has made an increasing contribution to the 
growth of industrial output. As Figure 3-2 shows, non-state ownerships, including 
individual firms, private firms, joint ventures, and collective-owned enterprises and 
other forms of ownership, have comprehensively outpaced the state-owned sector. 
Accompanying such surge is the declining role of China's state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) since the late 1970s. At that point they produced 75 % of output, while 
'collective' enterprises produced the rest; by 1999 their share was down to about 28 %, 
with the private and other sectors rising from 0.5 % in 1980 to 44 % in 1999 (NBS, 
2000; Tylecote and Cai, 2004). 
village enterprises (TVEs), which fueled rapid industrial growth in rural PRC and absorbed millions of 
surplus farm workers. ]n the data for the PRC TVEs are classified outside the state sector, and yet cannot 
be considered part of the private sector in a strict sense of the word. To complicate things further, many 
essentially 'private' firms have embraced collective ownership. They made themselves 'collectives' by 
sharing ownership with local governments in order to obtain the security and privileges that those 
governments extend to collective firms . 
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80% .---------------------------------------------------------
1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
--+-Share of Private (and Individual) Firms 
_ Share of Non-state-owned or controlled 
--.-Share of Private and Others (Including Foreign-funded and share-holding) 
Figure 3-2 Growth Rates of Real Industrial Output in China, 1985, 1990-1999 
Notes: 
I. 'Other types' include foreign-funded firms and non-state-controlled shareholding 
corporations. 
2. Since 2001 the China Statistical Yearbook does not report total industrial output data by 
ownership; this figure therefore covers only the period up to 1999. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2000. 
However, despite the general lack of dynamism and efficiency, the state-owned firms, 
no matter majority or minority (see Chapter 1 for definition), will continue to exist in 
China. Unlike the 'Big Bang' approach adopted by countries in Eastern Europe, China 
still maintains a communist regime. Its economic reform so far still has limited effect 
on the political aspect of the system and pursues a 'dual-track' approach (Sun et ai. , 
2002). That is, alongside implementing to a certain degree market mechanisms - the 
'market track'; the planned economy has not been, and will not be entirely abolished -
the 'plan track'. The basic principle of the dual-track approach is as follows . A market 
track was introduced under which a gradually expanding proportion of the goods sold 
at free-market prices, compared with a shrinking proportion of the goods sold fixed 
quantities at fixed plan prices as specified in the pre-existing plan (Lau et ai, 2000). By 
2006, only 5.6 % of industrial capital goods were sold at fixed prices and 2.3 at 
government guided prices (National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC], 
2007, http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwfb/t20071213178607.htm). However, the price of 
some essential goods (e.g. water, coal , electricity, mobile services) is still highly 
regulated (NDRC, http://www.ndrc.gov.cn). 
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Although not directly referring to the coexistence of different types of ownership 
system, the dual-track system does reflect the Chinese government's cautious approach 
in the ownership reform process. In fact, the official term used in China is not 
'privatization' but 'share ownership scheme' (Sun and Tong, 2003). 'Privatization' is not 
an accepted term in China, as it implies capitalistic private ownership: the government 
calls it a 'share ownership scheme' (Sun and Tong, 2003). The Chinese government has 
a practical wariness of full privatization for large and medium enterprises, and in many 
of them keeps a substantial stake, leading to the emergence of a large number of 
minority state-owned enterprises (Cai & Tylecote, 2005). Even for purely privately-
owned firms the government tends to intervene (Huang, 2008). Moreover, the state 
retains close controls over high-technologyl 'pillar' industries such as Information 
Technology, Automotive, Aviation, Oil, Electricity, etc. (China Daily, 20106/2004) 
How did, and more importantly how will such government ownership work, is key to 
understanding China's growth pattern and perspective, and hence is a highly relevant 
element when studying the two industrial sectors (Electronics and Auto) scoped in the 
thesis (see also Chapter 1). 
3.1.2 Internationallsation and export-led growth 
China experienced a rapidly increasing economic openness during the reform period. It 
has emerged as the fourth largest trading nation. Since 2002 China has also become the 
largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world (Ministry of 
Commerce [MOfCOM], www.mofcom.gov.cn). 
China's exports rose more than tenfold, between 1985 and 2001 - while world trade 
merely tripled. (OECD, 2002). According to WTO, in 2007 China has overtaken the 
United States and become the second largest merchandise exporter of the world, after 
GermanYo. The share of China's exports in the total volume of the world increased 
from 1 % In 1985 to 8.7 % In 2007 (WTO Trading Statistics, 
http://stat.wto.org/StatisticaIProgramlWSDBViewData.aspx?Language=E,accessed In 
April 2008). 
20 Caution has to be taken as to the significance of such progress - the difference in value-added between 
China and Germany is much bigger. 
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The landscape of China's exports also substantially changed: Between 1985 and 2006, 
exports of primary products and resource-based manufactures fell from 40 % of all 
exports, to less than 10 %, while non-resource-based manufactures rose to 94 %; the 
percentage of high-technology products in China's exports jumped from 3 % in 1985 to 
29 % in 2006, while the percentage of high-technology products in its import 
accounted for 31.2 % (UNITED, 2002; NBS, 2007). In manufacturing exports, the 
share of electric and machinery products, including electronic products, demonstrates 
high growth rate (see Figure 3-3). 
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Figure 3-3 Break-down of Chinese manufacturing exports, 1992 and 2005 (% of manufacturing 
exports) 
Source: China Customs website, http: //www.customs.gov.cn 
Note: The above sectors account for around 70% of all manufacturing exports 
However, the boosting effect of artificially undervalued exchange rate to China's 
export was significant during the 1990s (Yue & Hua, 2002), more importantly, behind 
the export boom was the role of inward FDfl. Gu and Lundvall (2006) found that in 
higher-technology categories such as computer and IT products - export are mainly 
manufactured Western and Taiwanese invested factories. In 1988, foreign subsidiaries 
produced less than 9% of exports; in 2003 fully foreign-owned and partly foreign-
owned firms produced respectively 61.9% and 21.4% of high-tech exports (Gu & 
21 See Zhang and Felmingham (200 I) and Liu et at. (2001) for discussion. 
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Lundvall, 2006: citing China S&T Indicators 2004). Meanwhile, between 1998 and 
2005 the share in exports of high-tech products of Chinese-owned finns (excluding 
international joint ventures) fell by more than 50% 
(www.sts.org.cn/sjkllkjtjdtldata2006.Fig2-1O).AlthoughChina·shigh-tech product 
trade surplus to U.S. increases rapidly since 2002, it has been mainly, and increasingly 
so (at least up till 2006), contributed by foreign-owned and foreign-invested enterprises 
(see Figure 3-4). In sharp contrast, domestic enterprises, especially SOEs, are 
constantly in deficit. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
~SOEs _ Joint-Ventures 
--.- Foreign-owned Enterprises - Collective-Owend Enterprises 
-;-- Private Enterprises 
Figure 3-4 Trade balance in High-Tech products between China and U.S. 1996-2006. 
Note: Value in Million U.S $. 
Source: Adapted from Bi (2007). 
3.1.3 Dependence on foreign technology transfer and slow 
competitiveness upgrading 
Since the opening of its markets in the late 1970s, the Chinese economy has 
increasingly integrated into the world economy. Although China's insertion into the 
global value chain through mass production of commodities has been overwhelming, 
the industrialization process has not brought about a widespread and robust indigenous 
innovation capability in Chinese firms (Ou & Lundvall , 2006). 
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The general approach to acquiring foreign technology by Chinese finns can be 
described as 'dependent' technology strategy (Freeman, 1992). They focus was on 
getting production capability through licensing or joint venture deals with advanced 
'Northern' finns. A good indicator of China's reliance on foreign technology transfer 
would be the ratio between technology imports and the R&D expenditure of Chinese 
industry. For all years in the 1990s, the expenditure on technology imports was well 
above R&D expenditure by Chinese industry, as well as for China as a whole (OECD, 
2002), and the gap further widened until 199922 (NBS Statistics Data on Science and 
Technology Development, 2006, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/gtsj/kjtjjrnz1l2006D. 
Moreover, statistics at the industrial level show an inverse relationship between the 
R&D expenditure by different Chinese industries and the cost of their technology 
imports, suggesting a substitution effect between technology imports and domestic 
R&D (MOST, 1999: 116). 
As a result of dependent technological strategy, import of complete-set machinery and 
equipment (including core equipment) has been the most important item of technology 
trade in China. Explicitly encouraged by the government through tax rebate policies23 
(Notice by State Council on Tax Refund of Imported Equipments, 1997), its absolute 
value increased by more than 40 % year on year since the late 80s (MOC, 
http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/tongji.shtml), representing highest increase of all fonns. 
Although finns with foreign investments serve as a mam channel of technology 
imports to China, in most cases the core technology involved is still controlled by the 
foreign partners of the joint venture, or by their headquarters (OECD, 2002). In China, 
foreign invested finns perfonn some parts of the manufacturing process with little 
technological innovation of product design (Liu & Wang, 2003). This channel of 
technology diffusion is thus rather limited. The lack of effort on the Chinese side to 
promote diffusion of imported technology has certainly further weakened the impact of 
foreign technology transfer on domestic technological capability (Chinese enterprise 
technological perfonnance will be discussed in Section 3.2.2). Low absorption has 
reduced the opportunity for improving the technological capabilities of Chinese 
22 Such a switch might be partially explained by China's refonns in its R&D system by merging about 
200 state-owned R&D institutes with state-owned enterprises (Sun, 2002). 
23 In Chinese: Guowuyuan guanyu tiaozhengjinkou shehei shuishou zhengce de tongzhi, available on 
line: http://www.people.com.cnlzixunlfl/gk/item/dwjjp/alv/6/6-J-08.html 
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industry through transfer. As imported technologies become outdated over time, China 
will need to rely on new imports, thus falling into a vicious circle of 'import-Iag-re-
import-relag'. The limited efforts made in technology diffusion have also resulted in a 
limited 'spill-over effect', preventing more enterprise from benefiting from the imported 
technology. In fact only under 1 % of Chinese domestic firms own the IPR of the core 
technologies they use (Xinhua, 01103/2006)24. 
Also weak is China's patenting record. As can be seen in Table 3-2 Chinese patents 
granted by USPTO (US Patent and Trademark Office) have gone up in absolute 
numbers as well as in proportion of non-US patents. However, the degree of patenting 
is still low- its absolute number in 2006 (272) is still lower than that of Taiwan in 1987 
(411), and represents just about 0.3% of all patents granted to non-US applicants, 
compared to more than 3.5% by the much smaller country of South Korea in 1997. 
Table 3-2 Patents granted by USPTO by region, 1995-2005, 
_____ -11_1_97_7 1987 1997 2000 2002 _2004 ~ 2006 
Patents of 24,837 141,682 54,224 79,072 87,299 87,191 94,170 
non-US --L 
~~~f~~¥z~L~C: 
- South 7 1 105 1,965 3,472 '11 4,009 4,671 6,509 
Korea __ -, _____ -+ ______ 1 _i--_____ + ____ -+-____ _ 
India 14 12 48 125 123 115 127 
- Brazil 22 35 67 100 105 10-2---+-1 -88----
% 
- -
China, PR 
- -
0.12% 0.34% 0.29% 0.29% 
_J~p-'!!1 ____ 26.17% 41.49% 44.61% 41.64% 1 41.63% 42.47% 
_._._---_.-
-------------
17.71% 
-------
Taiwan 0.21% 0.99% 4.79% 7.34% 8.27% 
--
South 0.028% 0.25% 3.62% 4.39% 
1
4
.
59% 5.36% 
Korea 
-------
10.14% India 0.06% - 0.08% 0.16% 0.13% 
Brazil 0.08% 10.08% 0.12% 0.12% 10.12% 0.12% 
Source: Author's calculatIOn accordmg to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/cst_allh .htm. 
24 Only 0.03% Chinese Firms Have Own Key Tech, Xinhua, 3 January 2006, 
http://english.people.com.cnl200601l03/eng20060 I 03 _23237 6.html 
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On the macro level, China has not accomplished the transition from production to 
innovation. A 1996 sample survey on technological innovation conducted by the 
government reveals that only 5.8 % of new products (under Chinese definitions) are 
such by international standards new products accounted for only 3.3 % of export sales 
compared to 10.1 % share of new products in the total sales revenues (MOST 1999, p. 
69). The survey also shows that the perfonnance of state-owned enterprises lagged 
behind other types of enterprise in tenns of introduction new products, share of new 
products in sales revenue, and percentage of new products sold to export markets. 
After China entered into WTO in 2001, on the macro level, technological innovation as 
a driving force of economic development still remains inadequate. According to the 
calculation by the Institute of International Economic Research (Bi, 2007), in China 
capital fonnation, labour input and technology advancement contributed 83.6, 13.9 and 
3 %, respectively, to the growth of industrial value added from 2000 to 2005, implying 
that industrial growth has been propelled by factor input, and technological 
advancement has not become a main driving force for economic growth. It is therefore 
not a surprise that major indices (such as the Global Competitive Index and Innovation 
Capability Index) do not include China as strong in innovative (see Table 3-3). 
Table 3-3 China's in the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) and UNCTAD Innovation 
Capability Index (ICI). 
Country GCI in Higher Technologi UNCTAD ICI UNCTAD ICI 
(region) 2008 education and cal ( 1 995, N = 1 1 7) ( 2001, N= 117) 
(N=134) training readiness 
China 30 64 (99)* 77 72 74 
Taiwan 17 13 (8) 15 17 15 
S. Korea 13 12 (9) 13 20 19 
-----
._---- f..-.--------. 
--------
-----_._.-
-------
Brazil 64 58 (61) 56 64 48 
India 50 63 (107) 69 81 82 
Russia 51 46 (32) 67 23 24 
* Quality of higher education in parentheses 
Source: Compiled according to World Economic Forum (2008) and UNCTAD (2002) 
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On the other hand, despite of the disappointing overall performance of Chinese firms, a 
small number of bridge-head companies are becoming highly innovative and globally 
competitive. Huawei (Telecommunications); Haier (Consumer electronics); Lenovo 
(PC); Chery (Automotive); and BYD (Battery and Auto) are those with the highest 
profile. A common feature of these more innovative firms is that they adapted an 
alternative approach to technology transfer (and upgrade); termed as 'imitative 
strategy' by Freeman (1992), in which learning takes place more independently, with 
little help from the firm(s) being imitated, and even without their permission. (The 
reason why they were able to go a different way and succeed largely lies in their 
different corporate governance and finance system, which will be explained in detail 
with the help of case study of Chery in Chapter 6). 
Obviously, the indicators above are not going to paint a full picture of China's really 
technological strength .. To understand and to assess China's progress in moving from 
static production capability to more dynamic, innovative capabilities, we need to not 
only evaluate the outcome, but to assess the input. We also need to achieve an 
understanding of the organisations, institutions and their relationships (namely, 
National System of Innovation, see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3), which have shaped the 
development trajectory of China's technological development: under what 
circumstances did (or rather, did not) the transformations take place? How do policy 
networks and institutions of such an emerging economy contribute? Moreover, we 
need to review the situation of corporate governance and finance system (CGFS) in 
China, to help us develop our theoretical framework: how much adaptation is needed to 
apply the theory of (CGFS and technological capability development) developed in the 
Western context to developing countries, such as China. Historical review of China's 
national system of innovation as well as corporate governance finance system will be 
presented in the next 2 sections, followed by Chapter 4 - adaptations of western theory . 
to the context of China. 
66 
Chapter 3: China's Automotive and Electronics Industries in the Context o/Transition 
3.2 China's national system of innovation 
3.2.1 Historical Overview of China's NSI and the role of the state 
The empirical reality of China's NSes has two defining characteristics: 1) a dominant 
role played by the government, and 2) highly uneven regional distribution of resources 
and activities which are mainly concentrated in the coastal regions and big cities. The 
former feature persists and feeds to the latter, so that past reforms and transformations 
have been relatively unsuccessful in addressing this problem (Huang, 2008). 
• Pre-reform era: 1949-1979 
Before the reform started in 1979, the industrial organisation structure of China 
features high degree of centralisation and state ownership. During that time China's 
NSI focused on the development of weaponry, particularly strategic weaponry (Sun, 
2002). Consequently, the civilian industries were largely neglected and poorly 
managed, lacking incentives for the development and adoption of new technologies 
(Suttmeier, 2002). Moreover, there was a clear separation of activities among industries, 
governmental laboratories and universities. For example, industrial enterprises 
(factories) were centre of production; governmental laboratories focused on research 
and development; and universities with few exceptions26 were education centres (Liu 
and White, 2001; Sun,2002). There was little spontaneous interaction among the three 
- industries, universities, and research institutes. Governments, particularly the central 
government, funded and controlled all R&D activities (Sun et aI, 2003). 
• NSI in transition during the reform: 1979-2009 
In March 1978 Deng Xiaoping promoted the status of 'science and technology as the 
primary force of productivity' at the National Science and Technology Conference. In 
the same year the National Science and Technology Development Plan (197801985) 
was issued, marking the start of S&T system reform in China. In 1999, after Zhu 
Rongji was appointed Prime Minister, the central government issued the 'Decision on 
2S Definition of National System of Innovation adopted in this study can be found in Chapter 2, section 
2.2.3). 
26 Research and development in universities were mainly for weapons, see Sun et al (2003). 
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Strengthening Technological Innovation, Developing High-Tech Firms, and Realizing 
Commercialization of New Technologies.' The decision called for the creation of a 
national innovation system, recognizing the intricate relationship among refonns in the 
economy, S&T, education and innovation. In 2005 Hu lintao and Wen liabao made 
important speeches on the National Science and Technology Conference and 
established a long-term objective of constructing 'an innovative country'. Innovation, 
especially indigenous innovation was elevated to national strategic level. 
The reform of China's NSI thus has been a gradual process, consisting of a number of 
successive policy changes and adjustments. The refonn experience resembles a process 
of institutional learning based on results and lessons learned from previous policies 
(Gu, 1999; Sun, 2002), which does not exclude the possibility of regression - after 
1989 (Huang, 2008). Some trends can be identified: 1) a change from piecemeal reform 
to the recent more systematic approach, 2) a shift in emphasis from government 
research laboratories to individual enterprises; and 3) growing market orientation and 
increased (although still insufficient) participation of industry (Sun, 2002). Despite the 
government's intent to create an enterprise-centred innovation system, the state is still 
central to China's innovation system .. 
The rest of the section will describe the role and performances of particular actors, 
institutions and policies, with a view to include the distribution of these activities 
within the system, where do organisational boundaries lie, how is the mechanism 
coordinated, and what do all these mean for a system to effectively introduce, diffuse 
and exploit technological innovation .. 
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3.2.2 The main actors of innovation 
The primary actors and the distribution of activities in the current Chinese innovation 
system are illustrated in Figure 3-5, and the sources and destinations of R&D funding 
in China's NSI is depicted in Figure 3-6. The activities in NSI include: (1) research and 
development (including basic, developmental and engineering), (2) implementation 
(manufacturing and operationalisation), (3) end-use (customers of the product or 
process outputs), (4) linkage (bringing together complementary knowledge and 
activities) and (5) education. (Rosenberg, 1982; Mansfield, 1991; Teece, 1987; 
Freeman, 1992; Lundvall, 1992; Anderson and Lundvall, 1997; Liu and White, 2001). 
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State 
SOEs, other type 
ownership firms, 
MNCs, 
Implementation 
---.~ Control 
Government 
programme funding, 
Grants, Subsidies 
Policy loans 
Government 
organisations, 
individual consumers 
End-use 
Finance 
Financial market 
FDI 
Venture capital 
Technology markets, 
Engineering Centres, 
Productivity Promotion 
Centres, Science parks, 
Employment fairs 
Linkage 
Figure 3-5 Primary actors involved in China's current innovation system and distribution of activities 
Source: Adapted from Liu & White (200 I) 
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I overnment 74.2 
Universities 
27.7 
Figure 3-6 So urces a nd dest inations of R&D fund ing in China's NSI (2006) (billion RMB) 
Source: NBS (2006) 
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As the figures show, the state orchestrates the system of innovation through control 
over policies, finance, and governance. On the other hand, firms are increasingly 
becoming the centre of innovation: they are now performing over two-thirds of total 
R&D, up from less than 40 % at the beginning of 1990 (OECD, 2008). However their 
contribution to innovation remains weak, and is confined by the flawed corporate 
governance and finance. Research institutes are mainly involved in basic research; and 
their share of R&D in general has declined from almost half to less than one-quarter 
from early 1990s to 2004. The relative weight of higher education institutions has 
changed little (OECD. 2008). Below their roles and performance are each reviewed. 
1) Thestate 
After a decade of restructuring, although China's NSI increasingly feature heightened 
enterprise participation and greater cooperation among industries, universities, and the 
government, however the state is still playing a dominant and guiding role (Sun et ai, 
2003). In addition to the persistence of state ownership in high-tech and key sectors 
(see section 3.1.1), the government's influence is mainly through S&T and innovation 
policy, corporate governance of SOEs, and finance in general. In this part our 
discussion mainly focuses on the state's role in S&T and innovation policy. As 
corporate governance and finance are the main subjects of research in this study, they 
will be separately reviewed in the next section (section 3.3). 
Founded in 1998, the State (National) Steering Committee of S&T and Education 
(SSCSTE, Guowuyuan keji jiaoyu lingdao xiaozu) is most superior body in charge of 
innovation policy in China. The Premier of State Council also has the responsibility to 
coordinate strategic policies, such as S&T strategy, education and policies at the local 
level. 
Since 1998 the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has been designated as 
the principal participant in China's technological endeavour. Through its executive 
body, it implements several programmes to fund basic and applied R&D, support and 
guide innovation in enterprise. It is also in charge of management and promotion of 
incubators and science parks, and S&T human resource plans .. 
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However, in practice MOST is not the only body, or even the most important body in 
issuing and implementing key policies in the Chinese innovation system. As shown in 
by Sun et al (2007), in August 2006 over 40 departments were participating in 
technology policy-making, and the department issuing most policy documents is not 
Ministry of S&T, but Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (see 
Figure 3-7). Although Ministry of S&T and State Intellectual Property Office are 
departments most relevant to technological development, their role in technology 
policy making has not been central. It was the departments with key economic and 
administrative resources and power that have been crucial departments for technology 
policy issuing, such as State Economic and Trade Commission, Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
Financially, the central government remained the primary source of S&T funding until 
1992 when it was overtaken by industry (Sun et ai, 2003; see also Figure 3-6). Since 
the 1980s the Chinese government has been utilizing a series of programmes with 
different priorities as a mechanism to fund S&T activities. Such as the 863 programme, 
Key Technology R&D Programme, and 973 Programme (Huang et ai, 2004i7 
Although China is a mostly agricultural country, the Spark programme is the only 
programme that targets China's agricultural and rural area. Initiated in 1986, it is 
commissioned to promote technology transfer to, and development in the rural region. 
Unlike other programmes in which the central government is the main financier, in fact, 
the projects sponsorship mainly takes the form of bank loans. In 2006 only 16.8 % of 
project funding was from bank loans (see Huang et ai, 2004, Table 4). 
27 For details of these Programmes, see .(Huang et ai, 2004), and Appendix III 
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National People's Congress and its Standing Committee (19) 
National Development and Reform 
Commission (21) 
National Development and Plan 
Commission (J 2) 
State Import and Export Commodities Inspection Bureau (I), 
State Administration of Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine 
(I), State General Administration for Quality Supervision and 
Insoection and Ouarantines (5) 
State Intellectual Property 
Office (4) 
Ministry of Communications and 
Transoortation (4) 
Figure 3-7 The framework of Chinese technology policy according to Sun et al (2007) 
Note: The year on the vertical axis is the time when the relevant department started to be 
involved in S&T policy-making. Numbers in parentheses are total amount of policies issued by the 
department. For example, State Administration of Taxation started to participate in S&T-related policy-
making in 1990, and since then have issued 74 of such policies. Source: Sun, et al (2007) 
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2) Thefirms 
Although firms are becoming the principal R&D spenders in China (see Figure 3-6), 
they remain a weak part of the country's innovation system. In reality, improving the 
performance of the industrial sectors and innovative capacity has been one of the most 
difficult challenges (OECD, 2008). 
Domestic firms 
Before the reforms, Chinese firms were state-run factories with minimal research and 
development. The past decades however saw vast progress; particularly in the firms' 
R&D input (see Table 3-4 and Figure 3-6). The share of R&D input by enterprises has 
gone up from 19 to 70 % between 1991 and 2006. The share of R&D personnel 
employed by enterprises has also risen steadily from 50 to 66 % between 2000 and 
2006. (The remaining were mainly in R&D and higher education institutes). The 
absolute number of R&D personnel employed by enterprises, has also increased from 
481,000 in 2000 to 988,000 in 2006, while R&D personnel in research institutions only 
gained a marginal increase over the same period, from 229,000 to 232,000. 
(http://www.stats.gov.cnltjsjlqtsjlkjtjjrnzV2007/t20071130_402448644.htm). 
Table 3-4 Relative role of the three main actors of innovation, year 2002 
% share of Firms Research Higher education 
institutes 
R&D expenditures 62.4 25.9 10.5 
Basic research 9.0 53.5 37.6 
Applied research 25.9 45.3 28.8 
Technological development 77 19 4 
Technology market 48 18 10 
Patent application 63 14 22 
Government funding 59.9 18.6 17.3 
Source: Table 2.1, OECD Review of Innovation Policy, China (2008) 
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However, the level of R&D by domestic firms in China is disproportionate to the scale 
of its economy. The majority of Chinese companies, especially those in the high-
technology industries, continue to have much lower R&D intensity than their 
counterparts in most OECD countries. The overall R&D intensity in high technology in 
China was just 4.6% in 2004. The comparable 2002 figure for the US was 27.3% and 
for Japan 29.9% (www.sts.org.cn/sjkllkjtjdtldata2006). The breakdown by sector is 
even more instructive: for electronic and telecommunications equipment, the 
corresponding figures were 25.4% for the US and just 5.6% for China. In computers 
and office equipment, the figures were 32.8% for the US and only 3.2% for China. 
Together these two sectors made up 72% of the value added of high technology 
industry in China in 2004. In 2006, only 4 Chinese companies were list as top 500 
global companies in terms of R&D investment: Petro China (185), China Petroleum 
(260), ZTE (298) and Lenovo (356) (UK DTI global scoreboard, 2006) 28. 
In addition to low R&D intensity, the spending structure is problematic. In many SOEs 
more R&D money was spent on importing technology than in developing their own. If 
we break down R&D expenditure by class of activity, the costs of acquisition for 
embodied technology, such as machines and production equipment, account for about 
58% of the total, compared with 17% internal R&D, 5% external R&D, 3% marketing 
of new product, 2% training cost and 15% engineering and manufacturing start-up 
(Guan, 2000). This has applied particularly to state-owned firms, which have good 
access to finance and other resources - most particularly to the 'insider' firms (Lu & 
Feng, 2004) or the 'national team' (Nolan, 2001) which have had the best access. 
As already revealed in section 3.1.3, Chinese large and medium enterprises (LMEs, 
almost all of which SOEs) are under investing in technology absorption, which has 
proved to be critical for developing countries to effectively utilise imported 
technologies (Mowery et aI, 1998; Bell & Pavitt, 1997). Chinese LMEs spent around 
US$ 4.0 billion on technology imports in 2006, but just US$ 1 billion on technology 
absorption and diffusion (NBS Statistics Data on Science and Technology 
Development, 2006). Although the 110.25 ratio of technology import/absorption 
28 Huawei as one of China's most innovative firms was not on the list; this is possibly a result of 
Huawei's reluctance to disclose its operational details. 
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improved from 1/0.06 in 1997, it compared badly with those of more than 1/3 in other 
industrialised countries in Asia in the 80s (Zhang, 1998). 
Many of the private firms on the other hand actively seek to implement new 
technology. They also undertake vital R&D even with resources constraints. However 
since these firms mainly operate in the low-tech sectors, the scale of R&D investment 
is very limited (MOST, 1999; Liu & White, 2001). 
Chinese firms in general have not shown an increase m R&D outputs that is 
comparable to their growing input. For example, Liu and White (2001) point out that 
firms' increase in share and account for total patents is concentrated in design patents 
(their Table 2 and Table 3). Although their R&D units and spending keep grow, it is 
not matched by an enhanced performance in technologically intensive invention or 
utility patents. In fact Chinese firms accounted for only 23 % of the total domestically 
granted invention patents, much lower than R&D institutions (33 %) and universities 
(26 %) (NBS Statistics Data on Science and Technology Development, 2006). 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) 
As argued above, despite higher R&D expenditure than foreign-funded enterprises 
(Table 3-5), the Chinese domestic enterprises have not become the main force of 
innovation. On the other hand, dynamism of overseas R&D centres in China varies 
case by case, and their spill-over effects within Chinese industry are hard to measure. 
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Table 3-5 R&D expenditure proportion between Chinese and foreign invested enterprises 
All industries 
Electronic and 
telecommunication equipment 
Medical and pharmaceutical 
products 
Aircraft and spacecraft and 
transport equipment 
Electrical machinery and 
equipment 
Share of R&D expenditure by 
domestic enterprises 
72.78% 
52.15% 
74.87% 
67.88% 
76.11% 
By foreign-invested enterprises 
27 .22% 
47.85% 
·25 .13% 
32.12% 
23 .89% 
Source: China National Economic Census 2004, cited in China Daily, 08/01 /2005 
China's activist inward FDI strategy means that multinational corporations are no 
longer peripheral to its NSI. By the end of 2006, around 750 world industry leaders 
such as Microsoft, Samsung, Volkswagen, and Toyota have set up R&D facilities in 
China (China Daily, 12/1212006). These MNCs employ not only highly experienced 
extrapolate staff, but also well educated (and cheap) local personnel. However, some 
believe that for many multinationals in the 1990s, setting up R&D centres in China was 
a way of getting market access, or gaining favour with the government (Reuvid & Li, 
2005). Such argument is supported by statistical data, as foreign-funded enterprises 
have much lower R&D expenditure than Chinese ones, even in electronic and 
telecommunication equipment manufacturing sector, in which the former accounts for 
83.5 % of total sales (see Table 3-5 and section 3.1.3), indicating that their R&D 
activities are mainly conducted abroad. This is due to cultural and political mismatches, 
and more importantly the fear of technical details seeping to local competitors (von 
Zedwitz, 2004), and surely also due to the general tendency to keep R&D, as a rather 
strategic activity, close to home base. 
Others argue that MNE's have emerged as important actors providing a new propeller 
for innovation activities within China (Liu & White, 2001). Through case studies in the 
auto glass industry, Huang (2008) found that whether joint ventures or wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, they often have more demanding specifications than local firms for inputs. 
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It means that local suppliers may loose out to their peers if they failed to innovate or at 
least to adopt innovations developed by other firms. It is becoming more common 
place that MNEs work closely with local suppliers with new technology, so that the 
latter can meet their specifications. It is argued that at the macro level China's 
innovation system has been improved as a result of such activity. 
On the other hand, multinationals posed great challenges to local companIes and 
research institutes in the competition for highly skilled labour and R&D human 
resource. More and more local talents in China flowed to multinationals since the latter 
are often more active in researches concurrent with the world trend and offer high 
salaries. Reports show that almost 40 % of China's graduates worked in foreign-
invested enterprises (Asia Times, 03/0112007). A survey conducted in foreign-invested 
research agencies based in Shanghai also reported a near 40: 1 ratio of Chinese 
researchers to expatriate R&D staff (Nanning Daily, 30/0112007). 
However, the training provided by multinationals can in the long term help improve 
China's domestic research and development potential. Locally educated scientists and 
R&D staff tend to be well-taught in terms of academic knowledge, but lack creativity 
and practical experience. The well-trained talents in multinationals could actually be 
potential human resources for the Chinese local companies, once these companies grow 
stronger. 
3) Research institutes 
Before China's reforms, research institutes were the primary performers of R&D and 
other technology-related activates. Any technology brought in from abroad came to 
them, in the form of technology licensing or sample machine procurement: they then 
'fed' the enterprises, particularly the capital goods producers, whatever innovation or 
technological change took place (Tylecote et ai, 2010). In the reform process of the 
1980s and 1990s, the government reduced its financial support to force the institutes to 
seek funding outside of the governmental channel. The government stopped giving 
support, in 2000, for the operating budgets of over 5000 research institutes (Liu & 
White, 2001). At the same time, the institutes' activities were liberated - they were 
encouraged (tacitly) to engage in commercial technology services, such as licensing, 
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consultancy, etc. Some others managed to capitalised on their in-house technology by 
setting up production facilities or creating spin-outs (Gu, 1999; Liu & White, 2001). 
Meanwhile, the public research system was also downsized both in number and size of 
institutes, rebalanced in favour of universities. In 1999, the R&D expenditure of 
research institutes was 43.4% of national R&D spending, while that of enterprises was 
41.6% (NBS, 2000). In 2005 these two ratios have changed to 19% and 71 % 
respectively (Figure 3_6)29. 
Currently, public-owned research institutes in China still play an important role in 
supporting strategic and basic research, as well as commissioned research (OECD, 
2008), mainly in the high-technology-related and natural sciences areas. 
4) Universities 
• Universities as Institutes of Higher Education 
Human capital has been widely recognised as one of the crucial resources of 
development (Wemerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993; Teece et ai, 1997), and a crucial source 
of human capital is formally organised education system. Since Cultural Revolution in 
the late 1970s, China has not established a strong education system to support its 
technological upgrade. According to DECD (2002), in the whole of 1990s China's 
education constantly received fiscal appropriation that is disproportionate to its 
economic growth)30. In addition, since the 1990s there exists an increasing tendency of 
policy discrimination in favour of universities in general and universities in developed 
coastal regions in particular. Meanwhile, the development of secondary and primary 
education and vocational education as well s education in the rural areas have been 
unduly neglected (Huang, 2008). As a result, preparation of human resource for the 
innovation system has been mainly undertaken by universities in China. Table 3-6 
gives some headline statistics of China's current situation in higher education: 
29 The change appears to result in part from the conversion of government research institutes into SOEs 
(as described in the previous page) 
30 The Education Law stipulates that the government at various levels have the legal obligation of 
enforcing that 'the increase of education expenditure of government at various levels shall be at a higher 
rate than the growth of normal fmancial revenue'. However, in 1996, 1997 and 1999-2001 the central 
government itself failed to fulfil this legal obligation. 
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Table 3-6 A snapshot of China's higher education situation 
Quantity Year I Sources 
S&T workforce 2.25 million scientists 2004 NBSIMOST S&T Statistics. 
~nd engineers URL: 
- --
1.15 million person years 2004 http://www.stats .gov.cnltjsjl 
spent on R&D 
Enrolment in higher education IS million 2004 Ministry of Education 
-_. __ .. __ . __ ._---_. __ ._---_._--
-- Statistics of Higher Enrolment in postgraduate 1,104,653 2006 Education. URL: 
_.P.!:?.g!~.!!lfll~~_. __ . _____ . __________ . 
--_._----, 2 004---1 http: //www.moe.edu.cnledoa Number of science, 6,508,541 
medicine and engineering s/website 18/IeveI2.jsp?tablen 
undergraduates ame=2234 
Number of science, medicine 662,903 · 2006--
and engineering postgraduates 
PhDs awarded 36,247 (72% in 2006 
science-related subjects) 
Number of students studying 1.2 million 2007 
abroad (1978-2007) 
Number of returning overseas 319,700 2007 
students (by 2007) 
Number of colleges and 1,867 2006 
universities 
-------"--""------ -----_._--------Number of graduate 767 2006 
schools/research institutes 
_._--_._----------_._-- ----_._-_._--_._-----
-2008--1-; ------Number of universities in 6 Times Higher Education 
global top 200 Supplement. URL: 
http://www.timeshighereduca 
tion.co.uklhybrid.asp?typeCo 
de=243&pubCode= 1 
Source: own calculatIOn based on above data source, wIth certam cntena draw from 
Wildson & Keeley, 2007) 
Boosted by relatively larger amount of higher education investment3!, China's higher 
education has achieved remarkable development in the recent years, especially in 
applied science and engineering SUbjects. According to Liu & White (200 I). graduates 
in the sciences and engineering increased from 38% in 1991 to 49% of all graduates by 
1995, while 75 % were engineering graduates. 
3 1 The current ratios of about 10:2:1 in China's government per-student spending on higher, secondary 
and primary education, respectively, are already high compared to the USA, Korea, Chile and Mexico. 
(W orld Bank, 2003). 
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In 2006 more than 500,000 postgraduates were from SCIence, medicine, and 
engineering subjects, and 72% of 36,000 PhDs were in science-related subjects (see 
Table 3-6). However, there are questions about the efficiency of the current workforce. 
During the rapid expansion of China's higher education system since 1998, a large 
amount of vocational training institutions were converted to colleges and universities. 
As a result, the quality of newly-qualified scientists and engineers is questionable, 
while well trained and innovation-capable technical workers and technicians are in 
short supply (OECD, 2008). 
• Universities as Institutes of Research 
The higher education system has developed significantly over the ten years as a 
research performer. Although about 700 higher education institutes are recorded as 
active in R&D (OECD, 2008), the number of significant players is still very small, and 
only a few of them enjoy international reputation as major research universities. The 
Ministry of Education collaborates with other organisations to devise a number of 
funding regimes to attract Chinese researchers around the world to work in China, 
mainly in universities and public research institutes. This is accomplished by rewarding 
the leading researchers (with competitive packages of remuneration and project 
funding), who are expected to enhance the level of some key research projects. Figure 
3-8 describes the priorities of the programmes. 
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Cheung Kong Scholar Programme 
(Changjiang Xuezhe Jiangli Jihua) 
University Young Scholar Award 
(Gaoxiao Qingnian Jiaoshi 
Jiang) 
New Century Talents Training 
Programme 
Promising Young 
Scholar Funding 
Programme 
(Youxiu Qingnian 
Jiaoshi Zizhu Jihua) 
(Kuashiji Youxiu Rencai Peiyang 
Jihua) 
University Key 
Scholar Funding 
Programme 
(Gaoxiao Gugan 
Jiaoshi Zizhu Jihua) 
Overseas Returnee 
Scientific Research 
Fund 
(Liuxue Huiguo 
Renyuan Keyan 
Qidong Zijin) 
Figure 3-8 Ministry of Education's research funding programmes 
Source: Ministry of Education website: www.MOE.gov.cn 
However, the lack of accountability in the Chinese research system and highly 
quantitative incentive policy means that plagiarism and research misconduct are 
common place, even in high profile research programmes such as the Cheung Kong 
Scholars Programme32• The highest profile case involved Jin Chen, head of Shanghai 
Microelectronics Research Institute, ,who had received government praise for his work 
and was the recipient of over £7.5 million from Cheung Kong Programme research 
grants. He was found to have placed his company logo on MotorIa's chips. (Leadbeater 
& Wilsdon, 2007). 
'Again, it's the result of politics getting mixed up with science... There are policies to 
encourage people to generate publications and patents and prizes. You get a score and if 
you are an 'A', you get 25 % more salary. It's easy to understand why this leads people to 
32 The Cheung Kong Scholars Programme is jointly established by the Ministry of Education and Li Ka 
Shing Foundation. It is regarded as the highest ranking of all externally funded programmes for 
university scholars and has an ambition of funding China's most prominent scholars and their ground-
breaking projects. 
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plagiarise results. Every university has this problem. I've suffered from it myself. Some ex-
students of mine took my data and published it in Science. This happened only five months 
ago.' (Ze Zhang, Vice President of Beijing University of Technology, in an interview 
recorded in Leadbeater & Wilsdon, 2007: 17) 
There is concern, that this sharp rise in plagiarism is corroding the culture of research 
within institutes and universities (Leadbeater & Wildson, 2007). 'Collaboration 
becomes very difficult. You can't trust people not to steal your work. Everyone works 
with the door closed, in secret. This is very bad for innovation. ' (Ze Zhang, see above). 
• Foreign Universities - brain gain from overseas returnees 
In the past five or six years, the trickle of overseas returnees, or vividly described as 
'sea turtles ('Haigui') has become a steady flow. The annual number has soared from 
only around 6000 per year in 1995, to over 40000 in 2006. Mostly from US (Silicon 
Valley), UK, Germany, Japan and Australia (MOE website, accessed 2007), many of 
the returnees were attracted by some combination of China's abundant economic and 
business opportunities, national sentiment, family ties, and government incentives. 
Among the returnees, those with established entrepreneurship in the west are most 
valued with their creativity, managerial expertise, networks and access to venture 
capital, even though the most benefited areas are those already-rich coastal cities 
(Leadbeater & Wilsdon, 2007). 
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5) Linkage and supporting structure 
The dynamism of an innovation system largely depends on its ability to generate new 
activities in existing firms, create new firms, and to promote knowledge diffusion and 
absorption within the system (Fein son, 2003). China since the mid 1990s has started to 
adapt the internationally prevalent approach to linkage and supporting structures, such 
as science parks and incubators .. There are already over 400 business incubators and 53 
high-tech zones set up at the national level (Huang et ai, 2004) (the name of high-
technology development zones could be referred to as science parks in Chinese 
translation [Deloitte Research, 2003]). These are mainly supported by a government 
technology diffusion scheme called 'Torch Program' (see Appendix III: China's current 
S&T Programmes). 
Moreover, China Hi-Tech Fair (CHTF) as an intermediary event receives strong 
support from the central government. It functions as a linkage between Chinese and 
overseas high-tech industry sectors. Since 1999, the fair has been held annually in the 
South-China hub of international trade and technology,Shenzhen, and is currently the 
largest and most important exhibition and trade fair in China for high-tech 
achievements (Huang et ai, 2004). According to its official website, in year 2006 alone 
CHTF secured a contract value of 13.6 billion USD from over 20 attending economies 
(China Hi-Tech Fair website, accessed 2006). 
Another important intermediary is Productivity Promotion Centres (PCCs), it is 
established in 1992 by a group of intermediary and consulting to support innovation in 
the business sector (Huang et ai, 2004). As of 2006, there are over 800 PCC at 
provincial, municipal and county levels, providing conSUltancy, technology promotion, 
product testing and other technology related services. (CPPC website, accessed 2008). 
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Table 3-7 Chinese science park and incubator development 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total revenue of the 53 national high-technology zones' 8.73 23.09 56.36 94.26 152.9 230.03 338.78 483.96 677.48 920.93 1192.84 1532.64 
Output value of the enterprises inside 53 national high-
tech zones 1 
7.12 18.68 44.73 85 .27 140.28 214.23 310.92 433 .36 594.36 794.2 1011.68 1293.71 
Output value at current prices of high technology sector 
across Chinal •2 
409.8 490.9 597.2 711.1 821.7 1041.1 1226.3 
Output value at current prices of manufacture sector 
across China 1,2 
4870 5130.1 5998.5 5966.8 6395.4 7510.8 8442.1 
Ratio of output value of the enterprises inside 53 national 34.23% 43.64% 52.06% 60.94% 72.33% 76.28% 82.50% 
high-tech zones to output value at current prices of high-
tech sector across China 
Ratio of output value of the enterprise inside 53 national 2.88% 4.18% 5.18% 7.26% 9.29% 10.57% 11 .98% 
high-tech zones to output value at current prices of 
manufacture sector across China 
Number of incubators 43 61 61 73 73 90 100 77 110 131 280 436 
Number of tenants 500 1,013 1,500 1,390 1,854 2,476 2,670 4,138 5,293 7,693 12,821 23,373 
Number of graduated tenants 190 364 648 825 1,316 1,934 2,770 3,994 6,927 
Note: 1. The unit is billion RMB. The values are treated as current price values. 
Source: (Huang et ai, 2004), Torch Program website: http://www.chinatorch.gov.cnl 
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3.3 Corporate governance and finance system in China 
In China, the corporate governance issue started to arouse attention in the late 1980s 
and the concept became more familiar to China in the late 1990s (Fei, 2004). The 
discussion related mainly to state-owned enterprises. Private enterprise on the other 
hand, since almost always managed by the owners, tend to suffer more from financial 
shortage rather than corporate governance defects. 
3.3.1 Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in China 
The current corporate governance of Chinese SOEs faces the following challenges, 
which will be each elaborated below. Their effects on technological capability 
development will be illustrated in Chapter 4, Section 4.2: 
• Multiple-level agency problem. Government officials supervise SOE executives, 
who are officials (or are viewed as officials) themselves. They often do not 
possess, or have the incentive to acquire industrial expertise. 
• Managers' career paths as officials - that they are prone to the problems of 
shortermism and lack of engagement 
• Executives have to spend much time to cultivate and maintain relationship with 
officials, hence are weak in relationship building with employees and 
shareholders - poor stakeholder inclusion. 
• Managers' remuneration scheme based on short-term financial data means that 
managements' incentive to pursue longer-term development through investment 
in technological innovation is lacking. 
Since the above issues have been rooted, mostly since the early 1950s, it is necessary to 
understand the causes by examining the four stages of SOE corporate governance in 
China. 
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Stage One: Mass nationalisation o/private enterprises: 1956·1966 
From 1956 to 1966 China went through a massive nationalisation of enterprises (gong 
si heying), entrepreneurs were forced to sell their businesses to the state in return for 
shares and fixed dividends (both benefits were abolished by the government since 
1966). Business corporations were gradually but completely delegalised and became 
state-owned enterprises. SOEs were however, not complete business enterprises. 'State 
ownership deprived them of legal independence, and the state planning apparatus 
deprived them of economic independence.' (Meyer & Lu, 2004: 60) Most SOEs were 
referred to as factories (Gongchang); which had only production function, and were 
were administered geographically as government branches (Meyer & Lu, 2004). In 
each SOE there was a committee of the Communist Party (Dangweihui), trade union 
(Gonghui) and meeting of employees' representatives (Zhigong daibiao dahui) who 
exercised monitoring rights over SOEs' managers. The government agencies were the 
authorities to hire and fire SOE managers, and the latter were paid as government 
officials themselves (Meyer & Lu, 2005). ). They functioned as government officials as 
well, with neither obligation nor incentive to behave as entrepreneurs. 
Stage Two: Management Contract System: 1979·1993 
In order to revive a struggling public sector accounting for over 70% of the nation's 
economy, in the late 1970s Chinese authorities aimed at restructuring SOEs by 
establishing a 'Modem Enterprise System' (Xiandai qiye zhidu). The SOE reform 
started in 1979 had no intention to abolish state ownership. Rather, it was intended to 
consolidate and enhance the efficiency of state ownership. The dominant policy from 
mid 1980s to 1990s was the management contract system (MCS) - contracts of profit 
sharing rules and decision rights which were agreed between the firm and the 
governing authorities ( administrative as well as financial departments) (Zhang, 1998). 
The length of a contract varies between 3 and 5 years, and typically contained 
conventional performance indicators including profit and tax target, debt repayments, 
asset appreciation, and utilization of retained profits (Zhang, 1998). However, in most 
cases, only profit target were weakly enforced and other only used as indicative, and in 
many cases the same set of contracts were adapted by various firms by simply 
changing name (Zhang, 1998; Firth et al. 2006). 
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Under the management contract system, although SOE managers have gradually 
received more business operational autonomy, the reform did not lead to generally 
enhanced SOE performance in the early 1990s. World Bank conducted a survey in 
1994 and found that those SOEs with management contracts appeared to even 
performance worse than those without. This survey also reported lower capital and 
labour productivity, plus more over-employment and more bank-finance by those with 
management contracts (World Bank, 1997). If the direction of causation does come 
from contract to performance, then it does require managers to have the expertise and 
access to information to secure benefit from decentralized decision-making (Carlsson 
& Eliasson, 1994), which the conditions were missing in Chinese SOE (Zhang, 1998): 
• First, under the MCS system it was the officials from line ministries or 
regulatory bureaus who had the right to select and dismiss SOE managers, and they did 
not have to worry about the consequences of their selection. This implies that, they had 
no adequate incentive to search for, or install good managers. Observation suggests 
that officials often based their selections on guanxi (personal connections) rather than 
yeji (performance) (Zhang, 1998). Naturally, SOB managers behaved more like 
officials than entrepreneurs - they did not have the needed ability, nor did they have 
the incentive to acquire such ability . 
• Second, although the MeS system intended to mitigate government 
intervention in enterprise operation, in fact local governments often were reluctant to 
lose influence over these SOEs. Meanwhile, firms also actively sought good 
relationships with the local authority for access to various state-controlled resources. In 
return, they would inevitably suffer political intervention. Normally the size of the firm 
is positively correlated to the degree of political benefits as well as political 
intervention it suffers (Cai, 2005). The autonomy of managers was thus less than was 
intended. Moreover, manager's contract term was normally 3-5 years, and their benefits 
from the firm did not extend beyond departure. Consequently the short-term pressures 
could all too easily arise. This induced managers of SOEs to invest in quick pay-off 
projects rather than in long term R&D and other productivity-enhancing projects 
(Huang et al. 2004). In many cases, abnormal short-term profits made at the large 
expense of long-term productivity (Broadman & Xiao, 1997). 
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Stage Three: Corporatisation and Company Law: 1993-2003 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, Chinese planners tried to merge state firms to create 
big 'national champions' (Nolan, 1996, p 12). Moreover, state firms were pushed onto 
the stock market as a quick way to pump money from the public into state firm 
investment. However, those efforts were accompanied by the old communist regime 
and organisations (Batjargal, 2005), and relatively little improvement in the 
governance practice. 
Since the early 1990s Chinese policy makers started to look to the models of corporate 
governance in western countries, in order to address the SOEs governance problems in 
a way compatible with the market economy. The corporatization policy was formally 
introduced by the Party in 1993 with some caution, but it soon became a law for SOE 
reforms (Lin & Wei, 2006; Zhang, 2007). The guiding principle was later summarised 
as 'zhua da, fang xiao' or, grasp the big and let go the small. In so doing the 
government hoped to concentrate resources on nurturing the larger SOEs, while 
gradually loosen state control over smaller SOEs. Through methods of government 
initiated bankruptcies, mergers and divesting of small and medium SOEs, SOEs' 
number has been significantly cut, from over a quarter of a million in 1995 to under 
150,000 in 2005 33 (Imai, 2006, p.5). Most small SOEs quickly transformed their 
ownerships into (employee) shareholding and POEs, while Medium SOEs and large 
SOEs were transformed from straight state-owned into limited liability or stock 
companies. By late 1997 around 9,000 SOEs had gone through the process (Xinhua, 
18/12/2006), which allowed them to issue and list shares on the two stock exchanges in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, which were opened in 1990 and 1991 respectively. (Listed 
firms and Chinese stock market will be described in detail in section 3.3.3) As of end 
2003 there were 1287 enterprises listed on the exchanges, of which 940 were SOEs 
(Hua et ai, 2004). 
In 1993 Company Law was introduced to help the firms build their modem enterprise 
systems. According to the Company Law, the organisational structure of a share-
holding company should consist a shareholdings' meeting, a board of directors and a 
supervisory board. In theory such structure of xinsanhui (the 'three new organisations') 
33 During the same period, 3,484 SOEs were closed down as part of government-funded programs, with 
6.67 million employees affected (Naughton, 2005) 
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would replace the laosanhui, the 'three old organisations' (Communist Party committee, 
labour union and employee representative meeting). 
The Chinese government has also taken other measures, which can be regarded as 
market-orientated in its bid for good corporate governance. For example the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) adopted a detailed corporate governance 
code in 2002 to promote best practice in terms of governance structure, shareholder 
voting, board composition, and the conduct of board and shareholders' meetings etc34 
(Zhang, 2007) (see Appendix IV. The formal corporate governance system of China). 
Despite the emergence of new rules, regulations and organizations, fundamental 
corporate governance flaws in the Chinese SOEs remained unaddressed. For example, 
the Company Law requests that the board of directors 'appoint, dismiss and decide on 
the remuneration of the company's general manager' (Company Law, 2006), most top 
managers of Chinese listed SOEs were still selected or nominated and approved by 
government authorities (Chen & Huang, 2001). According to a survey conducted in 
2000, from 1979 to 2000 around 80% of SOEs top managers were appointed by 
government authorities (http://www.cess.gov.cn!dcyj/diaocha.html). 
Stage Four: State Asset Supervision and Administration Committee: 2003 to 
date 
In 2003, State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) was set up. For the first time China has a dedicated body to be in charge of 
the control and administration of state asset with distinctive and bold initiatives. This 
demonstrated the strong determination of the central government to deal with the 
unresolved problems and remaining challenges of Chinese SOEs (Altenburg et ai, 
2008). 
Officially, SASAC as a 'special entity' at the ministry level is able to report directly to 
the State Council (Guowuyuan zhishu teshe jigou). According to NaUghton [2004, p. 
34 The CSRC & the State Economic and Trade Commission, Corporate Governance Code for Listed 
Companies (9, January 2002). 
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12], this special status enables SASAC to bypass the legal and administrative constraint 
of the National People's Congress.) It was even rumoured that State Councle has 
exclusively creative this organisation category for SASAC (Matt lin, 2007). 
According to Interim Regulations on the Management of Enterprise State-Owned 
Assets, SASAC's mandate includes drafting laws and regulations regarding state-
owned assets, managing and restructuring state assets, and hiring and firing the 
executives of SOEs under its supervision, whilst the ultimate authority over key 
appointment is still retained by the Party Committee). 
The establishment of SASAC indicates the central government's attempt to both 
decentralise and centralise. On the one hand, SOEs along the hierarchy of 
administrative levels were clearly separated, and control over local SOEs was handed 
over to local SASAC offices. Meanwhile, SASAC is commissioned to take over 
several functions formerly dispersed among different government authorities and party 
organisations. For the first time in modem China, there is a unitary administrative 
organ to manage the state assets. Central SASAC's other key function is regulation and 
supervision of more than 100 'Central Enterprises' (see below). Those are the 
mammoth SOEs hand-picked by the central government in hope to foster China's 
future global competitors (see below). 
As of end 2009, there were 141 'central enterprises' under the direct management of 
central SASAC 35. Although relatively small in number, these central enterprises 
possess more resources than all of the other SOEs combined, and have crucial 
importance to the national economy. Financially, central SASAC firms account for 
roughly 70% of all SOE profits, which equals 20% of government revenue (Mattlin, 
2007), and more than 30% of the entire valuation of China's domestic stock market is 
from listed central SASAC subsidiaries. Together these firms have an asset value of 
more than 1.6 trillion usn (Xinhua, 25/01/2007). 
As mentioned above, local SOEs are controlled by SASAC offices at the corresponding 
administrative level. For the first time, 'independent power over SOEs are delegated to 
3S This list can be found in Chinese on SASAC's website at 
www.sasac.gov.cnlnllSO/n1226/n2425/index.html . The number of firms is slowly dropping due to 
SASAC-supervised restructuring and merging efforts. 
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the local level' (Central Enterprises Investment Supervision and Management [trial 
directive], July 2006; see also Naughton 2006, pp. 3, 16). 
Structure of Control 
The establishment of SASAC as the first non-governmental representative of state 
ownership in P.R. China's history clearly demonstrates the central government's 
intention to separate state asset ownership from political administration. However, it is 
still difficult to map out a standardised structure of control, i.e. the relationship 
between central and local SASAC, local SASAC's relationship with local governments, 
and the actual distribution of power (ownership) over most SOEs among central/local 
SASAC. The reasons are listed below: 
1) The multi-centric, or 'fragmented authoritarianism' (Lieberthal, 1995) system of 
decision-making has made it impossible to clarify the distribution of state-asset 
ownership at different levels (Naughton, 2006). Before the reform, power distribution 
among government authorities was highly intricate: it has both vertical hierarchy as 
well as horizontal cross-over (tiao and kuao). Mandates of departments/authorities 
were defined in an ad hoc manner: they could either by type of activity (such as 
education), industry (such as pharmaceuticals, machinery, and electronics) or 
institution (such as pricing) (Liu & White, 2001) .. Moreover, the overall authority of 
State Planning Commission at that time was more formal than real. During the reform, 
authority of most of Chinese industries has experienced several decentralising and 
recentralizing arrangements. For example, the administration of Chinese automotive 
industry has been assigned to a sequence of 7 different authorities between 1982 and 
2003 (Liang, 2004: Table 6-1). Consequently, the ownership structure of SOEs in 
terms of 'who has invested, when, and by how much' is further complicated. 
As mentioned above, for the first time SASAC is no longer in the established 
ministerial structure (or at least it is intended not to be one). The relationship of central 
and local SASACs is also not simply hierarchical; since the latter are also independent 
special organs representing governments' state asset ownership at the local level - they 
ought to answer to the commissioners of the ownership. Paradoxically, the 'Provisional 
Ordinance of Enterprise State Asset Administration' (2006) requires the central 
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SASAC to guide and supervise local SASACs. 'The central government is in a 
dilemma on the issue of separating state-ownership from government authorities -
without clarification of the duties and rights, the central SASA C can intrude the 
decision-making of any local SOEs as it wishes, and thus become yet another 
government authority. The relationship between central and local SASA Cs will also 
remain much entangled.' (Li Shuguang, member of State Asset Law drafting committee: 
http://finance.people.com.cnlGBIl 037/5559925 .html). 
Efforts and achievements 
Compared to its predecessors (industrial ministries at the central level and bureaus at 
the local level), SASAC has more expertise in external supervision over the firms' 
operational activities. We can expect that SASAC officials, given that their 
responsibility is mainly about supervising firms, would be able do a better job. For 
example, SASAC has become increasingly active in the restructuring and strategic 
management of large SOEs, putting heavy. emphasis on developing indigenous 
technological capabilities. According to the 11th five-year plan, this is in accordance 
with China's current development priority (Guidelines for the 11 th five-year plan, 
03/2006). Also, since its foundation in 2003, SASAC has been trying hard to formulate 
systematic incentive mechanism and performance measurement for its SOEs (see Table 
3-8). Meanwhile, it attempts to include innovation performance in the comprehensive 
assessment system. To this extent, there should be a positive impact on firms' 
technological strategy. 
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Table 3-8 Portfolio of performance assessment in central enterprises by SA SAC 
Financial Performance (70%) Managerial Performance (30%) 
Content and Weight Basic indices Weight Reference Weight Assessment Weight (%) (%) indices (%) Item (%) 
Sales profit rate 10 Strategic 18 Net asset earning 20 management 
ratio the surplus cash 9 
cover ratio 
Profitability 34 
Profit/cost of 8 Development 
capital (EVA) 15 
Return on asset 14 and innovation 
Rate of earnings 
on equity 7 
Total asset NPL ratio 9 10 
turnover Operational 16 Current asset 7 decisions Asset 22 turnover quality 
Acct. receivable 12 
turnover Cash/asset ratio 6 Risk 13 
management 
Quick ratio 6 Basic 14 
assetlliability 12 management 
ratio 
Cash ratio 6 
Debt risk 22 
Ratio of Human 
Paid liabilities to 5 resource 8 
interest/debt 10 interest management 
Contingent 5 liability ratio 
Sales profit 10 Sales growth 12 growth Influence in 8 
rate the industry 
Operational 22 Growth rate of 7 growth Ratio of value total asset 
maintenance and 10 Contribution to 8 appreciation of Technological society 
capital input ratio 5 
Source: Translated from Central Government of People's Repubhc of China webSIte: 
http://www.gov.cnlgzdtJ2006-10/27/content_425677.htrn.AlsopublishedinTylecote. Caiand 
Liu (2010) 
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Financial performance of central enterprises directly supervised by SASAC has had a 
marked improvement. Profit increased more than 30 % at these enterprises in the first 
quarter of 2005. The total value of the SASAC-run companies increased from around 
RMB7 trillion at the SASAC's creation in 2003 to over RMB 9 trillion in early 2005 
(SASAC official website). Under these circumstances, the SASAC can certainly argue 
that it has done its job of increasing the value of state assets. However at the local 
level, the mass of smaller SOEs are still struggling to break even or continuously loss-
making (Mattlin, 2007). The bulk of SOE profits are made in a small number of large 
SOEs, most which are of course central SASAC enterprises36 As mentioned above, 
most of the central enterprises are in monopolistic or semi-monopolistic sectors, such 
as the oil and petrochemical, energy, telecommunication and metal industries. 
Therefore, operating in a fast-expanding economy, and shielded from competition, 
large state enterprises do not only have SASAC to thank for their recent success. 
Potential problems 
While it is recognized in China that ownership and regulatory functions need to be 
separated (Mako & Zhang 2004, p. 4), in the case of SASAC such seperation does not 
seem to have been implemented. It can be said that the SASAC combines both 
ownership and regulatory functions. While it struggles to assume ownership authority, 
it simultaneously carries out regulatory and other miscellaneous roles at behest of the 
central government and Communist Party. This state of affairs gives the SASAC a 
powerful and intrusive role which can be detrimental to the management of SOEs. In 
fact some of the old problems in SOE governance remained: 
• Management short-term ism may be encouraged by unnecessary reshuffling of 
enterprise management (see Figure 3-9 for the case of telecommunication 
sector); 
• Letting local government meddle in the management of successful companies 
can take managers' time and focus off stakeholder inclusion, and force them to 
care more about guanxi with officials, (see chapter 6, case study of Longertek); 
36 According to the NBS statistics, in 2005, the entire SOE sector had a net profit of 644.7 billion RMB, 
whilst according to the SASAC statistics, 627.7 billion RMB came from central enterprises, equivalent 
to 97%. 
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• Retained discretion by the Party Committee over appointment of key 
management personnel, combined with highly quantitative performance 
measurement criteria, may result in pursuit of short-term financial gain at any 
costs and failed 'interest alignment' between the principal and the agent. 
China Mobile retired CEO Wang Jianzhou 
China Telecom CEO Wang Xiaochu 
China Unicorn CEO Wang Jianzhou CEO Chang Xiaobing 
EVP Shang Bin -------.~ President Shang Bin 
Figure 3-9 Reshuffle of senior managers in China's three major telecom firms, 2005 
Source: (Naughton, 2006) 
3.3.2 Corporate governance of private enterprises 
The organisational forms of private enterprises (Siying qiye) can take many forms: sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability companies, and shareholding 
cooperatives. There are different requirements for registered capital and numbers of 
shareholder associated with these forms of private ownership. Since the early 19905 
limited liability companies have been the fastest growing form of private enterprises 
(Qian, 2002). 
According to a survey of the governance structures of private companies by Guo 
(2000), private companies showed the typical characteristics of family-dominated 
enterprises. The governance structure pattern in private enterprises is characterised as 
the 'blood-relative based distribution and balance of power among family members' 
(Chen & Huang, 2001,p. 12). Fei (2004) points out that, though a growing number of 
large private companies have been set up as limited-liability companies and have 
introduced the standard formal corporate governance system, the sources of the board 
of directors, operators and managers have the characteristics of close family-orientation 
(Fei, 2004, p.78). According to the third national POE census in 1998, more than half 
of the spouses of the married proprietors of private companies were engaged in 
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managerial work in the proprietors' companies. On the other hand, individual 
entrepreneurs still played a dominant role in making decisions despite the formally 
installed governance structure. The Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2003) concludes 
that the owners of private firms still maintains a firm hand in the business. Their survey 
(see Table 3-9 ) shows that private firms are currently still run by the shareholders 
(owners) themselves. 
Some scholars argue that such alternative, informal governance mechanisms have been 
remarkably effective in the private sector (Allen et ai, 2005). It is understandable from 
the Agency Theory viewpoint: the shareholders are much likely to be fully incentivised, 
enthusiastic managers themselves, excepted cases where non-family majority 
shareholders exploited minority family member shareholders. However, the informal 
governance structure may generate other governance issues, as Morek and Yeung 
(2003) points out. In China's situation, for the majority of POEs which are still under 
the control of first generation entrepreneurs, there is not much evidence of corporate 
governance (Huang, 2008). Many of these POEs are managed in an authoritarian 
tradition - entrepreneurs still perceive the business as his own property even when 
shares are sold to non-family members. 
Other problems related to corporate governance in POEs need to be understood in the 
context of the political system. For example, the long-standing inferior status and lack 
of security for POEs means that entrepreneurs are prone to short-termism. Many prefer 
quick realisation of profit rather than reinvestment or long-term development. The 
difficulty in accessing and securing external finance, on the other hand, leads to risk-
aversion - entrepreneurs are often reluctant to spend money on high-opportunity 
technological activities where there are high demand for capital and high level of 
uncertainty. Although not owned and run by the state, it is necessary for entrepreneurs 
to spend time and (often money) to cultivate and maintain a good relationship with the 
authorities, which means that they will have less to spare for activities for 
technological development. Moreover, POEs are often under pressure of the local 
governments to take in unwanted employees (Cooke, 2002). 
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Table 3-9 Internal Governance Structure of China's Private Enterprises 
Highest decision-making body 
Shareholders meeting 
Board of directors 
President of the company or the chairman of the board 
Major shareholders 
Other 
Major decision maker 
Major shareholders 
Minor shareholders 
Professional managers with no share 
Other 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2003); Fei (2004) 
3.3.2 Financial system as a source of funding 
(%) 
13.2 
33.1 
36.0 
14.3 
3.S 
86.9 
2.7 
6.8 
3.S 
In China, debt finance is the primary method of corporate external funding. In 2003, 
the total loans of financial institutions reached RMB IS, 931.5 billion, accounting for 
130.1 % of GDp 37 , while stock market capitalization reached only 36.38% of GDP 
despite impressive growth since 1994 (see Figure 3-10). The bond market is essentially 
only accessible by the central government to raise funds, and is so far off by 
corporations (Chen, 200S). 
Access to finance in general is highly unequal between SOEs and POEs. Unlike SOEs 
which receive policy-oriented loans from state-banks and stock exchange, private firms 
find it difficult to gain access to capital or to obtain loans from state-owned banks. The 
situation did not improve even after the government set up a network of credit 
guarantee agencies in the late 90s (Fung et ai, 2007). 
There are several explanations why the financing situation of POEs in general has not 
benefited from the establishment of the stock market. First of all, China has, until very 
recently very stringent listing requirements and quota system, which in practice 
37 Data for loans by enterprises is not available at the national level, however according to NBS's 
statistics, corporate loans account for around 50% of al1loans in economically developed coastal regions 
(NBS annual statistics, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, 2006). 
99 
Chapter 3: China's Automotive and Electronics Industries in the Context o/Transition 
prevented private finns from fund raising via stock market. This also applies to cash-
thirsty high-tech start-ups. 
Due to the high technology opportunity (see Chatper 2), high-tech enterprises often 
require high investment, especially in the early stage. This can be achieved through 
venture capital or other private equity arrangements, especially in Anglophone 
countries. Although international venture and private equity funds have recently started 
to grow in China (Financial Times, 19/02/2008), fast-growing Chinese VC industry has 
not been able to provide much help (Fung et ai, 2007),). Below each of the three main 
channels of financing are reviewed, e.g. Banking, Stock market, and Venture capital. 
The banking system 
China's financial system is dominated by large state-owned banks, and their business 
has mainly involved giving cheap loans to large SOEs (Wang & Bi, 2006; OECD, 
2008). On the other hand, POEs are strongly discriminated against and almost do not 
stand a chance applying for bank loans. 
The banks' intention to favour SOEs can first be attributed to the current legal 
framework, which remains contradictory with regard to the state-owned banks' 
independence from the state. According to Article 6 of the current Commercial 
Banking Law, 'commercial banks are ... protected from bureaucrati influence' 
However, Article 34 contradicts the above, stating that banks are required to support to 
the PRC's 'industrial policies'. Moreover, '... the traditionally close ties between 
government and bank offiCials at the local level have created a culture that has given 
local government officials substantial influence over bank lending decisions' (OECD, 
2005, p.140-141). 
On the other hand, state banks show particular aversion to small and medium finns 
(SMEs), particularly private enterprise. SMEs on the whole contribute over 60 % of 
GDP, yet they only receive 16 % of total loans granted by China's financial institutions 
(Stock Exchange Daily, 19/0112006). Further down the food chain are the private finns, 
mostly also SMEs. In 2001 under 1% of all loans granted by the national banking 
system has reached SMEs (Tsai, 2002). Some researchers argue that most state banks 
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lack the administrative and technical expertise required for processing individual loan 
requests (Yang, 2005). That inexperience notwithstanding, the banking system remains 
institutionally biased toward state lending. 
Many commercial shareholding banks and city or regional banks have recently 
appeared in the financial system. However, even these banks appear to be averstive 
towards the private sector: the new banks respond to guanxi like everybody else 
(Tylecote et ai, 2010). This may be rational enough for these more commercially 
sensitive banks: private firms are more vulnerable to bureaucratic actions or inactions 
beyond their control; and if in trouble for any reason will not be bailed out by the state. 
They hence bear higher risks. So most of the new banks tend to favour large POEs 
with positive credit and those with collateral (Langlois, 2001) 
In order to resolve the problem, the Central Government in the late 1990s, set up a 
network of more than 200 guarantee agencies across the country, which were supposed 
to help channel a total of US$ 4.8 billion in bank loans for the SMEs, including POEs 
(Pei, 2002). Although well intended, the same obstacles were faced with the credit 
guarantee system as had been faced by banks dealing with POEs and SMEs. First most 
POEs did not even qualify for the service due to the tough criteria set by SETC: in fact 
only less than 1 per cent of SMEs qualified (US Embassy in China, 2002). In addition, 
ironically, these guarantee agencies continued to favour large enterprises (Fung et ai, 
2007). Moreover, interest rate ceilings means that commercial banks would not be able 
to structure commercially viable loans for private borrowers. The result has been that 
formal credit channels are nearly closed to private businesses. 
The stock market as source of funding 
Originally, almost all listed companies are former SOEs. This was because that the 
original purpose of setting up stock market was to help SOEs solve their funding 
problems associated with the restructuring process. In fact this has not worked out (see 
below). On the other hand, stock market is rarely utilised by the private firms as a 
funding channel. 
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As another primary actor in the Chinese financial system, the mainland Chinese stock 
market has grown rapidly since its establishment in 1992. According to the annual 
report by the Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), from 1992 to 
2004 the number of listed companies went from 53 to 1377. By mid 2007 the 
combined market capitalization has reached US$2.2 trillion, accounting for 76.8 % of 
GDP38 . 
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Figure 3-10 Total market capitalization of SSE and SZSE as percentage of GDP (%) 1995-2005 
Note : As of end of calendar year 
Source: SSE (2005), China Daily (08/01 / 2008) 
China's stock market has a split share structure (guquan Jenzhi). The shares controlled 
by the state may be owned directly by the governments at different levels, which may 
each own a substation number of shares of the same company (Zhang, 2007). These 
shares are termed 'state-owned shares' (Guoyou gu) . They may be directly registered 
under the governmental departments, or may be held by companies specially created to 
hold and administer state shares. Furthermore, non-shareholding SOEs or not-for-profit 
organisations (such as universities) can hold shares too, so can their subsidiaries. These 
shares are termed 'state-owned legal person shares' (Guoyou faren gu) . In addition to 
the distinction between tradable and non-tradable shares, all tradable shares of Chinese 
companies are divided into 3 categories. 'A' shares are the most common category: 
38 After Feb 2008 the Chinese stock market was affected by the global financial crises and experienced 
drastic devaluation. The total market capitalization had dropped by over 60 % by end of2008 (Stock 
Daily, 0 I/O 1/2009): <http://stock.j rj.com. cnl2009101101093032 19097.shtml>. 
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those domestically traded in RMB in SSE or SZE. 'B' shares are those traded in China 
although in foreign currency. 'H' shares are the shares of Chinese companies traded 
outside of China (including HongKong). 
Other tradable 
B Share shares 
A Share 
29 .91% 
State Shares 
27 .90% 
Legal Person 's 
Shares 
21.33% 
Private sponsor's 
Shares 
0.25% 
Figure 3- 11 Shareholding Structure of Chinese listed companies (2007) 
Source: CSRC annual report (2008) 
Before September 2005, both state-owned shares and state-owned legal person shares 
were not allowed to be traded on the open market, and the non-tradable shares 
accounted for around 2/3 of the total shares issued (Xu and Wang, 1999; Tylecote and 
Cai, 2004). This model is changing, now all non-tradable shares are being converted 
into tradable shares (Matt lie, 2007), and according to CSRC, this process to be 
accomplished in late 2010 (CSRC website). While it is likely that the state is selling 
a part of its massive shareholdings, it is by no means certain that these newly converted 
tradable shares are to be sold. As of January 2009, 68.15 % of shares listed on SSE 
were still not circulated (according to SSE, data of the same period not available for 
SZSE). 
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Originally, almost all listed companies are former SOEs. This was because that the 
original purpose of setting up stock market was to help SOEs solve their funding 
problems associated with the restructuring process (although it has hardly worked out). 
The common practice of listing is for an SOE to set up a new company and acts as the 
sole or principal promoter. The founding SOE then channels part of its quality assets to 
the new company and stays the majority shareholder. Sometimes it may also invite 
other related SOEs or institutions to invest in the new company as co-promoters. The 
rest of the shares are then issued for public subscription. Such entities are known as 
'packaged shell companies' (Tenev, Zhang et ai, 2002, p. 75). 
Alternatively, the SOE may transform an existing subsidiary is transformed into a joint 
stock company and have it listed, or quickly acquire a out-side listed company and 
inject group assets into it - the last is called 'houmen' (back-door) listing .. Thus, a 
typical listed group corporation consists of mUltiple legal entities, the group, its 
subsidiaries, and often subsidiaries of subsidiaries (Meyer & Lu, 2006) (As illustrated 
in our case studies in Chapter 6). As a result, the state retains ultimate majority stake in 
the bulk of listed companies (Zhang, 2007). It is estimated by Lu and Sun (2003) that 
the state controlled around two-thirds of the total shares of listed companies. This 
figure is expected to have significantly dropped now, as in recent years the state has 
received or completely given up its shares in companies in financial distress flowing 
floating (Zhang, 2007). 
According to the stipulation of the law, state companles or institutions or their 
subsidiaries are the legal shareholders of listed companies and exercise residual rights 
on these shares, but governments have some arbitrary influence over the ownership 
rights (Zhang, 2007; Socialismtoday.org: 
http://www.socialismtoday.orglI22lhybrid.html). For example, appointment of top 
managers by the SOE controlling shareholders often needs to be approved by the state 
or even the Party (Liu & Sun, 2003; Firth et ai, 2006). 
On the other hand, the stock market is rarely utilised the private firms as a funding 
channel. Since stock financing for SOEs clearly benefited the government by reducing 
its fiscal burden, SOE listing was enthusiastically supported, partly by deliberately 
preventing non-SOEs from getting listed (Cao & Shi, 2000). Not until 1999 when the 
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Stock Exchange Law was revised did Chinese private firms enjoy equal treatment with 
SOEs when applying for listing. However, the stringent capital registration and 
profitabi lity requirements mean that it is still impossible for most POEs to make their 
way into the stock exchange market. According to the new Stock Exchange Law, any 
firms to be listed must have at least RMB 50 million registered capital, and must have 
at least 1,000 shareholders with shareholding of 1,000 or more, and must payout 
dividends within three years of initial public offering (Wu, 2003). Therefore, it is a 
commone practice for private firm wanting to be listed in the stock market to 'borrow a 
shell' - buy an already listed enterprise. This pragmatic approach not only incurs high 
cost but is also subject to hefty regulations (Bruton et ai, 2003). As of end of 200 I, out 
of 119 listed POEs in the 1175 listed firms in China, 65 were 'shell borrowers' (Wu, 
2003) 
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The Small and Medium Enterprise Board launched in June 2004 is supposed to help 
SMEs and POEs raise funds, however since it is a component of the main board; firms 
wanting to be listed on SMEB still have to reach same stringent list requirements. For 
example, CSRC requires that all firms to achieve a rate of return of 10% on net assets 
before they can be given permission to issue shares (Xiao el al. , 2004), and by stock 
exchange rules firms may be de-listed if they persistently report negative earnings 
(Buck et ai, 2008). 
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Figure 3-13 Number of private firms registered vs. number of firms listed on SMEB 
Source: SSE (2006), NBS database (2006) 
On the other hand, some private and family firms are reluctant to get listed, owing to 
the fear of ownership and controlling power dilution associated with listing. Nor are 
they willing to follow the rules of regular information disclosure or shareholders' 
meetings. One extreme example is Wenzhou, the city with the highest number and 
development speed of POEs. None of Wenzhou's over 130,000 POEs is listed, and 
most of them chose not to (Wall Street Journal, 30/03/2005). 
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Figure 3-14 Firms listed on China's SME board by industry (2006) 
Source: SSE annual report (2007) 
Venture capital market and private equity funds 
uring 
Since 1985 when the first venture capital (VC) corporation was established ' in China, 
the venture capital market in China has vastly expanded. The number of VC 
institutions in China has increased 16 times, from less than 20 in 1994 to 336 in 2006, 
and the total funds increased from RMB7.2 billion (US$870 million) to RMB 58.3 
billion (US$7.28 billion) (People's Daily, 15/02/2002). However, Allen et al (2006) 
show that the venture capital industry in China is still underdeveloped and has a 
limited role in supporting the growth of young firms. 
Until very recently, venture capital in China was still a state-controlled business. Up 
till the end of 2003 , government or state-controled corporations still control more than 
80% of VC funds in China, and only less than 15 % were provided by foreign and 
private investors (Fung et ai, 2007). Since 2004, due to the relaxed policy constraint 
following China's WTO entry, foreign VC institutions started to invest in Chinese 
domestic businesses, either through offsetting-up a new VC company or by investing 
directly in an existing Chinese firm. Consequently, the landscape of VC in China 
significant changed. As shown inFigure 3-14 Figure 3-15, in 2006 around 40.57 % of 
available VC funds were from foreign investors. As for actual VC funds invested in 
2006, 76.1 % came from investors with foreign background, whereas domestic funds 
only accounted for 23.9 % (Fung et ai, 2007). 
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Venture capital investment in China features distinctive sectoral, development stage 
and geographic concentration. Most VC chose to invest in high-technology projects. 
As Table 3-10 shows, in 2006 the most invested VC projects were in 'internet-based 
IT' sector, accounting for nearly 113 of all; other popular VC destinations included 
'traditional manufacturing' and 'energy/environment' projects. These three sectors 
together accounted for 64.05 % and 70.62 % of total projects and amount invested. In 
contrast, 69.94 % of the RMB 4.46 bn (US$ 557 million) invested by foreign funds all 
went to internet-based IT sector (Annual report of Venture Capital in China, 2006) -
foreign venture capital investment has a higher sectoral concentration rate. 
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Geographically, venture capital investment in China has concentrated mostly in the 
developed coastal regions. The Bohai Area (round Beijing), Yangtze Delta and 
Guangdong province took 85.28 % of total investment projects and 93.28 % of 
investment amount in 2006 (Yu et ai, 2007). 
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While more and more funds tend to shift to the later stages of firm development, less 
than 10 % of venture capital investment projects were in the seed or start up phase (see 
Figure 3-16). In 2006, 55.92 % of total venture capital investment went to projects in 
their expansion or mature stages. This trend indicates that risk aversion of VC 
investors has in fact become stronger, and is likely to impede the development of cash-
thirsty high-tech young firms. A number of factors deter venture funds from injecting 
into start-up POEs. Any firm seeking VC must show at least three years of financial 
accounts - and accounts in China are unreliable anyway. To evaluate a firm, a venture 
investor needs to know what sort of guanxi is possessed by the firm and by its 
managers as individuals, and how much they can capitalise that: as we have shown, 
these guanxi constitute valuable assets in Chinese context (Bruton et aI, 2003). 
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Figure 3-16 Distribution of China's venture capital by development stage 
Source: Annual report of Venture Capital in China (2006), China Venture Capital Research 
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3.4 The Chinese Automotive Industry: the industrial contextl9 
Globally, the automotive industry remains one of the most important industries in the 
modern economy and contributes a prominent share of total GOP and employment. 
China regards automotive as one of its pillar sectors and has given it high strategic 
importance to develop. Quantitatively, it ranked fourth in the largest automotive 
manufacturing countries in 2003 and progressed to third in 2008. Nevertheless, China's 
passenger car industry is still in an early stage. The Chinese government seems to have 
pursued a 'third road' of industrial development in which Inward Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) was invited to reshape the industry during the reform period. During 
a relatively short period of time, the national market developed rapidly against a 
background of the fastest growing economy in the world. Most leading car-producing 
multinationals (MNCs) have invested in China, primarily in the form of International 
Joint Ventures (IJVs) - as a consequence of government policy constraints. Entry 
barriers and trade barriers imposed by the government largely hampered the function of 
the competition mechanism (Lu & Feng, 2003). Only in recent years, this pattern of 
industry policy characterised by the 'twin barriers' was significantly revised. In such 
context, China's passenger car market has witnessed high degree of market dominance 
and consequently high level of prices and profits (until 2004). The SOEs and MNCs 
have collaborated through INs to share the high profits guaranteed by restrictive 
government policy. The slow improvement of the domestic technological capability 
has highlighted the failure of the 'market for technology' strategy in this sector. 
During the last ten years the landscape of China's automotive industry has been 
transformed, with the gradual introduction of increasing competition from abroad, and 
the sudden introduction of increased domestic competition from relatively small new 
entrants such as Chery and Geely. In subsection 3.4.1 we first examine the evolution of 
China's automotive industry in general and passenger car industry in particular, and 
39 Unless otherwise stated, much of the information relevant to the development of the Chinese auto 
industry (including passenger car sector) is from the China Association of Automotive Manufacturer 
(CAAM) website (www.caam.org.cn).This is because information of this type is fact-based and official 
statistics are relatively reliable. Other sources used in this section include Liang (2004) 'New 
Competition -foreign direct investment and industrial development in China' which is a Ph.D thesis of 
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Lu, F., & Feng, K. (2004) Fazhan 
woguo zizhu zhishichanquan qichegongye de zhengce xuanze (In Chinese: The Policy Choice in 
Developing China's Proprietary Car Industry). Beijing: Beijing University Press. 
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some main characteristics of the industry context. In 3.4.2, industry policy is discussed 
alongside evidence of the bad effects of 'featherbedding' and the classic mal-
governance of state-owned firms. Subsection 3.4.3 summarises the current 
development of China's passenger car industry. 
3.4.1 Industrial evolution 
The Chinese government has always attached great importance to building a strong 
automotive industry since the foundation of the People's Republic of China. In 1956 
with help from the former Soviet Union, First Auto Works (FA W) was set up in 
Changchun. In the mid- 1960s China began to build its second auto factory with its 
own effort, the Dongfeng Motor Corporation (DMC). In 1960, the total output of motor 
vehicles exceeded 20 thousand and increased to 222,000 in 1980, the products 
principally medium-sized trucks (CAAM website). 
In the pre-reform era of mid 1970s, China's automotive industry experienced stagnant 
development in a planned economy. In 1979, there were 130 assemblers making 
186,000 motor vehicles, most assemblers had production of fewer than 1,000 vehicles. 
In 1980, over 75 % of the motor vehicle production was commercial vehicles, mostly 
medium-sized trucks, while the share of passenger cars was under 2 %. Product 
diversification, therefore, became a major aim in the government-led restructuring 
(Liang, 2004). Since the mid-1980s, the Chinese government started to shift its 
strategic focus from heavy- and light-duty trucks to passenger cars, resulting in a 
production boom of the passenger car industry, which is the main concern of this 
section. 
The reform period since the late 1970s witnessed an all-round growth of China's 
automotive industry, particularly in the passenger car sector. For a long period of time, 
entry restriction and high tariffs imposed by the central government prevented both 
domestic and international competition. The situation gradually changed after the WTO 
access, as new international rules were increasingly complied with and government 
policies adjusted accordingly (for details of policy adjustment see the next subsection). 
Moreover, as a nation of rapid economic growth and a large population with almost 
zero penetration of private cars, the demand for passenger cars is explosive. 
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Consequentl y, a new phase of industrial development began since 2001 , and the 
growth of automotive production accelerated with the structure dramatically shifting 
towards passenger car manufacturing. In 1990, the total production of passenger cars in 
China was merely 42.2 thousand. In 2006, China produced 2.33 million motor vehicles, 
including 703.5 thousand passenger cars. In 2002 the two numbers increased 
respectively to 7.28 and 3.87 million (see Figure 3-17). The percentage of passenger 
cars in total automotive production increased to 53 %. 
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Figure 3-17 China's automotive production, 1958-200640 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook 2007, China Association of Automotive 
Manufacturers, Beijing. 
3.4.2 Industrial policy 
As an industry that had heavy legacies of state planning and central to the government's 
development strategy, China's automotive industry has been largely led by government 
policy and intervention. Two of the most influential policies that have hampered the 
development of China's automotive industry have been 'entry restriction' and 'market 
for technology'. 
Based on the argument that the Chinese automotive industry was in a highly 
fragmented structure, entry restriction was implemented continuously by the 
government agencies responsible for the regulation of this industry (Liang, 2004). In 
1986 the Automotive Industry was officially listed as one of China's 'Pillar Industry' for 
explicit support. In 1988, the government sanctioned three major car assemblers, FA W, 
40 This figure is also published in Tylecote, Cai and Liu (20 I 0). 
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DMC and SAIC, plus three smaller ones in Beijing, Tianjin, and Guangzhou. This was 
known as the 'Three Big and Three Small' Strategy41. The effort to limit new entries 
was confirmed by the later-formulated first industrial policy for the automotive 
industry in 1994. From 1989, one year after the establishment of the 'Three Big and 
Three Small' strategy, motor vehicle made by non-sanctioned firms has been included 
in the list of products that need to be strictly controlled (Quanguo qi che, min yong gai 
zhuang che he mo tuo che sheng chan qi ye ji chan pin mu lu guan Ii zan xing guiding 
(Provisional Regulation for the Administration of Automotive Vehicle Production and 
Producer), 1989: Item 5). Within the overall environment of strict entry control, two 
more SOEs obtained special permission to produce compact cars. Although new 
market entries were permitted since the early 1990s, new entrants were all IJVs formed 
between MNCs and the identified six domestic firms (Liang, 2004, Figure 6-2). Only 
after 2000, new entries other than the 'Three Big and Three Small' were permitted. 
Since the mid 1980s, the Chinese government believed that the quick expansion of 
export-oriented automotive industry in Japan and South Korea was due to active 
government interventions (Aoki et aI, 1996). As a result, China's first formal industrial 
policy was issued to the auto industry. The policy was formulated in 1994 and 
modified in 2004. In February 1994, the formal State Planning Committee released the 
'Automotive Industry Industrial Policy'. As a long-term plan for industrial development, 
the automotive industrial policy highlighted the Chinese government's determination to 
building a strong national automotive industry. In 2004, this policy was replaced by 
'Automotive Industry Development Policy' released by National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC). 
The 1994 industrial policy reinforced the strategy of stringent entry control, and like 
many other government policies it not only established objectives but also dictated 
specific means. 1) It named the State Administration of Machinery Industry (SAMI), a 
small bureau under the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) to implement 
entry control through a system of product catalogue management (Automotive Industry 
Industrial Policy, 1994, Chapter 2). 2) The policy also provided detailed administrative 
41 In a meeting held by the State Council in August 1987, FAW, DMC and SAIC has been identified as 
the three car production bases. In 1988, the State Council declared the 'Three Big and Three Small' 
Strategy in 'Notification on the Strict Control of Passenger Car Production Locations'. In a later national 
meeting on automotive industry held in Shanghai, 1991, the strategy was re-stressed (www.caam.org.cn). 
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screening at the product level, deterring the firm decision on the development of new 
products (Automotive Industry Industrial Policy, 1994: Chapter 3, item 10). 3) 
Moreover, according to Item l3 in the policy, firms reaching certain production 
capacity, which could only possibly be large SOEs, were given an array of fiscal and 
financial privileges, including tax refund, prioritised stock market floating, cheap bank 
loans, priority to access foreign funding allocation and policy-related zero-interest 
loans. 4) In addition, a product license system was established, serving as an effective 
administrative measure of entry restriction. As a result, in order to avoid 'inefficient 
competition', private firms and small SOEs were practically not allowed to enter the 
Chinese automotive market in the whole of the 1990s (Liang, 2004). 
The 1994 industrial policy also encouraged foreign investment in the automotive 
industry. It was hoped that through establishing 50-50 shareholding international joint 
ventures, the domestic firms would gain access to the most up-to-date technology from 
their MNC partners. Such strategy was clearly reflected in the policy wording. In the 
first sentence about the industry's technology policy, the document reads: 'the 
government encourages and supports automotive enterprises ... to build product 
development capability through assimilating and absorbing foreign technology ... the 
foreign technology to be introduced needs to reach the current international standard'. 
Nothing was mentioned about self-reliant learning and development. 
Such strategy posed striking contrast to that of South Korea in the 1970s (Kim, 1997). 
In 1973 the Korean government released its 'Long-Term Development Plan for the 
Automotive Industry', in which it requested Korean firms to design and develop their 
own cars. The Chinese policy on the other hand, only set 'product content localisation' 
as the industry's development objective in the 1990s. The logic was linear and over-
simplified - that by achieving parts and components localisation, the industry would 
automatically achieve self-reliant R&D (see Figure 3-18). However content localisation 
involves a different set of technological activities than product development, and 
therefore requires (and consequently develops) different capabilities. Automotive 
vehicle product development is R&D intensive, which requires the capability of system 
integration (Teece et ai, 1997) bringing together the component 
subsystems/technologies into one and ensuring that the subsystems function together as 
a system. Parts and components manufacturing on the other hand is based on 
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production, and mainly involves the capability to manufacture against specifications 
and requirements. Therefore it does not automatically generate indigenous R&D 
capability. The unsatisfying performance of the protected SOEs proved such an 
approach wrong (see the next subsection for more details). 
Technology 
introduction 
through joint-
venturing 
Parts/components 
1/ localisation Self·reliant R&D 
Figure 3-18 Hypothetical trajectory of technological development in China's automotive industry-
policy before 2004 
Source: Own composition 
In May 2004, the NDRC released the 'Automotive Industry Development Policy', the 
newest version of industrial policy, with the new situation after China's WTO entry in 
consideration. The new industrial policy has eliminated the provisions related to FDI in 
the previous version that did not comply with the WTO obligations. The local content 
requirements have been eliminated, but the restrictions on foreign equity and on the 
number of IJVs participated by one foreign firm have remained. Surprisingly, despite 
of heated policy debate and open objection by industry experts, the new policy further 
increases barriers to entry. Although the administrative screening has been simplified, a 
series of criteria for investment projects of motor vehicle production have been 
prescribed. The threshold investment level for new automotive projects has been 
increased to from RMB 500 million to RMB 2 billion (average inflation rate during the 
10 years has been -0.3 %), and a R&D centre with investment of over RMB 500 
million must be established. This threshold imposed a restriction to relatively small-
sized projects, especially those with private capital investment. By forbidding the 
transfer of production license, the new industrial policy also blocks new entry through 
mergers of small incumbents. Again private and small state firms have been officially 
blocked by the new industrial policy as a consequence. Although the industrial policy 
alleged to aim at the 'creation of a fair-competitive and integrated market environment', 
it did not treat different firms equally - as 'large-scale automotive group', firms with 
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over 15 % market share can implement their own development strategy with the 
permission of the NDRC. Although no firms were specified, the SOEs with over 15 % 
market share in 2004 were only FA W, SAIC and DMC - the Big Three 
(www.caam.org.cn). 
3.4.3 Current development in the passenger car Industry 
Following a heated policy debate triggered by Lu & Feng's report (2004), coupled with 
the reduction of trade barriers, the year 2004 sees a certain degree of deregulation 
toward a more open industrial environment has taken place in the automotive industry. 
As a result, entry barriers have been reduced and more automotive (especially 
passenger car) companies have been established. A few small-sized latecomers, such as 
Geely, Chery and BYD walked sideways and managed to get the license to produce 
cars. Most of them demonstrated determination to carry out own R&D and have out-
performed the protected SOEs (for detailed example, see case study of Chery in 
Chapter 6). As the production capacity of the industry increased rapidly, with 
latecomers speeding up their presence, competition has been intensified. 
Although industrial analysts agree that China still lag far behind leading nations in 
innovation capability, production capabilities have expereienced remarkable and rapid 
growth. Fuelled by the rapid expansion of domestic demand, in two decades China has 
grown from a nation with almost zero automotive production to the third largest auto 
producer globally (Noble, 2006). According to Goldman Sachs, between 2005 and 
2025 the Chinese automotive market will boom another 10 times, from 19 million units 
in 199 million, and overtake the US market (Wilson, Puroshothaman, & Fiotakis, 2004, 
p.23). Meanwhile, in sharp contrast to their almost negligible presence in 2000, 
domestic brands are now making speeded appearances and taking over the low-end 
market (see Table 3-11 and 
Figure 3-19). In early 2009, China's domestic brands for the first time take up more 
than a quarter of China's passenger car market (Xinhua, 24/03/2009: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com!auto/2009-03/24/content_11060476.htm). In the February 
2009 top 10 ranking, 4 out of 10 brands were domestic, again an unprecedented rise. 
Latecomers such as Geely, Chery and BYD have been the fastest growing Chinese car 
firms. 
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Table 3-11 Market share and concentration ratio in China's passenger car industry, selected 
years42 
Year 1986 1990 2000 2004 2006 
Domestic brands (%) 4.1 10.5 25.7 
IN brands (%) 83 69 83 77 71 
Concentration ratio (C3) (%) 99 71 65 48 46 
Note: Calculated according to the production data (units of passenger car produced) 
Source: CAAM 
The recent success of Geely and Chery in China's passenger car industry demonstrates 
that domestic brands can establish their competitiveness in a market that has already 
been dominated by international brands. Table 3-11 shows how 'domestic brands' -
made by domestically-owned firms outside joint ventures - have held their position in 
the domestic market in spite of the increased openness to foreign competition (from 
wholly-owned subsidiaries as well as imports) following WTO entry in 2001. Chery is 
the first Chinese domestic passenger car brand to have sold 300,000 units in a year. In 
2006 one of its models ranked first in the best-seller list on the Chinese market; and 
Chery's domestic market share growth also surpassed all of its competitors - foreign or 
domestic. Exports of these domestic brands have also begun to climb rapidly. Chery 
has become the biggest car exporter with headquarters in China. According to the 
statistics of International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, in 2006, 
Chery has become the world's fastest growing car manufacturer at the rate of 65.62% 
(http://oica.netlwp-contentluploads/2007 /07 /chery.pdf). 
42 This table is also published in Tylecote, Cai and Liu (2010). 
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Table 3- 12 Product ion and market shares of Cherl: and Geell:' 1999-2007 selected l:ears4J 
Firm 1999 2001 2003 2005 2006 
Production MS Production MS Production MS Production MS Production MS 
(Units) (%) (Units) (%) (Units) (%) (Units) (%) , (Units) (%) 
Chery 30,070 4.2 101 , 141 5.0 207,300 5.9 308,000 6.7% 
Geely 3,750 0.7 23,808 3.3 85,000 4.2 150,000 5.3 238,080 4.6% 
Source: Chery and Geely websites: www.Chery.cn; www.Geely.com. 
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Figure 3-19 Market shares of domestic brands in passenger car segments, 2007-200844 
Source: Beijing Lange Steel Information Research Centre. 
URL: http://www.lgmi.com!shanghailglinfo/detailnewsb.asp?infono=514634 (accessed in 
June 2008) 
43 This table is also published in Tylecote, Cai and Liu (20 I 0). 
44 This table is also published in Tylecote, Cai and Liu (20 I 0). 
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Some national programmes and young firms are showing strong ambition to compete 
in cutting-edge innovations, such as the development of hybrid cars, electric cars and 
hydrogen fuel cells. For example, BYD Auto (Biyadi qiche) as a young auto firm 
established in 2003 has been leading the race of electric car development. In 2008 its 
parent, BYD, made '65% of the world's nickel-cadmium batteries and 30% of the 
world's lithium-ion mobile phone batteries' (BYD official website: www.byd.com). 
The firm was established as BYD bought the bankrupted state-owned auto maker 
Qinchuan in west China and hence acquired tightly controlled license to produce 
automobiles in China. In first half of 2007, the company's F3 model was selling over 
10,000 units per month. In addition to F3, the company has unveiled the new models 
F3R, F6, F8 and Fl. BYD announced introduction of a production plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicle (PHEV) sedan in China in the second half of 2008. At the North 
American International Auto Show in Detroit in January 2009, BYD also exhibited the 
PHEV, which has a 100-kilometre (62 mi) all-electric range. It uses iron-phosphate 
based batteries based on BYD's midsize F6 sedan, and can be recharged to 70 % of 
capacity in 10 minutes. The car went on sale on 15/12/2008 (www.byd.com). With 
confirmed investment of $230 million for 10 % of BYD by Warren Buffett (Berkshire 
Hathaway Annual Report, 2008), the firm currently makes the F3e, the electric version 
of F3, which has a claimed speed range of 350 kilometres with a single charge. Electric 
as well as plug-in versions of all its models are planned. The company also produces 
car batteries specifically designed for electric vehicle applications and electric vehicle 
charge stations. BYD Auto is also planning to use BYD's experience in mobile phone 
battery to construct dual-mode, gasoline-electric hybrid plug-in vehicles to be sold in 
Europe by 2010. 
In addition to own R&D, some national manufacturers also seek to attain IP and know-
how through global mergers and acquisitions (M&A). For example, China's largest 
auto parts manufacturer Wanxiang has performed extensive M&A and Greenfield 
activities in 30 companies in eight countries, including United States, England, and 
Germany (Altenburg et aI, 2008). As for BYD, through acquisition and reconfiguration 
of BAIC's mould divisions, it has now become one of the largest Chinese auto mould 
producers and the only Chinese car assembler with passenger car complete-mould-set 
production capacity. In 2008 it also started to enter the international market by 
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supplying moulds for Land Rover's new models (Moju zhizao [in Chinese, Mould 
manufacturing], 1112008). The largest auto maker SAlC also acquired a majority stake 
in Korean Ssangyong CLiu & Tylecote, 2009) as part of its intention to build Chinese 
cars with its own brand. However it remains to be seen whether such capital 
operatioins really boosts indigenous capabilities. 
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3.5 The Chinese Electronics Industry: the industrial context 
The electronics industry in China has developed remarkably during the reform era, 
especially since the early 1990s. The total sales and profits increased from RMB 49.2 
billion and 5.7 billion in 1989 to RMB 2,996.9 billion and 188.9 billion in 2005, and 
the total export jumped from US$ 2.8 billion to US$ 268.2 billion during the same 
period. In 2003, China surpassed Japan by almost 20 % to become the second largest 
producer of electronics products (MIl). It has also become the single largest 
manufacturing industry in China in terms of both output and export. 
China's imports and exports of electronics and information products reached US$885.4 
billion in 2008, up 10 % from the 2007 (Shanghai Daily, 19/02/2009). 
Exports rose 13.6 % to US$521.8 billion, which accounted for more than a third of 
China's total export. Imports expanded 5.4 % to US$ 363.7 billion, or 32.1 % of the 
country's total import. More than 75 % of the industry's exports in 2008 were 
telecommunications products, computers and home audio and video products. 
According to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China's 
production of mobile handset, colour TV, monitor and central office switches in 2006 
accounted respectively for 35, 40, 55 and 30 % of the world's total. In 2006, 40 % of 
colour TVs, 50 % of mobile handsets and PCs, and 60 % of monitors produced in 
China was exported (NDRC website: www.ndrc.gov.cn). 
It is a broad consensus that FDI played a central role in shaping China's electronics 
industry (Ma, Nguyen, & Xu, 2006). The largest exporters remain foreign, but several 
Chinese electronics firms have rapid grown to become global players in under 20 years, 
and the most famous examples include Huawei Technologies, Lenovo, and the Haier 
Group (see Altenburg et ai, 2008 for a snapshot of these firms) 
Chinese electronics multinationals are serious about the competition, each dedicating 
substantial resources to innovation. Huawei, for example, claims to have almost 30,000 
employees in this field and to invest more than US$l billion in R&D (Altenburg et ai, 
2008). Like in other export-oriented industries, Chinese electronics firms initially 
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depended heavily on insertion in global value chains for technological catch-up: 
through low-cost OEM according to the specifications of foreign customers, these 
Chinese subcontractors quickly learned how to carry out mass production. Furthermore, 
the explosive boom of domestic markets for PCs and consumer electronics also 
brought enormous economies of scale. Chinese leading firms quick accumulated 
experience in both the home and export market. For example, Chinese personal 
computer brands in 2004 had roughly two thirds of the domestic market (Zhou, 2005, p. 
1121 ). 
However, the apparent prosperity in the Chinese electronics industry does not 
withstand closer inspection. It is undeniable that apart from a small number of 
enterprise mentioned above, the Chinese electronics industry as a whole still mainly 
operate on the low value-added manufacturing, packaging and assembly end of the 
global value chain. In value terms, more than 80 % of the exports were only processed 
or assembled in China with materials supplied by overseas clients, according to MIl 
(Shanghai Daily, 19/02/2009). From 1995 to 2001, foreign invested firms increased 
their value added share in Chinese industry by an annual rate of 18% on average. In the 
electronics industry, foreign invested firms account for at least 65% of total value 
added (Hu & Jefferson, 2009). 
In the next three subsectors, we examine three areas where China's manufacturing 
strength lies: consumer electronics and telecommunication equipment. 
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3.5.1 Consumer electronics (non-white goods) 
The consumer electronics industry was the first segment within the Chinese electronics 
industry to grow up. According to international standard definition (ITU website), this 
segment includes two broad ranges of consumer electronics categories: white goods 
and brown goods. White goods include refrigerators, air conditioners, washing 
machines, and other household appliances, which is not included in our observation. 
Brown goods include home audio and video products such as television, DVD players, 
MP3 players, digital still cameras, personal digital assistants (PDAs) and home stereo 
systems, as well as portable audio products. 
The development of the consumer electronics industry in China features temporary 
success after foreign technology introduction in the 90s, and fierce price war 
afterwards (Woetzel, 2003, Gao et aI, 2007). Starting from the early 1980s, MNCs 
have gradually moved the production of consumer electronics products from South-
East Asian economies to lower cost countries, such as China. Due to China's 
protectionism industrial policy back then, these MNCs were not allowed to invest 
directly; hence some international joint ventures (INs) were established, such as Panda 
and Skyworth. They have been among the largest firms in this sector. On the other 
hand, the development of INs has been accompanied by the rapid growth of domestic 
firms, both SOEs and non SOEs. Home-grown firms such as Changhong (TV), 
Chunlan (Air Conditioner) were initially actively involved in technological learning 
and catch-up, and their effort brought them overwhelming success in the late 80s and 
the whole of 1990s. Unfortunately, after absorbing and assimilating technology 
introduced from foreign MNCs, these Chinese firms did not manage to gradually 
develop indigenous products and upgrade their technological capabilities. Therefore, 
most domestic Chinese firms continue to be located downstream of the global value 
chain (Gao, 2005). 
In the meantime, following the homogenisation and commoditisation of these 
consumer electronics products, competition for Chinese firms was increasingly based 
on price. One may argue that in the name of defending the home-owned industry, price 
wars did help domestic firms fend off their foreign competitors temporarily. But the 
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rising market share of some of the Chinese firms was at the cost of their domestic peers 
or even themselves (Liang, 2004). For example, Changhong TV sets have been sold by 
their weights - RMB 30 per kilogram. (Zhongguo jingji shibao [China Economic 
Times), 12/06/2002). In 2001, the average profit level for Chinese TV manufacturers 
further reduced from 2.26% in 1999 to 2.05%, and caused an industry-side loss of 
nearly 3 billion Yuan (Hong Kong Mail, April 26th 2002, p. 2.). 
3.5.2 Telecommunications equipment 
Telecommunications equipment is an industry which is exceptional within the broader 
area of 'electronics/ICT' in at least two ways. The first is its success - to be precise, the 
success of mainland Chinese firms - in international competition. See Figure 3-20, 
Table 3-13 and Figure 3-21. The second is its independent approach to technological 
development45 (Gao, 2003; Cai and Tylecote, 2005; 2008). 
The rise of Huawei, the largest Chinese telecoms equipment manufacturer, has been 
remarkable. In less than 10 years, Huawei has set up 20 branches and 100 offices 
outside China, selling to over 100 countries and regions with over 1 billion customers. 
It has 12 foreign-based research centres and 28 regional training centres. In 2007, over 
72% of its sales revenue was generated from the overseas market. In December 2005, 
Huawei, together with three other multinationals: Ciena, Lucent and Siemens, became 
supplier of British Telecom's $17.4 billion 21st Century Network (21 CN), which' ... 
has been one of the largest single procurement programmes ever undertaken in the 
communications industry worldwide'{BT Group, 9/12/05, 
http://www.btplc.coml21CNlWhatisBTsaying/Keymilestones/Keymilestones.htm). 
ZTE, the second-largest telecoms equipment manufacturer, is following the same 
trajectory, approximately two years behind. From 2004 to 2006, the company entered 
partnerships with the top 50 global GSM/WCDMA systems equipment operators, as 
45 It can be, and has been, argued that it was this 'forced' independent development which made Chinese 
telecoms more successful than (for example) television manufacture (Gao et al., 2007). However what 
happened in the telecommunications sector is that the only people (and organisations) who get to 'first 
base' by the end of the 1990s, were the ones which were capable of understanding a certain type of 
innovation strategy which requires a certain type of corporate governance (Cai & Tylecote, 2005). 
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well as six of the top ten WCDMA telecom vendors in terms of terminals. In 2006, it 
secured 10 WCDMA deployment contracts in Western Europe, South America and 
Asia Pacific. In 2007 its total revenue was $4.6bn, of which 57.8% was generated from 
overseas markets, and its sales growth in Europe and North America was 155%. (ZTE 
website:http://wwwen.zte.com.cnlmainlNews%20Events/Whats%20New/2008040260 
720.shtml). 'It is believed that the recent merger and acquisition deals between 
Ericsson and Marconi, Alcatel and Lucent, and Nokia and Siemens were at least partly 
designed to 'fight off competition from Huawei and ZTE'.' (Li, 2007 p.2). We are not 
aware of any other part of the ICT industries in which the leading players are (or seem 
to be) afraid of their Chinese rivals. 
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46 This table is also published in Tylecote, Cai and Liu (20 I 0). 
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Table 3-13 Stored Programme Control Exchange (SPC) annual market share by three groups in 
China (1982 _2000)47 
1982 1987 1992 1997 2000 
Direct import (%) 100 89 54 5 0 
Joint venture (%) 0 1 1 36 63 57 
Domestic supplies 0 0 10 32 43 
(%) 
Source: (Tan, 2002) 
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Figure 3-21 Value ofsales contract ofHuawei: 2002-2007 (100 million US dolJars)48 
Source: Huawei website: http: //www.huawei .com/about/Aboutlndex.do 
(Accessed 08, June 2008) 
47 This table is also published in Tylecote, Cai and Liu (20 I 0). 
48 This table is also published in Tylecote, Cai and Liu (20 I 0). 
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3.5.3 The Chinese electronics industry- conclusion 
To sum up, China's electronics industry has developed rapidly, but it still is structurally 
poor. Apart from a small fraction of bridge-head firms such as Huawei and ZTE in the 
telecom equipment sector, China may have achieved economies of scale through mass 
production and export of electronic products, however most firm do not enjoy higher 
added value as they need to pay to use the core technologies. 
3.6 Summary 
The decision initially made to reform China's SOEs was not to privatise the large and 
medium SOEs, but to transform them into 'modem enterprise corporations' with as 
much state shareholding as possible. This strategy has been modified, but not 
abandoned. Chinese corporate governance in SOEs is far from aligning managers' 
interests with those of shareholders. Apart from financial reward (perhaps this is less 
effective, considering the low payment and short tenure) management in SOEs is also 
motivated by political status. Banks and stock markets in Chinese financial system are 
unable to playa positive role in SOEs' technological development. These financial 
sources however show a peculiar aversion towards the private sector. Finally, for the 
automotive and electronics industries, a series of policies and programmes 
implemented have had profound influence on their development. Despite a small 
number of bridge-head innovative companies, the majority of Chinese firms have 
followed a dependent technological strategy in acquiring technological capabilities, and 
have failed in general to achieve indigenous competence upgrading. 
128 
Chapter 4 Theoretical Frameworks Used in This 
Study 
This chapter describes the theoretical frameworks used in this study. Section 4.1 
discusses a conceptual framework developed to measure technological capability of 
firms in newly industrialising economies. Measurement of capabilities in NIE firms 
should serve a predictive function; it is important to assess the firm's potential to 
enhance the dynamism of their technological capability. Therefore the concept of 
'dynamic technological capability' is incorporated in the framework. Our definition is a 
synthesis of those of Teece et al and Winter's - the ability or the capability to generate 
change, to enhance future competitiveness in response to the competitive environment 
(see also Chapter 2, section 2.1.1). Therefore, rather than assessing firms' static 
capability - 'the ability at a given point in time to make a sophisticated product with 
advanced processes' (Cai & Tylecote, 2008, p. 1794), we aim to measure the firms' 
ability to achieve continuous, far-reaching improvements in product and processes 
(independently). Based on critical review of previous attempts to measure 
technological capability in the literature (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2), a framework is 
proposed in Section 4.1 to capture the 'dynamism' of firms' technological capabilities. 
Moreover, it is argued that the firms' technological performance should also be 
measured to gain a complementary insight into their capability, namely, innovation 
performance, sales performance and product performance. 
After the reality of China's corporate governance and finance system are reviewed in 
Chapter 3 Section 3.3, Section 4.2 adapts the theory of CGFS and technological 
capability development to the Chinese context. Section 4.3 describes the five general 
propositions to be investigated in the empirical research to follow. 
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4. 1 Framework for measuring technological capability in this 
thesis 
A combination of capability measurement and performance measurement is used in the 
empirical research. 
4.1.1 Technological capability 
The framework of technological capability In this study is composed of two 
dimensions. The first dimension is the conceptualization dimension, which defines four 
types of technological capability: Manufacturing, R&D, Internal and External 
Organisational: 
• Manufacturing capability measures a firm's ability to convert R&D results into 
products in accordance with design request, which caters for market needs, and 
cost effectively (Yam et aI, 2004). 
• R&D capability measures a firm's ability to incorporate customer/market desired 
functions into product design/development process, to carry out necessary 
process/product improvement and innovation, and to respond to market and 
manufacturing feedbacks about design and manufacturing. 
• Internal Organisational Capability measures a firm's ability to cultivate 
organizational culture, to secure organizational mechanism, and to adopt good 
practices to facilitate progressive, far-reaching technological improvement. 
• External Organisational Capability measures a firm's capability to interact with 
other companies. More specifically, its capability to construct a specialized 
network with its suppliers upstream of its operation; and with its customers and 
buyers downstream. 
There are 'elements' of capability within each type. For example, one of the elements of 
Manufacturing Capability is 'Manufacturing Cost Control'; another element of Internal 
Organisational Capability is 'Co-ordination and control of the major functions within 
the company'. These are fundamental building blocks of technological capabilities, as 
captured in Table 4-1. 
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The second dimension is the operationalisation dimension of the conceptual 
framework. It is concerned about the extent or strength of a firm's given element of 
capability: measured by degrees, which goes from degree 1 (below the average of the 
region) to degree 6 (advanced by world standard). Bear in mind that a firm could 
conceivably have high score in one or other element in Manufacturing Capability; and 
very low score in some element of R&D Capability. It would thus mean, to that extent, 
that the firm has high manufacturing capability, and low R&D capability - common in 
China (Cai & Tylecote, 2008). The converse (degree 6 in some element of R&D 
Capability, degree 1 in one of Manufacturing) is also perfectly possible for a firm 
which has long-standing research background but is new to manufacturing (examples 
can be found in public research institute spin-offs). Thus it might be skillful in reverse 
engineering, but poor in manufacturing. The framework is further elaborated below. 
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Types 
Manufacturing R&D 
Elements 
De2ree 
Below the average of the nation • Overall level and • Overall R&D capacity 
capacity of machinery 
and equipment • Communication within 
the R&D department 
Average in the country • Ensuring smooth functioning of • Process improvement 
equipments and routine 
production • Process innovation 
Above average but not advanced • Complying with the • Incorporating desired 
request of R&D functions in product 
in the country design/development 
• Manufacturing cost process 
control 
• Quality and speed when 
Advanced in the country 
• Total quality control responding to feedback 
from manufacturing about 
• Making improvement to design and engineering 
the manufacturing system 
• Incorporating market and 
Approaching world standards • Utilising manufacturing customer needs/feeback 
process to contribute to in the improvement and 
the innovation process innovation process 
Advanced in the world 
Source: own construction with some elements drawn from Yam et at (2004) and Cai & 
Tvlp.l".otp. (?OOR) 
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Organisational 
Internal External 
• Flexibility in adjusting • Access external 
organisational structure knowledge (science, 
according to the need for technology, techniques, 
technological know-how, tacit 
developments knowledge) 
• The culture and • Performance of 
mechanism to encourage purchasing and 
and reward procurement force 
inventiveness and 
creativity • Relationship management 
with major customers 
• Co-ordination and 
control of the major • Knowledge and skills for 
functions within the collecting market 
company intelligence 
• Initiative of sub-units • New markets 
within company strategy development 
• Establishing and 
maintaining distribution 
channels 
• Provision of customer 
services 
Conceptualisation Dimensioin: Types and elements 
Types. In this study, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the typology of technological 
capability follows the basic notion of classification of Lall's, i.e. according to function. 
An array of empirical research regarding measurement of technological capability, 
have also been critically reviewed (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.2) and synthesized to 
form the framework. Particularly, instead of categorising technological capability by 
Product and Production as Lall did, we make a distinction between Manufacturing and 
R&D capabilities. This is done with China's empirical reality in mind - that pronounced 
separation between Manufacturing and R&D functions is commonplace, especially in 
firms with a traditionlhistory of state-ownership (which is partly a legacy of the 
planned economy; see Chapter 3, section 3.2.3). Therefore it is meaningful to measure 
firms' Manufacturing and R&D capabilities separately, as a firm strong in 
manufacturing might well be relatively weak in R&D, and vice versa. 
The concept of Internal and External Organisational Capabilities is adapted from 
Arnold & Thuraus's work (see Figure 2-1), especially their typology of Internal and 
External capabilities, and the concept of organisational capabilities (OCED, 1992, see 
also Chapter 2, section 2.1.2). As mentioned above, it measures the firms' capability to 
coordinate and orchestrate internal and external efforts both on operational and 
strategic levels. Moreover, it emphasises the intangible aspect as well as the 
organisational characteristic of technological capabilities. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.1.2, we take into consideration of the mediating effect of linkage activities on 
capability development - that firms' linkage (networking) activities are partly 
influential to their development of other types of capabilities. It is hence sensible to 
leave out firm's specific linkage activities as elements of their organisational capability, 
as this may cause multi-collinearity issues in the quantitative study stage. Therefore 
when devising the elements for Organisational Capabilities, we focus on evaluation of 
the firm's capability to handle relationships on the strategic level, i.e. structural 
flexibility for innovation, cultural aspects, etc. 
Elements used for capability evaluation have also been adapted and synthesized from 
previous empirical frameworks. Particularly, we incorporate the concept of routine-
based evaluation. As argued in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1 (Dynamic Capabilities), 
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routines are good indicators of capability, and the efficiency of a certain routine reflects 
the degree of this type of capability being achieved (see below for an example in a 
routine in Manufacturing Capability). In this study we therefore include those routines 
which are both good reflection of firms' capabilities, and are relevant to the industrial 
sector. 
Operationalisation Dimension: Degrees 
In the second phase of empirical study (the questionnaire survey), in order to assess the 
sophistication of types of capability achieved by firms, all elements under all 
capabilities (Manufacturing capability, R&D capability, Internal and External 
Organisational capability) are ranked from Degree 1 to 6 (degree 1 - below average in 
the country; degree 2 - average in the country; degree 4 - advanced in the country, 
degree 6 - advanced in the world)49. It was assumed that firms have fully developed 
that element of capability when they reached 'Degree 5' The reason for using 'Degree 5' 
as the threshold is that 'Degree 5' means those capabilities are approaching the worlds' 
leading level. In empirical studies, an effective means to gather such information would 
be through subjective comparison with peers in the same sector (see Chapter 5 
Methodology for details about collection of data in this study). 
By using Degrees to evaluate capability elements/routines (see top of this page), it 
enabled us to apply the evaluation framework to a wide range of firms with varied 
dynamism of capabilities - since the selection of routines/elements used in the survey 
can indicate different Degrees of capability in different firms. For example, for the 
capability ' ... to comply with the request of R&D', an element/routine of Manufacturing 
Capabilities, Firm A may only have the basic ability to make to specification, hence is 
at Degree 2 or below (average in the nation). In Firm B, such routine may involve 
creation of new production systems or change of the current ones, and is therefore at 
Degree 5 or above. It hence can be said that Firm B has acquired dynamic capability in 
this element and Firm A has only acquired static capability. 
49 Using a 6-scale Likert points instead of 5-scale has been proven to be effective in forestalling 
respondent's default choice of scale 3 (Jacoby & Matell, (1971) 'Are three-point likert scale good 
enough? Journal of Marketing Research, 8(4): 495-500 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3150242).Cai& 
Tylecote has also adapted similar scale points in their survey in the Chinese telecommunications industry 
(2008) 
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Reflections on the capability measures and further implications for this study 
As with many other attempts to capture technological capabilities in the empirical work, 
the list of elements given in Table 4-1 should be regarded as an indication rather than 
definition. Its purpose was to ' ... allow respondents to identify with reasonable 
precision the degree and types of capabilities they were rating in their firms' (Cai & 
Tylecote, 2008, p.1798 ), and the case study and pilot survey (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.3,5.4 and Chapter 6) reassured that they felt they could do this. 
Another crucial element of this framework is that it also facilitates differentiation of 
visibility among types of capabilities (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3): the extent to which 
the type of capabilities respond to low-visibility technological activities and 
availability of finance. R&D capability and both internal and external Organisational 
Capabilities are assumed to gain more from low visibility activities than high-visibility 
ones (see Chapter 2, Section 3). Any such differential effect is likely to be less with 
manufacturing capability. For example, the 'overall levels and capacity of machinery 
and equipment' can be achieved via the purchase equipment and licenses - expensive 
but highly visible (as argued in Chapter 2 Section 3). The same would not apply to 
R&D capabilities, such as the capability of 'Incorporating desired functions in product 
design/development process,50. There, relatively low-visibility efforts would be needed 
and investment expected. Moreover, manufacturing capability should be most sensitive 
to the availability of finance, organisational capabilities least. 
4.1.3 Performance measurement 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2, we also measure the firms' technological 
performance to gain a more complementary insight into their capability. We decide not 
to rely entirely on financial performance measurements since Chinese firms are 
normally very reluctant to reveal such sensitive data (Yam et ai, 2004). Therefore three 
performance indicators - proposed by Chiesa et al.(1996) and successfully 
so Weare aware that some of the activities could be outsourced, however even in such a case the firm's 
overall ability to coordinate and orchestrate internal and external efforts towards innovation still reflects 
its overall technological capability, and is also incorporated in the Organisational Capability category of 
this framework. 
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experimented by Yam et al (2004) - were adapted in this study, namely, innovation 
performance, sales performance and product performance. 
• Innovation performance is measured as 'the number of commercialized new products 
expressed as a percentage of all products in the company over the last 3 years' (Yam 
et ai, 2004, p.1127). It is generally accepted that the absolute number of innovations is 
not a good indicator for innovation performance (DECO, 1997) as the numbers varies 
significantly across sectors. On the other thand, innovation rate shows the relative 
innovative strength and therefore is a better indicator. Moreover, how effective and 
how efficient new product development takes place often reflects a finn's 
competitiveness (Lawless & Fisher, 1990; Yam et ai, 2004). 
• Sales performance is defined as 3-year average rate of average annual sales growth. It 
is a good indicator of a firm's market advantage. It also shows whether the innovation 
has been commercially successful (Yam et ai, 2004). 
• Product performance also helps to demonstrate a firm's innovation impact on the 
market. Chiesa et al.(l996) used a portfolio of elements to evaluate product 
perfonnance, such as 'average concept-to-Iaunch time', 'programming product series', 
'quality leve'l, 'cost',,'technology characteristics', and 'price/function advantage' (p. 
121). Most dynamic technological capabilities are behind the market success of 
products (Fu, 1998; Wu, 2001). In our study, eight different product related dimensions 
are measured through subjective evaluations by top executives on a Likert-type scale 
(see Chapter 5, Section 5.4). 
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4.2 Corporate governance/finance and technological capability 
development in China 
As shown in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3, the theory of the effects of corporate governance 
and finance on technological capability, although originated from empirical research of 
developed countries, can be adapted to NIEs. Following a thorough review of the general 
technological strategy and the CGFS of Chinese firms in Chapter 3, this section further 
adapts these frameworks to describe the reality of China. 
As in any newly industrialising economy, domestic Chinese firms normally face the choice 
between: 
• Dependent technological strategy, which often involves buying state-of-the-art, 
complete-sets of technology and equipment from abroad - a typical high-visibility 
technological activity (see shown in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3); 
• Independent, or 'imitative' technology strategy (see also Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3), 
by a deliberate and careful combination of sourcing (from abroad and domestically) 
and self-reliant efforts. It is relatively cheaper, and crucially, less visible than the 
first option, but will often benefit the firm's long-term technological capability 
developmentS 1 • 
Historical review of corporate governance in Chinese SOEs shows that (Chapter 3, Section 
3.3.1), traditionally, SOE top managers progress in their career path as officials. They are 
often chosen by officials, not necessarily for their entrpreneurship but political merit, and 
are allocated to them with a view to rotate. The time horizon in the job is thus short, and 
whilst in it there is need to quickly impress senior officials - who are takeo regular 
rotations, and not likely to take a long-term interest in the firm (Cai & Tylecote, 2005). 
51 Very well-funded firms connected to research institutes may have a third, very expensive option of 
complete self-reliance. 
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There are modifications of this situation alongside the move towards a more marketised 
economy. Especially, according to Cai & Tylecote (2005), the most significant 
modification happens when (fully or partial) sales of state stake take place. Although in 
many SOEs key appointment are still made 'administratively' (see also Chapter 3, Section 
3.3.1), i.e. directly by the state; some are now selected by the shareholders (state or not), 
while the remaining adapt a middle route of recommendation or approval by the state. 
Since how they started may largely determine how they progress, the distinction in 
management selection method must will influence managers' behaviour and their decision-
making. On the other hand, the size of the state shareholding is likely to affect the firm in 
other ways. It is not hard to imagine that in the Chinese context, firms with higher state 
presence would be better looked after by state finance providers, such as state-owned 
banks. Cai & Tylecote argue that firms might be pursuing other financial sources when the 
share of state falls below 50 % (2005; 2008). Therefore it may be useful to draw a line 
between firms with 50% or more state share (Majority SOEs), and those with fewer 
percentage of state shares (Minority SOEs). 
Privately-owned firms (POEs) in China have a very different situation. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Sections 3.1.1 and 3.3.2, being young (since 1980) and predominantly family-
owned, they have shareholders who has every intention to be full-engaged, and with deep 
knowledge about their own firms. So information asymmetry does note often pose a 
dominant issue for these firms. However they are often financially handicapped, with 
discriminated access to finance and possibly other resources (Cai & Tylecote, 2005). As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, although private sector has become much less discriminated, they 
still clearly experience unequally treatment. 
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4.3 Propositions for empirical research 
Based on the initial review of theoretical literature and China's context, four propositions 
are thus developed; each of them are operationalised for in-depth investigation in the 
empirical phase of this study, which are presented in the next four chapters. 
Proposition 1. For Chinese Auto and Electronics companies, different types of ownership 
(e.g. MASOE, MISOE and POE) entail different patterns of corporate governance and 
level of access to finance; 
Proposition 2. Firms with a certain pattern of corporate governance (e.g. intelligent 
engagement and inclusion) will excel (other things equal) in capability types which are 
sensitive to low-visibility activities. 
Proposition 3. Firms with better access to finance will excel (other things equal) in 
capability types which are sensitive to high-visibility activities. 
Of these 3 propositions, the 2nd and 3rd have higher weight, as they help answer the key 
research question, i.e. what are the influential elements of corporate governance and 
finance on a firm's technological capability; and how these elements take effect (see 
Chapter 1, Research Questions). 
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This chapter introduces research methodologies which have been used in this study. 
Section 5.1 reviews the philosophical perspective underlying this research. Section 5.2 
describes the two main research methods used in this study: multiple-case studies and 
questionnaire survey. Section 5.3 introduces the techniques used for conducting 
interviews and case studies. Section 5.4 describes how questionnaire surveys were 
designed and circulated, including information about population, sample size, 
administration of the pilot surveys and the final stage of large scale circulation. Section 
5.5 summarises this chapter. 
5. 1 Philosophical perspective 
All research (qualitative or quantitative) is based on some underlying assumption about 
the validity of research and appropriateness of methods (De Vaus, 2002). There have 
long been debates been two of the mainstream views of how research should be carried 
out in social sciences. They are social constructionism and positivism. 
The main thrust of positivism argues that reality is an external existence, and can only 
be accessed through objective measures (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
Two fundamental assumptions lie beneath this statement and other propositions of 
positivists: 1) Ontologically, reality exists as a piece of external, objective 'hard truth' , 
and is not influenced by human perception or interpretation. 2) Epistemologically, 
knowledge can only be acquired through observations of the external reality, whilst the 
observations themselves must take an equally external and objective form. 
Consequently, positivists generally associate scientific research with the conventional 
physics type of approach, where they tend to believe truth can only be accessible 
through lab-condition experimenting, or in the case of social sciences, hypothesizing of 
fundamental laws. 
It has been strongly believed that positivism offers the best approach to studying and 
understanding human and social behaviour, and for a long time dominated the literature. 
However, a new and contrasting paradigm has come into being, and philosophers of 
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science start to argue that 'reality' is not only external, but socially constructed and are 
given meaning by people (e.g. Khun, 1960). The idea was further developed by many 
authors in social science authors and comes into being as the term social 
constructionism. It is concerned with the manners which we share experiences with 
others to make sense ofthe world, especially through the use oflanguage. 
Social constructionism, on the other hand regards reality as socially constructed, rather 
than what positivists believed to be objectively determined (Easterby-Smith et a.l, 2002) 
In the ontology of social constructionists, not only inanimate objects, but also humans 
are embraced in observable events. It therefore argues that the human interpretation of 
the phenomena and events should constitute the focus of research. 'The task of the 
social scientist should not be to gather facts and measure how often certain patterns 
occur, but to appreciate the different constructions and meanings that people place 
upon their experience' (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p.30). One should therefore try to 
'make sense' of people's different experiences through attempts to understand and 
explain them, and the explanation, according to social constructionists, does not lie in 
external causes and fundamental laws. 
Positivism and Social Constructionism are each associated with certain data collection 
techniques, namely, quantitative methods and qualitative methods. There is a noted 
tendency in social science to deliberately dichotomise these two methodologies, and 
the attitudes towards methodological matters seemed to have somehow polarised 
among certain scholars. It is believed by many people that these two philosophical 
paradigms are incompatible with each other; however recently there have been many 
pragmatic researchers drawing from both traditions by deliberately combining 
methods .. Easterby-Smith et at (2002) defines this mixture as the relativistic approach. 
The relativist position assumes that some reality does exist independently of the 
observer; however, this part of reality is not readily accessible through physics-type of 
experiments, in which key factors are measured to test hypotheses (Westacott, 2005). 
On the other hand, relativism acknowledges the roles that human participants, both the 
subject of research and the researchers themselves, are playing in shaping the 
characteristics of 'truth' in its own circumstances. In other words, the 'truth' cannot 
simply be determined through observations extracted from the circumstances, nor does 
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it merely depend on people's interpretations or predictions. Following this approach, 
with its more open-ended, exploratory nature, qualitative methods are particularly 
useful in the beginning of a study. Quantitative methods, on the other hand, can be 
adopted to verify the reliability of the theory by testing the hypothesis . 
Table 5-1 Comparison of positivism, relativism and social constructionism in management 
research 
Ontology : RepresentatWnalism ! 
i • 
Relativism Nominalism 
i 
~ -_ .......... -- ... ......". ... .. -----.. ~ 
: is determined through : 
requires verification of : : depends on who 
. : consensus between : 
prediction ' : establishes it. 
, different viewpoints : 
Truth 
------------~-----------------~ .---------------
Facts are concrete, but cannot i depend on viewpoint : are all human 
, 
be accessed directly , of observer. creations 
, , 
--- ........... -.. -~ ----.. ... ----...-'- ... --- --". ~... .. - ---.. .. - ----.-.... ---.. ... ... _--- .. ~ ...... .. -----..... ~ ... --. _ ... .. -...... _ .... ... ~~--~-- . ..,. ~ .. --. -
Epistemology ; Positivism ~ . Relallvism ! Social 
! ' , 
Elements of 1 I constructionism 
. .!!'.i!~!!l!..t!I!J!!.g!~s j~. . __ . ~ ~ _~_ ~ _~_~ __ ~_ ._ _L.... ~ ... ~~_ ~_~ 
Aims Discovery Exposure : Invention 
Starting points Hypothesis Propositions Meanings 
Designs Experiment Triangulation Reflexivity 
--------,-----------
Techniques , Measurement Survey , Conversation , 
, 
Analysis/interp Verification! 
, 
, 
retation falsification 
Probability Sense-making 
----- --,-
Outcomes Causality Correlation , Understand , , 
, 
Source: Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson (2008, p. 62-63, Tables 4.4 - 4.5,) . 
The relativistic approach is appropriate for this research. The ultimate goal of this study 
is theory verification in relation to the effect of corporate governance and finance on 
technological capability development in Chinese firms, however the theory to be 
verified is insufficiently researched in the past and requires further development. In this 
case a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods is effective. As illustrated in 
Figure 5-1 , both positivist and relativist approaches were utilised. In the early stage 
qualitative method has been used to: 1) gain enriched insights into the issues (i.e. how 
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does corporate governance and finance influence technological capability development 
in a developing country); 2) answer the 'why' questions relating to the observed 
phenomenon (the failure of most Chinese firms and the success of a few of them and 
why there are not more); and 3) further develop the proposition and generate 
hypotheses (the specific effects of corporate governance and finance on technological 
capability development). At the later stage, positivist methods (data collection through 
questionnaire survey and parametric data analysis) have been used to evaluate the 
sampled firms' technological capabilities and to test the hypothesis. A detailed 
introduction to the specific methods and techniques employed will be provided in the 
next section. 
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Figure 5-1. Research methodologies of this study 
Source: Self-construction and partial adaptation from De Vaus • 2002. p16. 
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5.2 Research methods in this project 
Main research methods used in this research are the case studies (including face-to-face 
interviews and documentary data collection) and questionnaire surveys. 
Case study. It is widely believed that case study is a useful method of research into 
relatively new areas, especially those connected with social and organisational 
development (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Yin, 1994). Gill and Johnson (1997) summarised 
several advantages of case study: 1) it is an effective method to investigate a new topic, 
since case study research does not rely on previous literature or empirical evidence; 2) 
the case study can encompass a wide range of data, including documents, interviews 
and observations, therefore it can provide a deepened insights into the research 
objective; 3) the case study is also a preferred method of inquiring into those theories 
that are concerned with the organisational planning, culture, institutional reform, 
technological development, for its holistic, in-depth investigation. As our aims in this 
project are to explore, explain and establish a relatively new theory (Yin, 2002; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006), we therefore used multiple case-studies in the first stage to facilitate 
in-depth, longitudinal examination of individual instances to gain a sharpened 
understanding of the subject matter; then to decide what might become important to 
look at more extensively later; and then to shape hypotheses for testing in the next 
stage. 
Questionnaire survey. The advantages of a questionnaire survey have several aspects: I) 
it provides a widely reachable population and produces quantified and generalised 
information (which is necessary for hypothesis testing in this study); 2) it enables 
systematic analysis of results by using statistical methods; 3) it allows researchers to 
test hypotheses through both open ended and closed ended questions, and through 
multiple item scales and lor multiple questions; 4) it is well suited to make 
classifications and comparisons in different categories (e.g. the comparison of different 
levels of technological capabilities according to ownership types and management 
selection methods in this study) (De Vaus, 2002). There are also disadvantages with a 
survey method. De Vaus (2002,8-9) expressed a concern that the questionnaire survey 
is too restricted, because it relies on highly structured questionnaires. 
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The following part of this chapter explains how case studies and questionnaire survey 
have been conducted, and introduces the sample size and the administration procedure. 
5.3 Case studies and semi structured interviews 
A balanced portfolio of 5 firms from varied backgrounds was selected for case study. 3 
of them were from the auto industry (2 selected for paired pilot study) and 2 from 
electronics industry. 4 firms were majority state-owned enterprises (MASOEs) at the 
time of case study, and I private-owned (POE). Their geographical locations ranged 
from the most developed coastal area to underdeveloped inland provinces (see Figure 
5-2), and firms' ages also varied. This 'self-selection' sampling technique is 
recommended for exploratory research (Saunders el aI., 2000,171), and therefore 
would contribute to the understanding of how corporate governance and finance 
worked its way (in different settings) in shaping the firms' technological strategy and 
behaviour. 
Figure 5-2 Map of China and geographic location of case study firms 
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Pilot case studies of two state-owned firms - Shanghai Auto Industry Corporation 
(SAIC), and Chery - were conducted in the auto industry. These two cases were 
studied mainly from published sources, which in their cases are abundant. Analysis 
was made both longitudinally (how changes take place within the organisation over 
time) and laterally (how behaviour differ between the two). Specifically, the evolution 
of both companies' technological capabilities was monitored; their different approaches 
to capabilities building were compared and analysed in relation to their finance and 
governance mechanisms. During the pilot case study three goals were fulfilled: to gain 
practical experience in using the analytical framework; to help formulate interview 
questions for formal case studies at a later stage; and to make necessary modifications 
to the framework of research. 
Semi-structured interview questions were formulated through analysis of findings from 
the pilot study and through brain-storming with the supervisor and academics with 
similar research experiences in China. Following on initial findings from pilot study, 
formal case study was undertaken in three more Chinese firms (one from auto industry 
and two from electronics industry). In June 2006, 8 face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews was conducted in Guizhou Tyre Co., Ltd (the auto firm), starting from 
company CEO, party secretary, to technology director, line manager and then to shop-
floor workers. In June 2008 two follow-up interviews were conducted on the phone to 
collect updates about the firm's most recent development. From May 2006 to March 
2007, 16 in-depth semi-structured interviews were carried out in a similar manner in 
the two electronics firms (see Table 5-2). Such 'top-down' interview technique helped 
to generate holistic maps of the cases in limited time period and more importantly, to 
triangulate key issues of interest (Tylecote & Cones a, 1999). In the interviews adjusted 
sets of questions were put to each informant according to her operational role. See 
Figure 5-3 for the detailed research process during case study stage. 
Before each interview, background information was collected and studied, such as 
historical development, evolution of shareholding structure (if the company studied is 
publicly listed), product technology, and general industry and market information. The 
sources of information ranged from books, journals, public reports, newspaper (mainly 
electronic version), and internet. Through the pre-interview study, the interviewer 
developed a brief understanding of the case and can be more precise when formulating 
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technology / process-specific questions. Moreover, with an enhanced understanding of 
the general technology in the product sector, the intervie~er is able to comprehend and 
perceive the firm's level of technology advancedness more confidently. 
Table 5-2: Number and t e of interviews conducted in case studies 
Company 
interviewed 
Position 
CEO 
name 
GTe SouthElectro 
1 + 1 (resigned) 1 + l(retired) 
, 
Longertek 
------- ----- -------- --------------- - --- - -- - - -- ------------ - -----:----------- --- - ---------~--------------- ----- ---Senior managers in charge of : : 
technology or finance 2 + 1 (retired) i 2 i 2 
, , 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------:------------------ - -----~------------- - ------ ---
, 
Operation managers 1 : 1 : 1 
-- -------------- --- ---------------- ----- --- ---------------------:------------------------ i- ------- ---- ---------- -
Line managers 2 : I : 3 
_. S·hop· fl~·~~· ~p~~·~if~~·s ·~~·d······· ·· ··················· . ·i· ···· ··· ·· ·············· . . .. ........ . ......... -
maintenance workers 1 i 1 : 2 
, 
, 
--- - --------- - ---- ------- ------- -- - ------ -- ----- -- -------- ______ I_. __ _ •• - •••• -.----.-----~------------------ . ___ _ 
Number of interviews in : ' 
each firm 10 i 7 : 9 
, 
, , 
Grand total of interviews 26 
Interviews were carried out in Chinese and recorded by hand-written notes during the 
interview. Tape recording has been reported to be very difficult in the Chinese culture 
(Cooke, 2002). Initially, interviewees were asked if they would accept tape recording; 
however all but one refused, and this person was very reluctant to express opinions 
openly when the recorder was on. When the interviewer put the recorder away, he 
finally started to talk in a much more relaxed manner. Therefore the idea of tape 
recording the interviews had to be dropped. After each interview, notes were reviewed 
and reorganised within 24 hours to enable the interviewer to recall details more readily. 
In addition to the interview notes, the interviewer also obtained documents from 
interviewees to enrich the data collected. These documents include the organisations 
internal reports (long-term and short-term development agenda and minutes of 
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meetings), organisational structure, peer-comparison of market performance and R&D 
project planning, etc. All interview reports were presented to the supervisor so that 
feedback could be obtained for further improvement and as guidance for 
supplementary interviews. Effort was also made to ask the chief interviewees or their 
authorised representatives to review the reports (in English). The purpose is to 
minimise misunderstanding and to ensure that all information collected in the case 
studies has been at the informants' consent. 
Face-to-face interviews were also followed by site visits, where the researcher gained 
observational insights into the firm's organisational and daily routines, as they are often 
reflections of its capability dynamism (Zollo & Winter, 1999; Winter, 2003). In 
addition, after the interviews, the interviewees were invited to introduce some of his or 
her colleagues who have previously worked in the firm. Follow-up interviews were 
then made with these former employees (if possible) for their opinion on the key issues. 
Such anecdotal approach reported in past accounting and management research (Lukka 
& Kasanen, 1995; Hillebrand et al., 2001) has worked well in this project to cross-
check answers provided by the incumbent starf2, and to clarify some findings from the 
case study. 
Interview data was carefully studied and analysed, together with supplementary 
literature review. In Chapter 5 the key findings from pilot and formal case studies will 
be described and discussed with reference to the literature and theoretical framework. 
Once the analyses of the case studies were completed, the process of hypothesis 
generation, questionnaire formulation, design and circulation was undertaken. The 
objective of questionnaire survey was to find out the levels of technological 
capabilities which had been attained by sampled firms and the effects of those key 
factors identified on firm's technological capability development. 
52 Such method proved useful especially when the fIrm has a hierarchical structure and the current staffs 
were reluctant to reveal their opinion about the corporate governance and general management. 
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5.4 Quantitative questionnaire survey 
As a widely practised and powerful tool for quantitative research in the social sciences 
(Black, 1999), questionnaire survey is used in the research to test the hypothesis 
generated in the case study stage. 
5.4.1 Questionnaire formulation 
A multi-informant approach was adopted based on past survey experience in the 
literature (Yam et al., 2004; Cai & Tylecote, 2006) and the supervisor's suggestion. It 
helps to limit the possibility of common method bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) whilst 
testing the effect of corporate governance and finance on technological development 
(via strategy). For each firm two questionnaires were designed. One is for the company 
executive or board member, which contains questions related to corporate governance, 
finance and general technology strategy (see Appendix I). The other is for the R&D 
manager or chief engineer, which involves self-evaluation of firm's technological 
capability and more specific questions about technology strategy (see appendix II). The 
main body of questionnaires for the executives were based on literature review (see 
Chapter 2) and case studies (see Chapter 6); the questions for innovation performance 
were derived from the framework in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.1.3). Questionnaires for 
R&D managers were developed from frameworks explained in Chapter 4 (Section 
4.1.1). 
Questionnaires for the technological capability evaluation consists of 3 sections (see 
Appendix II). The first section is company profile, which is used to collect such 
information as respondent's job function, company's main product, and number of 
employees. The second section includes elements for the technology capability 
assessment, which is derived from Chapter 4 (Table 4-1). In light of the knowledge 
background of the informants, and in order to simplify the structure of the 
questionnaire, we regrouped the elements under Internal and External Organisational 
Capability into Organisational Capability, and reduced the number of elements to 
ensure that the informants are able to provide accurate answers to their knowledge. 
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Moreover, since it is not feasible to collect objective data about technological 
capabilities of a large number of firms, and subjective measurements have been widely 
adopted in organizational research (Powell & Micallef, 1997; Rouse & Daellenbach, 
1999; Guan & Ma, 2003), we asked the R&D managers to provide their opinion about 
the firms' technological capabilities. For manufacturing, R&D, and organisational 
capabilities, all elements were measured on a six-point Likert-scale, where the scales 
were labelled as 1 = less than average in the nation; 2 = average in the nation to 6 = 
advanced in the world (detailed explanations can be found in Chapter 4, Section 4.1). 
The questions on innovative performance were not included in this questionnaire, 
instead, we ask the CEOs to answer them in the other questionnaire. There are two 
reasons for such arrangement. First it could reduce the common source bias and single-
informant bias by gathering information from two groups of informants. Moreover, the 
company CEOs are expected to have a more reliable overview on the firm's general 
performance than the R&D managers; therefore they are in a better position to answer 
performance related questions. The third section collects information about firm's 
technology strategy and behaviour. The questions include internal and external links 
that have been forged and their impacts on the firms' technological development; the 
types of technologies that have been transferred; and the firms' reliance on certain 
technological activity for technological development over the last five years. 
The questionnaire for corporate governance and finance consists of four sections (see 
Appendix I). The first is company profile and the firm's general and innovative 
performance. Performance questions include: 1) the average annual sales growth rate 
over the last 3 years; 2) the ratio of the sales revenue generated by innovative products 
to that of the total revenue; and 3) evaluation of the competitiveness of products in 
general. In the last question, company executives were asked to compare their main 
products with the competitors' in eight dimensions: Average concept-to-Iaunch time; 
Quality level; Cost advantage; Price/function ratio; Product manufacturing process; 
Product technology features; Market need and growth potential; Market 
competitiveness. The second section of this questionnaire collects information about 
corporate governance issues, such as ownership structure, selection, evaluation and 
penalties of top managers, internal power concentration, and shareholder engagement 
that are proxied by evaluation of (financial) reporting. The third section is about access 
to finance and project approval. Questions asked relate to sources of finance for firms' 
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business expansion. The last section asks questions about firm's general technology 
strategy, such as the strategy for technology acquisition, proportion of expenditure on 
technology-related activities with varied visibility, and factors that inhibit firms' 
technological development. 
Review of the supervisor's experience in collecting data in China (Cai and Tylecote, 
2005) aided the design ofthe questionnaires. For example, after discussion of their past 
survey experience in China, every anchor of the items on a Likert scale was 
individually labelled. Moreover, explanatory texts were kept to a minimum to provide 
a neat appearance and encourage response. Many versions of the questionnaires were 
produced based on several meetings with the supervisor and a number of peer 
researchers and industry experts in late 2006 and early 2007. 
Finally, the issue of common response bias were taken into consideration. The question 
of self-reporting arose with any attempt to collect and analyse data through surveys. 
Several measures were used to address this. For instance, for different sets of items that 
are related to each variables, we used different scales of response (5-, 6- and 7-point 
Likert Scale). In the pilot questionnaire items that pertained to shareholder engagement 
measures were also reversed to verify attention paid by respondents. The data validity 
is also verified by comparing the firms' financial and market performance with archival 
industry data (see Chapter 7, Section 7.1). 
Questionnaires were first constructed in English and translated into Chinese for 
circulation. The language translation of final version of the survey was verified by a 
bilingual Chinese research professor in a similar area. After the translation had been 
proofread as accurate and modifications have been made according to the supervisor's 
and peer researchers' suggestion, the questionnaires (Chinese version) were taken to 
China for pilot survey. 
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5.4.2 Pilot questionnaire survey 
Table 5-3 Respondent firms of pilot survey 
Ownership 
No. of firm 
Sub-sector 
No. of firm 
Firm location 
No. of firm 
Firm size 
No. of firm 
Majority SOE Minority SOE 
4 3 
Telecom 
2 
Guizhou 
(inland) 
4 
Consumer TV & related 
electronics 
3 
Guangdong 
(coastal) 
2 
products 
Sichuan 
(inland) 
1 
Large size 
full-time staff> 1 000 
Medium size 
500<staff<999 
1 2 
Private 
3 
Electronic 
equipments 
4 
Qingdao 
(coastal) 
3 
Small size 
staff <499 
7 
The pilot questionnaire survey was first conducted in 3 electronic companies which 
have participated in the case studies, and then in 7 other companies with which the first 
3 had business connections - a sampling method called 'snow-balling'(Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2008,218). All questionnaires at this stage were filled out in a face-to-face 
manner with the researcher. Notes were carefully taken according to the respondents' 
reaction - such as when they had a prolonged pause on a particular question and why. 
Questions regarding ease of understanding were asked during and at the end of each 
survey. All respondents were also invited to provide suggestions, such as the design of 
questionnaire layout and question wording, to encourage future response. Moreover, 
two questions which measure virtually the same issue were put in two different parts of 
the pilot questionnaires as diagnostic questions to check if the respondents understand 
the intended meaning of the questions and if they were paying enough attention to 
answering them. 
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5.4.3 Final stage of the large-scale questionnaire survey 
5.4.3.1 Questionnaire circulation 
Table 5-4 Questionnaire survey for electronics industry: distribution of sample firms (total = 527) 
Ownership Majority SOE Minority SOE Private firms 
No. of firm 200 200 127 
Sub-sector 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 
No. of firm 88 75 57 55 55 53 46 45 40 13 
Firm 
location 
Coastal region Inland region 
No. of firm 315 212 
Large size Medium size Small size 
Firm size 
full-time staff >1 000 500<staff<999 staff <499 
No. of firm 115 79 333 
Following the pilot study, a large-scale questionnaire survey was conducted between 
March to August 2007. The target population of this research comprises 11655 
domestic firms in the Chinese electronics industry. The name and contact address of 
the firms were acquired through the database published in the Yearbook of Chinese 
Electronics Industry 2006. We systematically sampled 527 firms according to the 
following criteria: a) ownership type, we targeted firms of three ownership types: 
majority SOE, minority SOE, and private firms. (b) industrial sub-sectors based on 
China's National Bureau of Statistics' codes: telecommunication (coded 01), consumer 
electronics (coded 02), TV& broadcasting equipments (03), computers and related 
products (04), electronic equipments (05), integrated circuits & semi-conductors (06), 
sealed vacuum electronic devices (07), electronic parts and components (08), electronic 
material (09), and photo-electronic sectors (10); (b) 7 locations divided into two 
regions: coastal region and inland region. Table 5-4 provides detailed distribution of 
the sampled firms. 
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For each finn two letters were posted with return envelopes included: one to the CEO 
and one to the R&D department c/o R&D manager. Since the objective of this research 
is not only to evaluate technological capability attained by Chinese electronics finns, 
but also factors in the corporate governance and financial system (CGFS) which 
influence finns' capability building; we needed to collect both questionnaires from each 
finn to ascertain the correlation between CGFS factors and capability development. 
Therefore only if both types of questionnaires had been filled and returned, were they 
regarded as a pair of valid responses. In order to tell whether the respondent belonged 
to the same company, questionnaires were marked with numbers for identification. For 
example, number 001 was marked for both questionnaires sent out for company A, and 
number 002 was marked for company B. 
During the period of circulation, postal reminders were mailed every two weeks to 
encourage response. Moreover, various useful contacts were facilitated which included 
fonner interviewees, friends and relatives who had had contacts with those targeted 
sample finns. Personal connections turned out to be very effective to large-scale, state-
owned finns (not private finns). Also, respondents were offered three alternatives to 
fill out the questionnaire - either by post, or by email, or by filling out the on-line 
version of questionnaire at www.surveymonkey.com. If postal mail was chosen, a 
return envelope with pre-paid postage was provided and the respondent was asked to 
mail his questionnaire to a local address in China. Every four weeks the collected 
questionnaires were sent back to England. If email or on-line questionnaire was 
chosen, the electronic questionnaire version or the web link to the on-line version will 
be provided via emails. Appropriate coding was also used to differentiate respondents 
from different finns. 
For the final stage of the questionnaire survey, a total of 1054 (527 pairs) 
questionnaires were mailed. 207 firms participated in this survey. Among them 124 
had completed both types of questionnaires (one for corporate governance and finance 
and one for technological capabilities and strategies) and 35 completed by email and 26 
participated the online survey, the rest 22 finns had completed either type of 
questionnaires. It generated a response rate of 35.1 % (185/527). 392 questionnaires had 
been returned, of which 202 were for corporate governance and finance and 190 for 
capabilities and strategies. The total number of qualifying sets of response is 195 
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including those respondents from pilot survey. If firms are grouped by type of 
ownership (among 195 firms), 89 are MASOEs, 68 are MISOEs, and 38 are POEs. 21 
firms have been listed on the stock market of which 18 contain more or less state share. 
If grouped by size, there are 72 (37% ) large firms with more than 1000 full-time 
employees, 27 (13.9%) medium firms with 500-999 employees, and 96 (49.2%) small 
firms with less than 499 employees. (See Table 5-5). 
157 
Table 5-5 Respondent firms of full questionnaire survey (N = 537; n = 195, general response rate = 36.31 %) 
Ownership Majority SOE Minority SOE 
No. of firm 89 (43.6%)53 68 (33 .5%) 
Sub-sector 
No. of firm 
Firm location 
No. of firm 
Firm size 
No. of firm 
01 
38 
(42.2%) 
02 
24 
(30.7%) 
Large size 
03 
17 
(29.3%) 
Coastal region 
112 (35.0%) 
full-time staff> 1000 
72 (62.1%) 
04 05 
33 
(60.0%) 
21 
(35.6%) 
Medium size 
500<staff<999 
27 (33.3%) 
06 
16 
(30.2%) 
07 
17 
(37.0%) 
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Private firms 
38 (29.2%) 
08 
18 
(40.0%) 
Inland region 
83 (38.2%) 
09 
6 
(15.0%) 
Small size 
staff <499 
96 (28.2%) 
10 
5 
(38.5%) 
53 The percentage in bracket is the response rate within each category, for example, the sample for majority SOE contained 204 firms (4 in pilot and 200 in full circulation), 
89 firms returned both types of questionnaires, generating a response rate of 42.6%. 
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5.4.3.2 Questionnaire administration and data analysis 
During the questionnaire survey, data was administered and put into SPSS 15, every 
month. All of the returned questionnaires were printed out, coded and put into archive 
for later reference. A unique number was assigned to each pair of responses so that in 
the later stage of data analysis, any anomalies observed could be easily verified by 
checking the original document. Respondents were required to leave their email 
addresses and telephone numbers; therefore if one questionnaire was found to have 
more than 3 missing answers, the respondent would be asked on the phone or by email 
to answer these specific questions. 11 out of 17 such questionnaires were corrected in 
this way. As for the remaining 6, reasonable discretion was taken to either treat them as 
missing data (if analysis would not be significantly affected) or to discard the entire 
questionnaire. Finally only one questionnaire was discarded. 
In order to clearly interpret how this study evaluates the firms' technological 
capabilities, we take Manufacturing Capability as an example, as shown in Table 5-6. 
Survey data were sorted by types of capabilities - Manufacturing Capability, R&D 
capability, and Organisational Capability (Table 5-6 only shows Manufacturing 
Capability). Under each type of capability there are 4 to 8 elements which cover 
various aspects of the capability. In order to assess the level of technological capability, 
each of the elements were evaluated by Degree from 1 to 6 (see horizontal Degrees in 
Table 5-6). 
Analyses in this study measure percentage of those firms who have reached each 
degree of each element of capability. The average of degrees were then calculated and 
rounded to represent the overall level that the firms have reached in such type of 
capability. Cronbach's a (Cronbach, 1951) was calculated to checked the elements' 
internal consistency (further interpretation in Chapter 7, section 7.2). 
According to the research framework, detailed descriptive analysis was conducted 
which covered four aspects: 1) Firms' sales performance, innovation rates, and product 
competitiveness; 2) details about firms' development of technological capabilities; 3) 
Their technological endeavour, such as investment behaviour, technological 
development strategies and activities; 4) Firms' corporate governance and finance (see 
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Chapter 7). With reference to relevant theory and statistics, analytical description of 
such data is necessary, as it renders enhanced insights into the aforementioned subject 
matters, which were insufficiently researched. Moreover, through descriptive analysis 
the results of hypothesis testing at a later stage can be better validated and understood 
(see Chapter 8). 
Table 5-6 Manufacturing Capability 
Manufacturing Capability 
Elements of capability Levell: Level 2: Level 3: Level 4: LevelS : Level 6: 
less than average in less than advanced less than advanced 
average in the nation advanced in the advanced in the 
the nation in the nation in the world 
nation world 
Equipment 
•• _. __ •• M . ____ • ___ • ______ • _______ 
._-----
_. __ ._---
_._---_.-r-----.- --- ----
Production routine 
-AbilitY-of the manufacturing 
----
department to comply with the 
request of R&D 
--Tot-;iq~ality control ------.- ._-_._-_._----. -_ .... _._-------. . -... _ .... __ ."._--._-- ---------_._- ---.... ----- -- .. 
---------_ .. - ---.-.--.-- t----------- -. ---_ ...... _._-_._ ..... _. -_ .... _._._---_ .... ,,-
Manufacturing cost control 
--_.----_ .... _-_._-------- ._--------
_._-_ ..... _ .. _-_. __ . --. __ . __ .. _.-
. -----_ .. _--. ----. __ ... _._-----_._-- ._. __ ._.-_ ... _ .. _--
Ability to make improvement 
in the manufacturing system 
----------_._---_._--_._-
._-_._-_._--
-_._------ ._---_ ..... _._--
--------- ----------
Level of contribution made by 
manufacturing department to 
the innovation processes 
In addition, analysis were conducted of comparisons between different ownerships and 
management selection methods to find out which type is the most vigorous to develop 
high level of technological capability. Techniques used in these comparisons include 
both the descriptive and statistical methods. The descriptive method uses percentages 
to compare differences between different categories of firms, which have reached 
certain level of capability. However it is of equal importance to show statistically how 
robust these differences are. ANOV A was used to evaluate whether the ranks for 
different ownerships and management selection methods differ significantly 
(Hypotheses 1, 2, 6 and 7). Here ANOV A test as a parametric test is more desirable 
than non-parametric tests, as the former is more rigorous in detecting differences 
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between groups - lower probability of a Type- II error54 ; on the other hand, it is better 
than multiple T-tests in that the latter has relatively higher probability of Type-I errors, 
i.e. ascribing significance to chance differences (Black, 1999). Careful checks of the 
data was carried out beforehand to insure that the data meets the stringent requirements 
for ANOV A tests: 1) the scales of I to 6 for measuring technological capabilities are 
ordinal scores with very similar variances; 2) observation of the distributions of 
capability scores were confirmed to be normal; 3) the smallest sub-group (Private 
Owned Enterprise) has a sample of38 firms, which is higher than the threshold of30. 
In order to test Hypotheses 3 to 5, hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted. 
Definition of the variables used in the tests and the regression models are explained in 
Chapter 8, section 8.1; the results of the testing are reported in Chapter 8, section 8.2. 
5.5 Summary 
An essentially positivist approach is used in this study to evaluate firms' technological 
capabilities. A relativist approach is used to identify the key factors in corporate 
governance and finance which influence firms' technological development and how. 
Two main research techniques used in this study are case studies (with its techniques of 
interviews and archival data collection) and questionnaire surveys. Five case studies 
have been conducted in the electronics and auto industries to develop seven hypotheses, 
and paired questionnaire surveys have been undertaken in the electronics industry to 
test the hypotheses. 
54 A type -II error is also known as a fJ error, or a 'false negative': the error of failing to reject a null 
hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is the true state of nature (Greene, W. (2007) Econometric 
Analysis (6 ed.). Upper S~ddle River: Prentice Hall.) In other words, this is the error of 'failing to 
observe a difference when 10 truth there is one' (Wikipedia). 
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Generated55 
This chapter presents findings from the qualitative stage of the empirical study. Two 
pilot case studies were first undertaken in the Chinese auto industry: Shanghai Auto 
Industry Corporation (SAlC) and Chery. SAIC is a long-established 'favoured' 
enterprise controlled on rather traditional lines. Chery is a small under-funded 
latecomer that has received exceptional 'engagement' from its controlling local and 
provincial government. The two firms were studied mainly from published sources, 
which in their cases were abundant. Later, three more firms were studied on the basis 
of semi-structured interviews with senior and middle managers, line supervisors and 
shop-floor workers between June 2006 and May 2008. One of the case study firms is 
from the auto sector: Guizhou Tyre Co. Ltd (MASOE), and the other two from 
electronics industry: Longertek (POE), and South Electro (MASOE). GTC is a long-
established state firm, relatively poorly financed, and located in one of the least-
developed areas of China. From a very weak position, it managed to revive in less than 
20 years and became the biggest heavy-duty tyre exporter in China. We found that in 
GTC's long march to endogenous innovation, it was the low-visibility strategies 
(unbundling, in progressive manner) that contributed more to its dynamic capability 
building. Similarly, Longertek as a private firm excels in its niche market with 
excellent shareholder (owner) engagement as well as expertise. Low-visibility 
strategies which required hard work, long-term investment, staff cooperation were 
evidently implemented enthusiastically and confidently. In contrast, Electro wanted a 
quick-fix by joint-venturing (high-visibility strategy) and failed, lacking not only 
appropriate corporate governance and finance, but also the portfolio of capabilities. It 
failed again when trying to catch up. 
In Section 6.1 we describe key findings from the pilot studies. The distinctive patterns 
of technological capability development through 'bundling' (a typical type of high-
visibility strategy) and 'unbundling' (a typical type of low-visibility strategy) emerged, 
55 The three case studies in the auto industry - SAIC, Cbery and GTC, have been adapted from Liu & 
Tylecote (2009). Particularly, the majority of 6.1.3 and the last part of 6.2.3 (Potential problems and 
further insights) was written by Tylecote. 
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and then inspired the fonnal case studies. Sections 6.2 to 6.4 present key findings from 
each of the three interview-based case studies. In particular, the three aspects of the 
theoretical framework were investigated and analysed: 1) company profile and general 
perfonnance (including ownership structure, technological perfonnance and product 
competitiveness); 2) technological strategy and behaviour; 3) corporate governance 
(including shareholder engagement, stakeholder inclusion, etc). Section 6.5 discusses 
the findings from case studies with reference to the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 
and 4, and generates seven hypotheses for quantitative testing at a later stage. Section 
6.7 summarises the chapter. 
6. 1 Pilot Case studies - SAIC and Chery 
6.1.1 SAIC (Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation) 
Profile and general performance 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group) is China's biggest auto 
manufacturer both in tenns of capacity and market share (http://www.saicgroup.com). 
Together with First Auto Works (FA W) and Dongfeng Motor Corporation (DMC), it is 
also well-known as one of the state-favoured 'Big Three' auto manufacturers in China. 
In 2007, the finn sold 2.26 million vehicles including 1.13 million passenger cars, and 
achieved sales revenue of 22.6 billion USD, boasting to be one of the few Chinese 
'Fortune 500s'. The history of SAiC can be traced back to 1 940s. In December 1955 
Shanghai Car Plant was communi sed and renamed as 'Shanghai Internal Combustion 
and Components Company' and was conglomerated and renamed again in 1996 as 
'Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group)'. 
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Figure 6-1 SAIC's organisational structure 
Source: www.SAIC.cn 
Brands! 
subsidiaries 
SAIC's ownership entirely belongs to Shanghai State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (the regional division of SASAC). Its main body is SAIC 
Motor Co., Ltd, which is listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange (89% of its shares were 
owned by SAIC as of March 2008), which makes it a MASOE. SAIC has 8 vehicle 
subsidiaries, 4 of which assemble passenger cars (see Table 6-1). ]n 2004 SAIC 
produced 11 models of passenger cars, and apart from Saiba056, all other 10 products 
are sold under the brand names of its foreign partners. In 2008 the firm was making 23 
models of cars, however, only one of them has intellectual property that was entirely 
owned by SAiC - Roewe (sounds like 'glory and power' in Chinese), an improved 
modification of Rover 75. 
56 Saibao was a car model built in SAIC's own manufacturing base in Yizheng, Jiangsu province; it was 
a modified model based on GM's Opel platform. It was introduced in 2002 and only sold around 5000 in 
three ears . S Ie later decided to withdraw it from the market in 2005 due to sagging profit. 
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Tab 6 1 sAle' 4 Ie - s passen b 'd' . er car su SI lanes 
~ Year of Shareholding by Product models establishment SAle (%) 
----.. -----~ "--------_._--_. 
-------------" 
SVW 1985 50% 6 models 
SGM 1997 50% 11 models 
Ssangyong 2004 51.33% 5 models 
Shanghai 1955 100% 1 model (full 
Automobile IPR) 
Source: www.SAIC.cn 
Table 6-2 shows that from 2003 to 2007, SAle's revenue improved by 62.4% and 
export rose by 159%. However, the firm's income in 2007 was mainly from its long-
term investment in the two joint-ventures and from stock-market speculation (data 
collected from SAle 's public account). On the other hand, its solely-owned operations, 
including the Roewe project, were highly likely to be loss-making (Tong, 2008). 
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Table 6-2 SAle's general performance 2003-2007 
2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 
--
Gross product value 1,411 ,537 1,178,668 866,344 1,049,819 1,578,320 
(million RMB57) 
._----
------
------_. 
_. __ ._ .. _----
-_.- r--c-.---.----
Sales revenue 1,580,126 1,303,603 1,075,82 1,000,630 972,936 
(million RMB) 5 
-------_ .. __ ._-------_.-1----_ ... _---_._- -----------. r-::--:,-c--·-··----·· ._-------_._-1--._ .. _---
Export revenue 905.41 892.41 865.23 699.47 349.17 
(million USD) 
f------ ----_._- -----
Labour productivity 400,408 401,285 302,708 464,800 609,546 
(RMBNear) 
-
-
Full-time employee 79,394 70,374 68,726 68,720 64,343 
----
Total Vehicles sold 1,691 1,344 1,058 983 797 
(1,000 units) 
--_. 
--
Passenger cars 1,137.37 915 .23 742.95 610.64 612.22 
(1,000 units) 
f-.-.--... -------- _ ... _--_._-------_ . .. __ .. _----_._._-_ .... _--
I Business vehicles --553.14---·-1~ 315.68 236.89 184.81 
I (1,000 units) 
Source: SAIC's published annual report, vanous years. AvaIlable from http: //www.CNLIST.com 
Since 1978 SAlC has had 4 different chief executives, and their service terms were 4, 8, 
4 and 12 years respectively (the 4th and longest-serving CEO Mr Hu Maoyuan, 
resigned in early 2009 due to large losses from overseas acquisition of Rover UK and 
Ssangyong South Korea, but still remained Chair of the Board of Directors. (China 
Value, 07/03/2009). Three out of the four were transferred from senior positions in 
Shanghai government and two remained officials after leaving SAIC58• Hu Maoyuan, 
who was appointed in 1999, represents an exception. His career started in one of the 
SAlC's factories and he has been m the management Since 1986 
(http://www.saicgroup.com). 
57 1 USD ~ 7RMB 
58 The other one retired afterwards, yet he still is 'senior consultant' both in SAIC and in Shanghai Auto 
Industry Development Committee. 
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SAIC has always been well looked after by government officials at both central and 
local levels. For example, since 1985 SAIC was given the privilege to retain 1,250 
USD of the profit from each car sold by its joint venture. By 2002 this reservoir had 
reached more than $50 million. However, at the same time SAIC's R&D expenditure 
was less than 1 % of its sales (Jin, 2004). 
Approaches to Technological Capabilities Development 
The first half of SAIC's technological development history (1978 - 2002) resembles 
that of most other Chinese car companies, that is, seeking technological spill-overs 
from international joint-venturing. SAIC used to have its own brand and product 
development capability back in the 1950s. After Russian technical support withdrew 
from China, 'Phoenix' was built in Shanghai Auto Assembly Plant, the predecessor of 
SAIC. 'Phoenix' later was renamed 'Shanghai' and expanded into 4 different models 
and reached a capacity of 5,000 in 197559. 
Since 1978, SAIC followed the government's urge to seek co-operation with foreign 
companies. In 1985 it started a joint venture with Volkswagen, in which VW provided 
comprehensive package of product and production technologies, as well as capital 
investment. Before installing the production line, SAlC's capacity was examined by 
some Chinese industrial experts and was classified as 'too outdated to use'. In a 
company memorandum it read: 'the design capability was weak, the processing quality 
was low, and there were not enough testing equipments; the staff were only used to 
repairing and fixing tasks, and knew nothing about standardised streamline operation. 
If we were to rely on ourselves for equipment improvement, it would take too long and 
cost just about the same as importing ... therefore, it is highly recommended that we 
import the technology as well as the key equipments... it requires some investment, but 
it pays offvery quickly, and is economically feasible (italics are ours)' (Jiefang Ribao 
[Liberation Daily], 2004). It can be seen that the motive for SAlC to choose a 
packaged deal (technology, equipments, training, and components/subsystems, bundled 
together) was to achieve quick pay-off whilst avoiding investing time and effort in 
independent learning. 
S9 There were only 70,000 cars built in China from 1958 to 1991, and in 1982 total production was 5,101. 
167 
Chapter 6: Findings from Case Study and Hypotheses Generated 
In 1991 SAIC decided to cease production of its own brand 'Shanghai' and 
devoted 90% of its retained profit from 'Shanghai' to the SVW Santana project. The 
initial form of production in SVW was CKD (complete knocked-down) assembly with 
components and parts shipped from Germany - according to the contract, without VWs 
discretion SAIC cannot make adjustment to the original design ('not even a screw', Lu 
& Feng, 2004). Although VW and SAIC shared equal investments in SVW, the later 
was not happy to see disproportional profit distribution, especially after paying extra 
for imported parts. Significant effort was hence made to develop parts and components 
production capacity. In 1991 Santana became the first foreign-branded car to be 
exempted from import licensing, symbolizing fully localised production. However, 
after satisfactory profit margin - also thanks to the monopolistic policy - was secured6o, 
little was achieved regarding independent product development. With only one major 
design modification, Santana dominated SAIC's assembly lines as well as Chinese 
roads until 2002, whilst production in Germany already stopped in 1993. Apart from its 
two joint-venture cash cows, SAlC barely had car production in other divisions. In 
1999, it purchased a loss-making plant in Yizheng city, Jiangsu province. Three years 
later Saibao was launched as SAIC's first own-branded car since 1958. This model was 
developed on GM's Opel platform. However, Saibao did not appeal to the market and 
was short-lived; its total sale in 2003 and 2004 was 4,298, less than 10% of Chery's 
best-seller QQ in 2004 alone. In 2005 its production came to an end (Daily Economic 
Review, 15 Dec.2005). 
From 2003, SAle started to resort to offshore acquisition. The logic underneath was 
clear: blessed with cash but weak in R&D capability and bargaining power, SAIC 
hoped to acquire technological competence by acquiring new organisations. The first 
big target was Ssangyong, the loss-making South Korean company. In 2004 SAle 
bought 48.92% of Ssanyong's shares and became its controlling shareholder. In 2005, 
after giving up bidding on bankrupt Rover, SAIC paid £67 million on the technology 
details and rights to all of Rover's engines and its 75, 25 series. It was hoped that the 
injection of fresh blood could enhance SAIC's weak technology basis, however, as 
Rover's equipments and human resources were bought by Nanjing Automobile (Group) 
Corporation (NAC), another well-connected SOE, SAlC encountered difficulties in 
60 7 of the 153 companies under SAle make 85% profit and 5 of them are foreign partnerships (Financial 
Times, 21 April 2004, p.31). 
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mastering its newly purchased technologies. ' ... we now have four potential sources of 
technology, 1) Rover; 2) Ssangyong; 3) Ricardo in the UK (we pay them for engine 
design and technological consultancy); 4) our own joint ventures, Shanghai VW and 
Shanghai GM Apparently we are doing a lot better ... However we have a long way to 
go in understanding and integrating Rover and Ssangyong's organisation and 
technologies, plus we are still dependent on our partners in the two joint ventures for 
turnkey technologies ... ' said a senior member of management (First Economic Daily, 
03, Aug. 2005). 
With government encouragement and support, in 2007 SAIC successfully merged with 
its long-standing rival NAC. Most of NAC's operations were taken over by SAIC, and 
in return the mother company of NAC, Yuejin Motor, received around 5% of SAlC's 
shares. In doing so SAIC acquired the MG series sports car technology platform 
(Forbes, 2007) 
The effect of SAlC's serial mergers and acquisitions on its long-term success is yet to 
be seen. However acquisition of organisations with desirable technology provides a 
plausible alternative (considered as a 'short-cut' by rich SAIC) to capability 
development. On the other hand, several challenges remain as to how to assimilate 
newly acquired technology as well as to integrate new organisations. These issues are 
particularly profound when acquiring foreign firms with distinctive cultural differences 
- in year 2006 and 2008, strikes in Ssangyong have already cost SAIC billions 
(Jinghua Ribao [Jinghua Daily], 25109/2006; China Value, 07/03/2009), which has 
directly caused the CEO Hu Maoyuan's resignation. Even in the domestic environment, 
the MG project division in NAC has also expressed disappointment over the merger 
and threatened to resist the takeover through 'non-cooperation' (Li, 2007). 
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6.1.2 Chery Automobile Co., Ltd 
Profile and general performance 
Chery Automobile Co., Ltd. came into being in 1997, with an initial capital of RMB 
1.752 billion channelled from five local state-owned investment companies61 (Chery 
website, accessed in 2008). Plant construction commenced on March 1997 in Wuhu, a 
medium sized city in the landlocked province of Anhui. The first car was produced on 
December 18, 1999. This represents a mile stone in Chinese car manufacturing history 
because it was the first car produced by a purely Chinese owned and managed 
company (Chery website: http://www.cheryglobal.com/about_chery.jsp). Though small 
in size, short in history and simple in structure, Chery has caught the nation by surprise 
- it developed its first 2 models of cars in just 8 months, less than 2 years after its 
establishment; it is the first Chinese car makers to export branded cars and the first to 
build cars overseas with own IPR62. Shortly after the launch of 4 new models in 2006 
and China's first full-IP passenger car engine, it became the biggest car exporter based 
in China, with highest sales growth in 2006 and the first Chinese domestic passenger 
car brand to have sold 300,000 units in a year in 2007. In the same year one of its 
models became the best seller on Chinese market; meanwhile Chery's domestic market 
share growth also surpassed all of its competitors - foreign or domestic. According to 
the statistics of International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, in 2006, 
Chery has become the world's fastest growing car manufacturer at the rate of 65.62% 
(http://oica.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/07/chery.pdf). 
The foundation of Chery was however dramatic. The relatively remote city of Wuhu 
was a latecomer to the fast-growing market economy. In desperate search of growth 
potential, the local officials were fascinated by the lucrative business of auto parts 
production. Despite the strict entry control by the central government, they decided to 
build their own car company. In 1998, local officials bypassed the regulations and 
recruited Yin Tongyao, a rising star in one of the VW joint ventures as a well trained 
engineer (Hessler, 2005). Yin became vice-president of Chery and has been in effective 
61 According to Lu and Feng (2004), this figure was an exaggeration to meet the scale threshold set up 
bl the National Committee of Development and Reform. 
6 In 2003 Chery signed a contract with Iran to build a plant there, assembling CKDs with Chery's brand 
name. 
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charge since then - a total of 12 years by 2009. Chery received whole-hearted support 
by Anhui and Wuhu government. National regulations forbade new entries, so the 
officials named the enterprise 'automotive components' company. When Chery built its 
first car, VW was furious due to the apparent imitation, so was the central government 
(Hessler, 2005). Yet when authority has become decentralized during the reform erea 
in China, an ancient tactic prevailed - Xianzhan Houzou (act first, and then ask for 
forgiveness) (Hessler, 2005). After more than a year's negotiation between Wuhu and 
the central government, finally a compromise was made: by giving out 20% of its 
shares, Chery became affiliated to SAlC. In so doing it obtained the necessary licenses 
to manufacture cars and to establish a sales network. However, SAIC in this deal 
pictured its role as lenient rather than strategic, it made clear in the memorandum that 
SAIC's relation with Chery does not involve investment, management, debt, or 
dividend. SAlC realised its mistake afterwards; however, their marriage stopped 
shortly after Chery won favour with high state officials, leaving settlement of the 20% 
share a rumour (Jin, 2004). 
Approaches to Technological Capabilities Development 
Chery's strategy can be summarised as technological unbundling - acquiring the 
capability to produce each component and sub-system. and system. separately. and 
indeed at the extreme involves separate acquisition of each element (machinery from 
one supplier. trainingfrom another. blueprints from a third). 
A glimpse of Chery'S initial attempts to build its own engines and cars can be found in 
Hessler (2005), where modest, yet extensive unbundling was evident: • ... first 
manufacturing equipment from an outdated Ford engine factory in England and 
moved ... to Wuhu (italics are ours)' .... 'manufacturing blueprints ... from a struggling 
Ford subsidiary in Spain' ... - all were inexpensive alternatives to flashy new imports, 
and obviously the Chery people were not shy of sourcing what suited them from across 
the world.,. The first Chery-made engine was built in secret in May of 1999, followed 
by the first Chery-made car merely seven months later. It used parts from suppliers 
supposed to be exclusive to VW (Hessler, 2005). 2000 cars named 'Fengyun' were 
made that year. Since Chery did not have the license to produce or sell assembled cars, 
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Wuhu government persuaded its local taxi company to swallow the batch. In late 2000, 
Chery got hold of its first research team - a group of around 20 engineers who had 
formerly worked for Dongfeng Automobile Co., Ltd, another officially protected 
MASOE just like SAle. This team of elite engineers and designers were laid idle by 
their previous employer, and the rumoured intention by Dongfeng to close its technical 
centre after joint-venture with Citroen finally triggered their collective resignation. 8 
months after joining Chery, the team launched two new models, 'Son of the Orient' 
and 'QQ'. The former looked exactly like Volvo's 'S80', and 'QQ' immediately 
reminded people of Chevrolet's 'Spark' . In fact, Chery's own team was only capable of 
design, or imitation, of the bodies. The chassis were made by Tower (USA) and the 
majority of mouldings were provided by a Taiwanese company. In addition to engine 
production on its own Ford assembly line mentioned above, Chery also sought external 
supplies due to insufficient capacity. As for smaller parts like accessories, electronic 
devices and engine accessories, prototypes were provided by Chery to domestic parts 
suppliers for batch production (Hessler, 2005). By breaking down product technology 
to the most detailed elements possible, and by only paying for things that Chery could 
not do by itself, cost was brought down. QQ was 113 cheaper than its Chevrolet 
counterpart and so was Son of the Orient. Both types became big hits in the Chinese 
market and ranked top-sellers. 
Figure 6-2 Illustration of Chery's initial unbundling behaviour: the making of QQ 
Source: Own construction according to Lu & Feng (2004) and Hessler, 2005 
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After winning the first buckle of gold, Chery started investing heavily in R&D and 
technological training. It is spending 10%-15% of its revenue on R&D (Chery website 
March 06), and from 2000 to 2005 its research and technical team expanded 40 times 
into 11 departments with over 800 members. On the other hand, Chery also worked 
closely with foreign companies to cultivate its technological capabilities. However it 
adopted a much different strategy in cross-border collaboration than most of its 
domestic peers. Rather than going to multinational competitors (car manufacturers) for 
turn-key plants or offering them OEM (own equipment manufacturing), Chery chose to 
work with up-stream players who had aligned interest in its own success and were 
therefore much more motivated to transfer their technology and skills than did those 
car makers. For example, in its cooperation with AVL (the world's 4th engine designer 
in Austria), it took over the responsibility of initiating ideas and setting up standards, 
while AVL specialised in design and coaching/mentoring of Chery's engineers. 'The 
baseline of our cooperation is that, we can ask any question regarding the technical 
details of their design, and that we can send our staff to observe and finally to 
participate.' (Wang, 2002: 29). More than 100 Chery engineers went to A VL to receive 
training, some other 900 were sent to other countries over the past decade. The strategy 
of learning by training and doing enabled Chery to develop the first China-made engine 
with its own IP. Compared to pure imitation and reverse engineering in the previous 
phase, its new models, Tiggo, AS, F and M series featured more in-house design and 
development. In 2006 Chery set up a branch research centre near the Ford HQ in 
Detroit, USA. Chery believes that, just like its forerunners Toyota, Nissan and Hyundai, 
conducting R&D at the world's Mecca of automobile technology will bring not only 
access to the US market but also a crucial edge in the human resource competition 
(Zhang, 2006). 
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6.1.3 Discussion of pilot case studies83 
SAlC's technological development (the first half) and that of Chery are manifestations 
of two contrasting approaches, i.e. bundling and unbundling. In SAlC's joint-venturing 
with VW and GM, components, key parts and sub-systems (brakes, engines, etc) were 
provided either by the foreign companies or by their designated (and also foreign) 
suppliers; while many of the process and product technologies were covered by patents 
or other forms of IP protection, licenses were granted. In order to guarantee adoption 
and implementation of newly introduced technologies, blueprints for production 
methods were provided, along with training. Whenever there was a problem, there was 
always on-site technical support from the technology provider. All of the above forms 
a typical full technology bundle. (In the initial stage of the VW-SAIC deal, the 
bundling activity even took a more extreme manner - a 'turnkey' plant, in which VW 
took responsibility even for putting the equipment together on site. 
The advantage of bundling from the technology seller's point of view is clear: the seller 
keeps control. The main advantage from the buyer's point of view is speed and 
simplicity: there is one bundle, one deal, one provider who (presumably) knows how 
everything fits together and can quickly make sure it all works, as long as local 
conditions do not get in the way. It can easily be seen that the speed and simplicity of a 
bundle are of particular value for the typical Chinese SOE top manager. As shown in 
Table 6-3, SAIC's CEOs, at least the first three, were functioning in a setting that 
featured governance with typical Chinese characteristics: 1) All of the first three CEOS 
were parachuted into the organisation, knowing little about the company, or even the 
industry, they therefore had very limited industrial expertise to understand what would 
be most beneficial for the firm's long-term technological competence. 2) With limited 
time in position (maximum 8 years) and short-termist performance pressure, these 
managers needed to deliver quickly - and bundled deals in this case did provide quick-
fix: the 'disengaged' monitoring officials were shown and pleased with quick results, in 
terms of technology: new products, new equipment, and new processes. The new 
products showed quick results too in terms of market share. The bundle also delivered 
quick profits: the main up-front payment was for equipment, and that would be shown 
63 This part is written by Tylecote, which is published as Liu & Tylecote (2009) 
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in the accounts as an asset, not as a current cost to be subtracted from profits. Of course, 
large amounts of money would have been needed - which has normally meant 
borrowed from banks - and interest paid on that. However, SAIC as a large SOE 
owned and favoured by central government, have long been able to borrow very 
cheaply indeed. 
Table 6-3 SAle's CEOs - OrJ21O, time 10 posItion, and performance ar2ets-1981-2008 
Name Occupation before CEO of SAIC Time m Main Performance Targets 
position 
(Years) 
Joint-venturing with VW; 
production of Santana 
model 
Planning 
Jiang Tao Deputy Director, Shanghai 1981-1987 
I City Committee of Economic (6 Y'"") 
----.------- 1-------------------
Lu Ji'an Deputy Director, Shanghai 1987-1995 100% localisation of 
City Economic Committee, (8 years) 
(27-year expenence m the 
textile industry) 
Committee of Economic (4 years) 
Planning; Deputy Secretary-
General of Shanghai 
Government/Shanghai Party 
Committee 
Santana model 
-------4-------------------------~---------.-.----~----------------Trainee staff in sAle since age 1997- 2009 China's Hu 
Maoyuan 17; workshop director, division (12 years) 
manager, assistant general 
manager 
largest/strongest 
car manufacturer; capable 
of producing own-brand 
cars and competing in the 
global market 
Source: SAIC's annual report 1997-2005; Shanghai City Chronicles, available online: 
www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/ 
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What was gained in terms of technological capability, then? By the end of its first stage 
of bundling, SAIC had achieved full localisation of imported car models and leading 
production capacity (mostly static manufacturing capabilities), however, due to lack of 
dynamic R&D and organisational capabilities, it still had to rely heavily on foreign 
partners for model improvement or diversification. The foreign partners still retained 
control over key technologies: 'we were rejected by VW when we offered to buy its 
Santana platform after more than 20 years' co-operation', said a senior manager from 
svwM. 
On the other hand, as an untypical SOE Chery opted for an untypical, independent 
unbundling approach. Unbundling can also be practised at different levels, depending 
on the technology basis of the unbundler. In Chery's case the initial unbundling was not 
done in glamorous fashion; it involved scrubbing and fixing of second-hand 
equipments: bargain-hunting out-dated product blue-prints, and even infringing copy-
rights of car models, etc. However Chery did gain from the process of decomposition. 
Its staff and technical team had to work out how all the parts and elements, both in 
physical and engineering terms, fitted together. In other words they had to master 
systems integration (Prencipe et aI, 2003). Such process requires learning endeavour 
and if managed intelligently, will improve not only manufacturing and design 
capability, but also organisational and strategic capabilities. Just as confirmed by CEO 
Mr Yin Tongyao: 
'Maybe the outsiders would consider what we had initially done (copying the design and 
technology of established car models) as trivial, however when we first started, even 
copying had appeared so difficult and impossible to manage ... yet we worked our hands to 
the bone and did it, and went beyond the initial imitation ... ,65 
Chery pressed on after having acquired the basic capabilities to assemble a copied car. 
It is apparent that Chery's unbundling at the later stage was planned and executed at the 
organisational and strategic level, and had much higher in-house technological content: 
It designed its new production lines and had them supplied through auctions; more key 
parts were made by itself, others by domestic suppliers working to its specification; 
64 First Economic Daily, 03, Aug. 2005 
65 Interview with China Central TV. July 2005 
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farther-reaching in-house R&D was initiated with extensive training by collaborators 
of its choice, most of which industry leaders such as A VL; it orchestrates resources 
both domestically and internationally to develop not only new cars but also engines. 
What was learned through the process of unbundling has given them the strategic 
ability to develop new models with ever more in-house and local input. 
How can we explain this in terms of its governance? Certainly not in terms of superior 
expertise among monitoring officials. What did the local Party hierarchies of Wuhu 
and Anhui know about the motor industry? Engagement, then? Undoubtedly Chery got 
a great deal of attention from the highest officials in Wuhu and Anhui. Lacking 
expertise, however, it is hard to believe that, however closely they engaged, they would 
have been able to judge the quality of Yin Tongyao's strategy. What they did was 
simply to take some trouble to pick the right man, highly experienced in the industry, 
and then to back him while he built them a successful motor firm from scratch. For this 
they gave him time (we do not know how much) and money - but certainly not much 
of the latter. As Hu Maoyuan of SAIC is alleged to have said when criticised for not 
following Chery's road, they did it that way because they had to: unbundling was a 
great deal cheaper. (It is plausibly rumoured that the teachers of the whole province of 
Anhui had to wait several months for pay at one point, when Chery got one of its 
largest cash infusions: Anhui is dirt poor compared to Shanghai.) Chery'S market 
position followed from its shortage of resources: they started at the bottom end of the 
market, where their low prices were most appreciated and their low initial quality most 
forgiven. Yin Tongyao, not having to watch his back, could watch his front: he could 
concentrate on building strong relationships with employees and suppliers. In sharp 
contrast with large-scale SOEs, staff expertise and inputs were treasured and their 
potential explored during the process of learning. Chery again wins higher marks for 
employee inclusion. Chery may also have gained from its complete insignificance in its 
early years. 
We argued that two factors, engagement and inclusion in corporate governance, affect 
a firm's strategy and behaviour in technological capability building. The findings of our 
pilot case studies fit precisely into this expectation: SAlC has had a problematic 
governance structure, government parachuted its officials into the company who did 
not necessarily have industrial expertise, and they were moved away not long after. 
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Managers came to their posts with assigned tasks, either to increase capacity or to 
enhance profit; anyway, both are quantitative, highly visible and easy to measure. 
Remember that they did not have much time nor did they have sufficient knowledge, 
hence it was sensible for them to choose bundled technologies which come from 
multinational partners - these are easy to understand, readily available, and fast in 
effect. Now threatened by competitors such as Chery, and having a CEO who came up 
from within the organisation and who has the potential to stay, SAIC started to try to 
fight its way out. Its advantage is that it need not worry much about its budget; 
therefore it is able to buy not only technologies but also organisations that own the 
technologies. It is too soon to say whether it will succeed, but at least this offers an 
alternative to its previous practices. On the other hand, Chery benefited from better 
practice. The CEO is highly experienced in the auto industry, and his aspiration level 
comes from higher autonomy and longer service term, which determines his strategy of 
technological unbundling. Such a process is more novel and low in visibility but 
proved rewarding and sustainable. Moreover, in sharp contrast with large-scale SOEs, 
staff expertise and inputs were treasured and their potential explored during the process 
of learning. Chery again wins higher marks for employee inclusion. All these 
contribute to its fast growth in capabilities. 
Chery's current success also has implications for SAIC. As a large enterprise with 
strength in finance and the capacity to produce against high standards, SAIC can 
experiment with unbundling and can do so from an advanced starting point. 
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Figure 6-3 Corporate governance and technological development -lessons from SAIC and Chery cases 
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6.2 Guizhou Tyre: a long march to endogenous innovation 
After the two pilot case studies, we conducted another case study in the auto industry. 
We wanted to find out, with the effect of firm's age on technological development 
(Audretsch, 1995; Toby, 2000) controlled for, how much the firm's technological 
strategy and hence development has been shaped by its governance. In the pilot studies 
it has not been possible to pursue this through second-hand data. We selected Guizhou 
Tyre Co., Ltd, whose age is similar to SAIC's; and whose political status (less 
favoured/noticed by the central government), governance practice, and location (inland 
China) are similar to Chery. In this case study a combination of archive search (journal 
articles, news reports, and official statistics), site observations and top-down in-depth 
interviews was adopted to collect data. 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted 
in the firm and interviewees were selected according to their job responsibilities and 
knowledge of different aspects of the research question. Longitudinal questions 
regarding evolution of the firm's technological capabilities and its corporate 
governance were put to the Chief Executive, the Party Secretary66/ Chief Operating 
Officer, the Chief Engineer, line manager and one of the shop floor operatives. 
6.2.1 Company profile and performance 
Guizhou Tyre Co. Ltd (hereafter referred to as GTC), was founded in 1965 through the 
merger of Guizhou Tyre Factory with Great China Rubber Company, which relocated 
in that year from Shanghai to inland Guiyang city. In 1995, GTC's main business 'GTC 
Tyre' was restructured as a shareholding firm and was listed in 1997 in Shenzhen. The 
holding group GTC was one of the 520 'key enterprises' selected by the State Council67 
in 1992 and one of the top 10 tyre groups in China. In 2002 GTC became the biggest 
heavy-duty tyre exporter in China and ranked 38 in the industry worldwide in 2004. 
(See Appendix V for introduction to tyre technology and the Chinese tyre industry.) 
66 In Chinese state enterprises the secretary of the firm's communist party committee still remains 
powerful - he or she often holds key positions in senior management and is officially the ultimate 
decision-maker of key human resource. 
67 In 2000, the State Council readjusted the composition of its original 512 'Key State Enterprises' by 
merging 113 into 14 ~oups and .taking in 107 new fIrms; many are well-performing private companies 
and high-tech enterpnses. The hst thus extends to 520, around 200 of which are listed companies or 
parents of listed fIrms. (www.sasac.gov.cn. 2000). The National Team (Nolan, 2002) is a subset of the 
list. 
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GTC's main products included bias-ply tyre, radial-ply tyre, steel-belted radial tyre, 
heavy duty tyre, agricultural tyre, tubeless tyre and air spring. 25% of its product was 
exported at the time of case study in 2006. At the end of 2005 it had 6,532 employees, 
349 of which were R&D staff. Its shareholding structure before May 2006 has been: 
state shares: 51 %, tradable shares 49%. (After May 2006 it became: state shares: 27.2%, 
tradable shares: 72.8 %.) Therefore GTC has been a MASOE during the period studied 
in this thesis. The recent state share reduction was operated through bonus issues to 
original holders as a gift (10:3.6)68. The state shares officially belong to Guiyang State 
Asset Management Co., Ltd, which is the provincial branch of SASAC; just as SAIC is 
owned by the Shanghai branch of SASAC. 
Table 6-4 GTe - contrasting performance between 1985 and 2005 
1985 
Below its 1965-
designed capacity: 
300,000 units per year. 
2004 
38th in the world in tyre 
output; heavy duty specialist; 
largest tyre exporter in China; 
25% of output exported 
Source: GTC internal document 
2005 
Radial tyre output 
reaches 1.5 million per 
annum; total sales 
income up 31 % on 04, 
exports up 39%. Most 
profitable listed tyre 
company in China 
68 This is perhaps a neat expression of the fact that private property in a formal sense in China is less 
important than a clear recognition by the relevant people in power that one has the right to the yields 
from a particular asset 
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Table 6-5: GTe's recent market performance 
---------------
Jan. - Nov. 2005 Increase from same 
period in 2004 
Gross Output Value RMB 2.47 bn ($298 22.46% 
.... --.. --.. -.--.. -...... -.-----.--.-.-... --.--.--.---.- iE!~X::(-$~-3 ~t1Th-== == __ !!:l_!~!.fr~~~ct!~~(Unil!) . _ .!~tal.§a!~jU nits} Total Gross Revenue 
million) 
--_._-----
------. 
---
Net Export USD 64.83 million 39.45% 
Source: GTC internal statIstIcs. 
Like most state-run enterprises in west China, in the 60s and 70s GTC almost had no 
technological input. In 1985, Mr Ma Shichun, an engineer who had worked in the tyre 
industry for over 20 years became executive of this finn. GTC at that time was lagging 
behind most of its domestic competitors. One example is that its designed capacity in 
1965 was 300,000 per year; while GTC's output never reached that amount even 20 
years later. The new management asked the National Ministry of Chemical 
Engineering - the then supervising authority for expert consultation. The latter 
commissioned Guilin Institute of Rubber Industry to draft GTC a 'Ten-Year 
Development Plan' for GTC, stating that it should 'acquire and assimilate advanced 
foreign equipment and technology, adjust product structure, improve quality and 
realise economies of scale'. In the next decade GTC's major technological activity 
mainly revolved around this plan. A total of 220 million RMB (mainly from 
government subsidy) was infused to fund technology-related activities, such as the 
expansion of heavy-duty tyre workshop; weight-reduction of nylon tyres and the 
purchase of a 1.05 million-capacity small-tyre manufacturing line and the following up 
process innovations. 
In less than 8 years GTC accomplished its first 10-year objective, and sales increased 
by 20%-30% annually. It also became the first and largest heavy-duty tyre producer in 
China. Seeing the higher profit margin of radial tyres, a second 'IO-year plan' was 
initiated by itself this time, aiming at developing radial tyres capabilities while 
maintaining its advantageous position in the traditional bias tyre and heavy-duty tyre 
market. From 1996 to 2000 1.05 bn RMB was channelled from retained profit, 
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government bonds, and bank loans (at subsidised interest rate) to acquire the capability 
to produce radial tyres. The initial product details were bought from Michelin, and 
since then GTC has been making continuous improvement and innovation on the basis. 
By the end of 2005 GTC's steel-belt radial tyre capacity had reached 1.5 million (the 
national capacity is 11 million), ranking 8th in China and the only one of the top 10 that 
was located in an inland areas. The products were among the first in China to be 
certificated with international standards, and were granted the official 'Famous Brand 
Product' title (mingpai chanpin) in 2004. It has become the only major tyre 
manufacturer in inland China (the others firms are all located in developed coastal 
regions like Shandong and Shanghai), and GTC Tyre became the most profitable listed 
tyre company. 
6.2.2 Technological capability development 
The history of GTC since 1985 has been an older case of unbundling, and according to 
its CEO Mr Ma, 'Sensitivity to cost has been the driving force behind our self-reliant 
development. ' 
Relatively poorly financed, and located in the least-developed hinterlands of China, 
GTC had little to offer to foreign multinationals in exchange for bundled technology 
and equipments. Therefore they had to seek effective alternatives to catch up. 'We 
always use domestic machines if there is one available, because they are so much 
cheaper' (said the CEO). The 1998 radial project is a case of unbundling in point. 
When buying production equipments, instead of importing the complete set of 
machinery from the production technology vender Michelin, GTC commissioned its 
technical team to work out the most appropriate combination of equipments that meets 
their need, and then organised 4 international auctions to get the key machines. In fact 
none of them were bought from Michelin. For complementary equipments they 
searched for cheap substitutes in China. After careful bargain-hunting, comparison of 
quality and after-sale service among over 30 domestic suppliers, they finally chose a 
private Tianjin company (such type of lower-end unbundling has also been found in the 
Chery case, see previous section). It later proved that these equipments were well 
adapted in production, and compared to the quote by Michelin, it was cheaper by USD 
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3.41 million (key machinery) and RMB 4.43 million (complementary equipments) 
respectively. GTC also cut cost through rigorous process innovation. According to the 
purchasing plan drafted by Michelin, GTC needed to buy 7 forming machines for the 
new project, which would cost over RMB 38.5 million. After studying the process of 
radial tyre production in both Michelin and Dunlop, GTC technical staff found out that 
they wouldn't need to invest that much in equipments if they could shorten the 
sulfuration time. Sulfuration process improvement was accomplished in 5 months' time. 
This enabled GTC to cut the purchase of sulfuration equipments by 6 units, forming 
machines by 3 units, and in turn reduced the demand for radial parting moulds, which 
saved the group a total ofRMB 29.46 million. 
Other measures of low-visibility technological acquisition were master-minded by 
GTC, with cost in mind of course. A retired tyre expert from Dunlop Australia 
(cheaper than usual consultants, but had much more time available and higher 
commitment, plus less need for GTC to bargain for technological details) was invited 
to work in the radial division as managing director until 2003. Asking a foreign 
manager to be fully responsible for a key division is a very rare case in Chinese SOEs, 
especially when no joint-venturing is involved. GTC was rewarded by implementing 
such an innovative strategy. By fully empowering this foreign manager it maximised 
his commitment; and his technological and managerial expertise were well observed 
and learned. GTC sent one of its deputy executives to shadow the foreign expert and 
took over after his departure. In the interview the CEO commented that the radial 
division had highly autonomous management style, largely inherited from the 
A I· 69 ustra Ian manager . 
Just like Chery, GTC also spent generously on staff training. Around ~ of employees 
from its two R&D departments (the steel-belt radial project has its own R&D team) are 
funded by the firm for part-time degree courses, either at Qingdao University of 
Technology (MSc in Macromolecular material) or at Guizhou University of Industry 
(MSc in Mechatronics). Regulations were enforced to insure that money was well-
spent - only when the staff passed all modules and received the degree would they be 
69 All medium level managers are university graduates and the division manager has HR rights to hire 
and flre people right under him. Wage rates are generally higher than same posts in other divisions and 
give more weight to workload rather than years of service. 
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reimbursed their fees. Training of managerial staff was also well planned. According to 
the Human Resources manager Ms Wei, tailored short courses were provided to middle 
and senior managers on weekends, organised in the form of seminars followed by 
group discussions. The area of training ranged from management psychology, strategic 
management, production safety, corporate culture, personalised leadership to logistic 
management. Tutors were from top main land universities, renowned industry experts 
from overseas, and professors from Taiwan. 'Flow of information and ideas from 
outside of the organisation expanded the managers' vision, which is crucial for a firm 
located in a land-locked province' (Ms Wei, May 2008). Moreover, during the courses, 
case-related group discussion among staff from different corporate functions enhanced 
mutual understanding and according to the HR manager has speeded up internal 
communication and decision-making. 
R&D expenditure in 2005 was RMB 140 million, thus 4.6% of its total turnover 
(Michelin in the same period spent 4.2 %, according to GTC's internal document). 'All 
the money that we got from GTe Tyre's IPO (Initial Public Offering) was invested in 
technology activities,' said the Party Secretary, Mr Qian (September 2006). To further 
enhance its endogenous basic research, in 2003 GTC set up a post-doctoral station and 
hired two post-docs from Sichuan University to conduct research in the area of 
macromolecule materials. Each of these researchers were assigned three GTe technical 
staff, who provided on-site assistance and support and meanwhile to learn by working 
closely with them (Mr Wang, Principal Engineer/ Deputy Chief Executive, September 
2006). 
GTe's attention to routine operations was also believed to have contributed to its 
dynamic capability building (Mr Qian). According to site observations in the heavy-
duty tyre and bias tyre divisions70, the level of routine operation was high; for example, 
the rubber-kneading workshop was kept very tidy, which 'was hard for such type of 
process' (Mr Qian, September 2006). Shop-floor workers mentioned during the 
conversations with the author that their working conditions have been constantly 
improved with ongoing process fine-tuning, carried out by engineers from the R&D 
department and themselves. 
70 A visit to GTC's radial tyre plants was rejected due to secrecy concerns. 
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6.2.3 Corporate Governance 
Quality of shareholder engagement 
Although officially supervised by Guiyang State Asset Management Co., Ltd which is 
an independent entity, GTC still perceives itself as a state firm closely associated with 
the local government (Mr Qian, Party Secretary). It can be seen how much support as 
well as autonomy (a type of intelligent engagement in the case of lack of industrial 
expertise) given by the local authority has helped GTC: 
' ... The leaders are very busy and are in charge of thousands of firms, making tyres is a very 
complicated thing, we cannot expect them to understand what we are doing, and all we can 
expect is autonomy and support ... ' (Mr Ma Shichun, CEO) 
'We were very lucky to be favoured as number one by the Guiyang government; it makes 
our life a lot easier. We received financial supports such as interest subsidy on bank loans 
in our radial project in the 1990s. Even now when subsidy is no longer allowed, we can still 
get our projects approved by the bank much more easily than other local companies since 
we have the local government as our guarantor... there have been occasions where the 
senior officials stepped in to sort our problems out ... Because we are doing quite well now, 
especially in a remote province like Guizhou, the central government starts to notice us and 
has listed us in the mid-long-term Agenda of the National Technology Development, which 
will provide us tax benefit. This has a crucial meaning because in the period of fierce 
competition it not only gives us the financial edge but also political support.' (Mr Qian, 
Party Secretary) 
The Party Secretary of Guizhou province and Guiyang city and the Mayor often come 
to GTC, sometimes spending a whole day working on the site. ' .. . the Mayor once said 
if our output reaches RMB 5 bn in 2007 he will give us this and that. We don't know if 
he really means it, and we doubt if he could do so because of the finanCial constraint 
that Guizhou faces as a whole, but at least we know that he cares about the whole thing 
and would be pleased ifhe could ... ' (Mr Ma, CEO, September 2006.) 
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Management continuity and de facto shareholding 
All senior managers have worked in GTC for at least 10 years and many of them have 
been on their posts for more than 10 years. 'We think it is very important that we have a 
relatively stable management team. I give you an example, there is another firm, for 
some reasons their senior managers were changed almost every 6 months, and now the 
firm is just about to go bankrupt, surely there are many other reasons to this, but the 
management disruption was definitely not a positive factor ... ' said Mr Qian, who 
started his career at GTC in 1965 and became Party Secretary in 1997. 
CEO Mr MA Shichun, aged 68 in 2006, has been working in the tyre industry for over 
38 years and remained chief executive until early 2008. His 48-years-old successor Mr 
Chen was also a long-standing insider who started from the firm's shop floor and has 
had extensive experiences in various posts. 
Although there was no sign of significant shareholdings by the management team, the 
CEO and other senior managers received discreet remunerations from the local 
government. At the end of 2004, due to outstanding product and market performance, 
Ma and his team was rewarded RMB 1 million each by the city government (Mr Qian, 
Party Secretary; September 2006). This amount was 100 times the average staff pay 
and 3 times the bonus paid to the company for winning the 'National Famous Brand' 
title. So long as they realised this would happen, Ma and Co had every incentive (and 
time) to aim and play long-term, as their personal wealth was tied to the firm's 
prosperity - Guizhou province, Guiyang city and Mr Ma and his team in effect have 
been co-owners of GTe. 
The role 0/ CEO and inclusion 
CEO Mr Ma was widely respected and regarded as the core of this enterprise. His name 
was mentioned by almost all interviewees with admiration: 'If our enterprise were to be 
described as a machine. then Mr Ma (the CEO) is the crucial axis that makes the 
machine start and work properly', said Wang Hai, Principal Engineer/ Deputy Chief 
Executive. 
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Mr Ma was thought to be able to make important, correct strategic decisions at the 
correct time. For example, lorries in China are normally seriously overloaded, and 
ordinary tyres are not durable enough. Ma asked research staff to modify the formula 
of the heavy-duty tyres and sold them to the replacement market. Sales increased 
dramatically and the profit was later injected into their new radial tyre project, which 
partially solved the fund-shortage problem. It was proved that such strategy secured 
GTC's market competence. He is also a diligent entrepreneur, shop-floor operatives are 
very familiar with him coming into the workshop and consulting them on strategic 
decisions (Mr Gou, operative, September 2006). 
Mr Wang also believed that sufficient autonomy was given to the technical staff: 
'We are encouraged to carry out experiments and trials, and don't need to worry about any 
fine or punishment ifwe do not succeed in the first place ... ' 
As a state-owned company in Guizhou, GTC has relatively high wage rates. Salary 
consists of two parts: basic pay and performance pay. Shop floor operatives are paid 
according to their job type/workload, requirement for skills and job hazard. 
Maintenance workers are paid slightly more than others. However, skilled workers still 
tend to leave, and Mr Wang admitted that continuous loss of skilled maintenance 
workers has had an impact on the firm. 
' ... working in a tyre-making factory is a tough job, but we are not too worried about shop-
floor workers, they are more or less attached to their jobs due to technical reasons 
(although we have a job-rotation scheme) and it is not too difficult to recruit young 
peasants from the countryside. It is maintenance workers that we are more concerned about 
at the moment. It's a much more skilled job and it takes longer to train qualified stafJ. The 
nature of their roles means that they must be very dedicated; there is hardly any time to sit 
down and chill out in a day. For the same work they could find much higher-paid jobs in 
other factories, either in Guiyang or in other big cities.' 
Examination of remuneration policy by the author also revealed that GTC had various 
awards for outstanding technical performances. The award committee was mainly 
composed of senior engineers and experts from research institutes and universities, 
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while GTe's senior management is not involved in the selection process, which was 
very rare for a Chinese SOE, according to Ms Wei, HR manager (May, 2008). Firm-
level 'model workers' were rewarded very generously as well. The firm's bonus was 
five times higher than the amount paid by the provincial trade union (Ms Wei, 2008). 
Apart from staff inclusion schemes, GTC was also seeking to incorporate external 
input from external stakeholders. It had close, friendly collaborations with local 
research institutes and universities, and ongoing R&D projects with China Science 
Academy and Qingdao University of Technology. According to the contracts, GTC 
owns all of the IPRs of new developments (Mr Wang, Principal Engineer/ Deputy 
Chief Executive). 
Potential problems and further insights71 
There are three key problems that GTC was still grappling with: the surplus of manual 
workers and lower-level administrative staff that it was not allowed to fire because of 
the poor employment situation in Guizhou (Mr Qian, Party Secretary, September 2006). 
Its rather poor brand reputation largely due to being a domestic firm in an 
unfashionable location; and its lack of basic R&D capacity which would allow it to 
tackle challenges like making full use of glass fibre (Mr Wang Hai, Principal Engineer). 
GTC's modest success since 1985 strongly confirms our view of Chery and SAlC. 
While limited in financial resources, due to its weak initial technological and market 
position, the poverty of its province, and its need to 'carry' surplus employees, GTC is 
an impressive example of endogenous growth based on sound corporate governance. 
The endogenous growth is clearly built on thorough and intelligent unbundling, as 
illustrated by the radial tyre project, including the use of the retired Australian. The key 
to the sound corporate governance was that the relevant officials picked the right man -
an experienced tyre engineer and manager - and backed him. He was still in charge 20 
years later and with no end of his tenure in sight - a dramatic difference from the 
traditional SOE rotation of officials doing a stint as an industrial manager. Clearly Mr 
Ma's time horizon was very long: he had every opportunity and motivation to aim for 
71 This part is written by Tylecote, which is published as Liu & Tylecote (2009) 
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real technological capability development and he did so. How expert and engaged the 
monitoring officials have been over the years it is hard to tell, and the evidence 
suggests, not very, but in this context it hardly matters: Mr Ma was very expert and 
very engaged and in effect, though not in any fonnal sense, he was a major shareholder 
of the finn: he could have every confidence that he would be handsomely rewarded if it 
succeeded, and he was. 
Under Mr Ma, there has been a great deal of inclusion, formally and informally. The 
Party organization within the finn (one of the laosanhui, old three organizations that 
controlled the finn) seems to continue to function and to do so in harmony with Mr Ma. 
(Not only can a good Party secretary - who in this case doubled as Chief Operating 
Officer - help to make relationships run smoothly within the finn, he can do the same 
for important relationships outside the finn.) There is a stable management team. Shop-
floor workers are made to feel included partly by Mr Ma's practice of Management by 
Walking About, partly by the care taken to reward valuable contributors. (The loss of 
skilled maintenance workers is however a point on the other side.) The cooperation 
with outside research organizations is another aspect of stakeholder inclusion, and its 
close cooperation with various domestic universities and the national academy of 
science is clear evidence. On the other hand, although there is no fonnal collaboration 
with other finns, according to Mr Qian, infonnal infonnation flow (Macdonald, 1992) 
from peer research staff in competitor firms has always been active and largely 
contributed to the growth of GTC's technological capabilities (for more detail and 
direct quote, see the next section). 
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6.3 Longertek 
After case studies of three firms with similar ownership types (MASOEs), we 
understood that governance practise can strongly affect a firm's technological strategy 
and capability. It would be meaningful, on the other hand, to find out how such 
mechanism works in a different ownership structure. Therefore our second interview-
based case study was conducted in a privately owned company. Also, we chose our 
target firm from the electronics industry to settle how much such experience is 
replicable in another industrial context. 
6.3.1 Company profile and general performance 
Longertek Technology (Group) Co. Ltd (hereafter referred to as Longertek) is a private 
enterprise established in 2000 in the coastal city of Qingdao, Shandong province. As of 
April 2006, Longertek Group's total assets were RMB 84.83 million, and had 285 full-
time employees (60 university graduates and 55 technical staff). It had two subsidiaries, 
Qingdao Longertek Co., Ltd (TLL) and Laiwu SANHE Technology Co., Ltd (SAN HE). 
TLL specialises in the R&D and production of Intelligent Power Control Modules 
(IPM), Universal Intelligent Power Modules (UIPM) and Permanent Magnet Variable 
Refrigeration (PMRV) related products; and SANHE mainly makes energy-efficient 
variable-frequency multiple-split system refrigerators and air-conditioners used on 
locomotives and passenger trains. 
Longertek has been awarded 16 national patents and 2 of its products have been named 
'National Key New Products'. According to 'Electronic & Information Technology 
Promotion Plan year 2008', it was the only Chinese firm to have independently 
developed, patented and commercialised Permanent Magnet Variable Refrigeration 
(PMRV) technology. Combining its PMRV and U1PM technologies, Longertek's 
energy-efficient products were at least 113 cheaper than ordinary PMRV controllers 
and much more user-friendly. Moreover, the unique re-programmable feature means it 
can not only be used on air conditioners but also on any other electric and electronic 
appliances and devices (Mr Li Jingrnao, CEO. September 2006). 
Longertek's market performance has also been impressive. It supplied IPM-embedded 
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controllers to most major Chinese air-conditioner producers, and hence dominated 
60%-70% of the domestic market at the time of case study in 2006. It was also selling 
to international brands including Siemens, LG and companies in the US and Italy 
(Longertek internal document, accessed in September 2006). In 2004 by introducing 
new technology and cutting unit price by 150% - 200%, SANHE became the only firm 
outside of the Chinese railway system to supply air-conditioners to locomotives and 
passenger trains 72 (Ms Zhan Meiyan, P A to CEOIPR manager, September 2006). It 
also dominates 80%-90% of the air-'conditioner market in other transportation sectors. 
Table 6-6 summarises its sales performance between 2004 and 2006: 
Table 6-6 Longertek's sales performance: 2004-April 2006 
Year Total Sale Gross Profit Net Asset 
(Thousand (Thousand RMB) (Thousand RMB 
RMB) as end of period) 
_. 
2004 41, 929 2, 741 15, 943 
-_.- --~-~ .. ---.--.-.. ----.---
2005 54, 417 3, 682 21, 575 
r' 1 sl Quarter 2006 19, 666 1, 235 22, 810 
Source: Longertek's Internal Document (May, 2006) 
6.3.2 Approach to technological development 
'Offence is the best form of defence - competition through innovation is what we have 
always been doing' (Mr Hu Wensheng, Principal Engineer/Director of R&D). 
Longertek's technological development has followed three stages: 1) Reverse 
engineering; 2) Extensive unbundling and other low-visibility in-house development 
accompanied by external support and collaboration; 3) independent 
design/development and high R&D spending. 
• Stage 1 - Initial acquisition of product technology through intensive reverse 
engineering. 
72 Procurement of air-conditioners in the railway system is highly controlled and rationed by the 
corresponding ministry; in the past only three companies were short-listed as suppliers. They are: 
Shijiazhuang Guoxiang Transportation Equipments Co., Ltd (Taiwan Invested and Controlled); 
Shanghai Hakenuke Refrigeration Co., Ltd (Foreign-invested) and State-Controlled Guangzhou 
Refrigerator Co., Ltd (bttp://www.chinarail.cn. accessed in May 2006). 
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Longertek's technology base can be traced back to the early 1990s. Mr Li Jingmao, 
CEO and owner-founder of Longertek gained his experience in air-conditioning 
through reverse engineering of Japanese technology: 
'/ was a free-lance engineer before setting up this company, and what I did basically was 
imitation ... of Japanese technology, and I then sold the copied prototypes to Chinese air-
conditioner makers at lower prices than if they were to buy such technology from Japan. 
But that for me was by no means easy. In J 994 I bought a 2-unit split air-conditioner from 
Japan. When I first saw the inside I gasped: it was so complicated and sophisticated, and so 
state-of-the-art! But I managed to disassemble it and understand the technology behind it, 
and finally made something even better than the original. J 2 years on, we are now 
producing our own branded J 6-unit machines.' (Mr Li Jingmao, CEO, May 2006) 
• Stage 2 - Although not overtly recognised within the company, unbundling as 
well as other low-visibility strategies have been practised over time, and the 
level and complexity has experienced significant progress: 
Phase 1. In the early stage of the company's development, due to lack of capital and 
experience in production operations, and since the production of an air-conditioner 
controller only involves generic manufacturing process which can be managed by any 
electronic company (information provided by Mr Li [CEO] and later confirmed by Ms 
Wang Ying [Production Manager]), Longertek outsourced production to its local 
partners between 2000 and 2003. In doing so it concentrated its limited resource on the 
areas where it has competitive advantage - concept development and product design. 
We identify such activity as one of the two orthogonal dimensions of unbundling as 
discussed in the Chery case, which are: tangible/physical component and 
intangible/process unbundling. (See Section 6.1.2) 
Phase 2. Withdrawal of outsourced production and fostering of manufacturing 
capabilities through tangible unbundling. Since 2003, after securing a leading position 
in the R&D of controllers for air-conditioners and refrigerators, Longertek started to 
expand its speciality to manufacturing, and set up two factories. The approach to 
developing manufacturing capability has been low in visibility: 
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~ Using local supplies of manufacturing equipments instead of expensive 
complete-set imports when possible. (Infonnation provided by Ms Wang Ying 
[Production Manager] and confinned by author's site observation at SANHE's 
Jimo factory, May 2006) 
~ In view of its modest budget, second-hand or stock-clearance machines were 
bought when technical staff and CEO safeguarded good value for money. The 
R&D staff then worked closely with production and maintenance workers to 
make fine-tunings and changes to the machines to meet the production 
requirements. (lnfonnation provided by both CEO and Head of R&D on 
different occasions, May 2006) 
~ As to parts and materials, Longertek purchased from domestic or local suppliers 
if possible. For parts and components that are crucial to the performance of 
products, supply was sought from the world's best makers to ensure quality 
(lnfonnation provided by Mr Zhang Gulin, line-manager at Jimo factory). 
• Stage 3. Independent design/development and high spending on R&D and other 
technological activities. 
~ Expansion of in-house R&D and informal technical consultation. From 2000 to 
2008, Longertek's R&D team has grown from 1 person (CEO) to over 70. The CEO Mr 
Li was widely regarded in the company as the driving force of innovation and was well 
informed of product and technology details; however with the steady growth of the 
R&D team, his role in the firm has gradually changed to a more strategic one. Most of 
the R&D staff had previously worked in the technical departments of China's two 
biggest air-conditioner companies (both in the same city of Qingdao), and were head-
hunted by Longertek for their expertise. Their experience in, and personal connection 
with these two strong clients/competitors proved to be precious assets to Longertek: 
' .. . It is quite commonplace that, when there was a technical issue that one of our member of 
staff was not very sure about, they would ring up their previous colleagues from their old 
jobs to check .. .l sometimes do that too, as I also came from one of the big firms ... but of 
course this is conducted very tactfully, and under the radar of their bosses ... ' (Mr Hu 
Wensheng, Director of R&D, May 2006). 
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As discussed in the previous case, informal information exchange among previous 
university classmates and colleagues has also been noticed in GTe (see the end of 
previous section): 
'Many of our R&D members, especially younger ones, have university classmates who work 
in the same (tyre) industry. Probably because they are workingfor firms in different regions, 
the sense of competition is much weaker; rather, they seem to share a lot of empathy 
amongst each other. I know some of my team members often consult their classmates for 
technical problems, especially those in SOEs - who feel much less loyal towards their 
employers than those in POEs ... '(Mr Qian, Party Secretary, GTe, June 2006). 
Such pattern of peer consultation and informal information exchange are bound to have 
benefited collective learning and development of technological capabilities in these two 
companies. 
~ High spending on R&D and technology-related activities. According to the 
company's management accounting reports, between 2003 and 2007 Longertek's 
investment in technology-related activities has exceeded 20% of its turnover. Besides 
formal R&D investment, a fair share of the expenditure has been on low-visibility 
technological activities. For example, Longertek pays executive-level salaries to three 
retired Chinese engineers and university professors in the tyre industry for formal staff 
training and technical consultancy. Through the CEO's personal network, two Japanese 
experts from Panasonic and Sanyo were also invited regularly to provide training and 
trouble-shooting. They were also financially rewarded for bringing market information 
and business opportunities. 
6.3.3 Corporate governance and finance 
As a private company, Longertek is controlled by its sole shareholder and founder, the 
CEO. There was thus no owner outside the firm; and the owner inside the firm was 
guaranteed to be fully engaged, and a well trained and informed expert in the industry. 
In the Chinese context however, absence of state shareholders does not necessarily 
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mean that the state has no share in control. We were informed that there is no excessive 
intervention from outside Longertek: 'we are subject to lots of authorities ... but it only 
involves quite ordinary stuff: paying taxesifees, renewing registration, handling routine 
checks. We are left to mind our own business ... ' commented CEO Mr. Li. However, he 
also admitted that ' .. . in China, it is essential for an enterprise to build and maintain a 
good relationship with local authorities.' Li learned his lesson the hard way. According 
to Li's old colleague from his free-lance job Mr Gu, as the first Chinese company to 
develop (air-conditioner) controllers, in the 90s Longertek's technology level was not 
very far behind its Japanese counterparts. However, not understanding the crucial 
importance of winning government support, it was never funded either under 
government projects or by banks, thus missing the opportunity of catching up. 
Nowadays Li spends 80%-90% of his working life cultivating all sorts of relationships, 
a significant proportion of which were spent on dining, drinking and entertaining with 
local government officials. It was believed to be beneficial for the firm, according to 
MrLi, 
' ... the government controls a lot of key resources - favourable taxation, industrial policy 
and the use of land - we need to have good guanxi to access them; on the other hand. we 
also need government officials themselves - they could use their resources and personal 
networks to help us with the sales of products. , 
Longertek's belated friendly gesture with the authorities finally took effect - it started 
to receive the treatment it had long desired, but on the other hand, seeing the firm's 
promising prospects some supervising bodies are getting over-excited. 
'At times we are given unrealistic performance targets and so on ... actually they (the 
authorities) don't quite understand what we are doing and what our situation is like. In 
other words they just want to use us to showcase their political merits. which gives us 
unnecessary pressure. ' (Li) 
Employee Inclusion 
The advantage of owner-management is that close committed relationships can be 
developed between those who control the firm and those who work for it - employee 
inclusion - starting of course at the top. At Longertek the CEO is not the only one who 
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is enthusiastic about his job - the R&D manager, company vice president and 
manufacturing manager works long hours both at the Qingdao HQ office and on the 
production sites. In 2 separate interviews, 2 members of senior management 
commented that ' .. ./ don 't simply Dagong (make a living) here, at Longertek I am 
building my career'. One of the 2 interviewees was 29-year-old Production Manager 
Ms Wang Ying, who was put in charge of the main factory 60 km from her home in 
Qingdao. In order to ensure smooth routine production, and to set an example for the 
young workers, she lived with workers in the factory's dormitory: 
'We moved to this new site this May (2006). I remember it was raining heavily on that day 
and the road outside of the factory became so muddy that our lorries got stuck. The young 
workers didn't know what to do. I dashed into the rain and picked up a box ... they all 
followed suit...those days I slept in the office, and since there was no hot water I even 
couldn't wash my feet... I. 
Highly motivated young managers - such as Ms Wang - did excellently in eliciting 
their team members' enthusiasm and contribution by demonstrating their own. Shop-
floor operatives were encouraged and rewarded for constructive suggestions and 
contributions. During the author's site observation in Jun 2006, one of the front-line 
operatives mentioned that after solving a technical problem, he was commended on the 
company's newsletter and financially rewarded. In addition, the company has 
implemented formal policies to reward committed managers and technical staff: 
1) The company selects top-performing staff (mainly from technical employee 
and managers) every year and pays for the interest on their house mortgage; 
2) The company pays all or part of the university tuition fees for outstanding 
staffs children; 
3) If any member of staff takes on part-time education that leads to degree or 
certificate qualifications, the fees can be reimbursed by the company. 
4) An employee shareholding scheme was being drafted at the time of 
interviews in 2006. 
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Finance 
As a private company Longertek had to constantly battle for financing. Due to the past 
discriminatory rules against small private firms, Li never managed to get a loan from 
the banks. 
' ... what we had at that time was nothing but ideas, patents and intellectual property rights, 
and we needed money badly to commercia lise them, but the banks wouldn't accept 
intangible assets as collaterals ... therefore we could not get even a penny'. The reason for 
choosing to float in the US rather than on the domestic market is similar. According to the 
current policy in China private firms have to go through a time consuming and painful 
process to get listed. 'It means life and death to us that our project be launched in a certain 
time frame, and I am afraid that by the time we finally got listed in China the dinner would 
be cold already'. (Mr Li Jingmao, CEO) 
6.3.4 Summary 
Longertek was a bridgehead of technology and market in its area; showing endogenous 
capabilities of executing independent development and innovations. The firm has had 
extensive reverse engineering, coupled with various combinations of sourcing from 
abroad, sourcing domestically, and different degrees of self-reliance in its early days of 
catch-up. All its behaviour was indeed associated with the strategy of unbundling, 
although the interviewees never used the exact term. Meanwhile, Longertek had a 
governance that featured high shareholder engagement; strong industrial expertise of 
corporate decision-makers; trust in, empowerment of, commitment by, lower-level 
managers and shop-floor workers. The interviewees agreed that these factors 
contributed to the process of organisational learning and capability building. 
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6.4 South Electro 
6.4.1 Company profile and performance 
South Electro is one of the four affiliates of South (Group) S&T Co., Ltd, which was 
among China's first batch of shareholding companies (all of its shares were state-
owned in various forms). South Group was established in 1965 as one of the 'National 
Defence Electronics Industry Bases' in inland China. Along with 6 other companies in 
Guizhou province, South Group had enjoyed the privileged status of National Key 
Enterprise73• In 1991 it became one of the first 57 'National Experimental Large-scale 
Enterprises/Groups,74. As of end of May 2006, 50.3% of South Electro's shares were 
tradable and the rest 49.7% were non-tradable state shares. However around half of the 
tradable shares were owned by state shareholders - it was thus a'MASOE'. 
At the time of field work in May 2006, South Electro had 570 full-time staff (large-
sized by NBS' standard), 170 of whom were in management and administration 
positions. The number of full-time-equivalent employees at South Electro was only 
half compared to that of its best in the early 90s. The firm was suffering from severe 
losses and struggling to survive. 
South Electro as one of the four subsidiaries of South Group specialises in the 
manufacturing of cathode-ray tubes (CRTs) for colour televisions and other generic 
electronic circuit boards. Its CRT production started in the late 80s when TV 
production and demand for CRTs started soaring in China. South Electro started off by 
manufacturing CRTs and television remote-controls against specification for a 
Japanese company which supplied the technology and equipments. A few years later, 
the collaboration ended but South Electro managed to understand the technology and 
continued its own production. By the end of 1992 its products ranged from 17" B/W to 
25" colour CRTs. Annual sales reached over I million units with over 30% gross profit. 
From 1997 on, however, when the competition among Chinese TV set firms became a 
cut-throat price war, 70% of decrease in profit margin was passed on to parts and 
73 GTe, on the other hand, as an SOE in the same province, was never given such status. 
74 The purpose was to deepen internal reforms, improve the level of management, enhance competence 
of the firms and hence to set good examples for other enterprises, in 1998 another 63 large-scale 
companies were selected to join the list. 
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components suppliers (Kang, 2003). As one of the major suppliers to most domestic 
TV brands, South Electro was then forced to cut its price by 40% compared to the mid 
90s. From 2000 on, major breakthrough in TV display technology started to prevail, 
such as rear projection, LCD and plasma. South Electro was still only capable of 
producing traditional small-sized CRTs for a fast-shrinking market. Moreover, with 
market perspectives for CRT TVs on the decline, many TV set firms ceased regular 
orders and demanded 'just-in-time' supply, which again increased pressure on South 
, 
Electro's inventory control and cash-flow. From 2001 on, due to lack of investment, its 
research and development team was cut by more than half compared to mid 1990s, 
, .. . the company's R&D has almost ground to a halt ... ' (Mr Hou Song, retired Chief 
Engineer, May 2006). In 2002 when the senior management found the firm was too 
indebted to guarantee regular wage payment, they resigned collectively. 
6.4.2 Technological Development Strategy 
South Electro's failure in developing technological capability can be attributed to the 
following reasons: 
1) Inconsistent product development strategy, due to decision-makers' lack of 
industrial expertise and firm-wise understanding. 
The strategic decision makers of the company, i.e. CEO and Party Secretary did not 
understand the firm's core competence and hence were not able to cultivate it. The 
management at South Electro was content with profit generated from its CRT division 
and never aimed at new projects that were compatible with the firm's traditional 
strength and long-term development. According to Mr Yang, Director of R&D (who 
refused to reveal his full name), South Electro made a strategic mistake in the mid 90s 
by entering into a product niche market where South Electro did not have any 
advantageous resources to compete. In 1993 China started mass production of wireless 
telecommunication devices, such as pagers and mobile phones. Seeing this as an 
opportunity to revive the company from failing in the TV components market, the CEO 
decided to chase the fashion by starting to produce chip resistors for mobile phones. 
Knowing nothing about the sector and production, it invited Samsung, the industrial 
leader to set up a joint venture - a quick-fix measure of technology transfer that is too 
familiar to disengaged Chinese SOE managers. However, the Korean guests were not 
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impressed by South Electro's overall performance, especially its problematic 
managerial practice (see explanation in section 6.4.3) and 500 retired employees 75. 
After the failed attempt to gain technological expertise through joint-venturing, the 
firm opted for the highest-visibility form of 'bundling' - complete sets of equipments 
were bought in batches - with interest-free loans taken from state-owned banks. 
2) The absence oftechnological and organisational learning. 
'The firm has always relied entirely on disassembling prototype products and then mass-
producing it. Such strategy worked and paid offin the early years of the reform (from 1979 to 
1989), but there was no growth from there, nowadays in the market economy, if you don't try 
hard to at least follow the tide, you are doomed to fail ... ' (Mr HOU Song, retired Chief 
Engineer, May 2006) 
Due to its poor endeavour in technological learning, the lack of knowledge stock 
within its human resources has also caused the company's failure to adapt to the 
industrial transformation: 
' .. .from 1995. due to lack of special funding by the government, the previous CEO decided 
to stop providing the technical staffs with on-the-job training and reduce the subsidy for 
their qualification programmes, such as Dianda [distance undergraduate courses). Many 
highly qualified and experienced R&D personnel started to leave for more lucrative jobs in 
the coastal regions and the technology team shrank from over 100 people to around 30. 
South Electro was not capable of carrying out any serious research and development 
independently. In the early 2000s, new TV display technology started to emerge in China 
and we knew we must do something to catch up; however, the gap between CRT and other 
types of display technology is too big to be understood by us.' (Mr Chen Song, CEO, June 
2006) 
3) Lack of investment in R&D and technological activities 
Sagging profits and the urgent need to meet all sorts of immediate payments meant that 
South Electro hardly had any R&D expenditure since the mid 1990s. Mr Xie Mingfang, 
line manager of circuit board workshop mentioned in the interview that sometimes, 
even project proposals which could lead to significant process improvement and cost 
75 In the mid 1990s Chinese firms were fully responsible for wage payment of retired employees. 
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reduction would be rejected: he once proposed to invest 7,000 RMB (1,OOOUSD) to 
improve the lighting system which could lead to significant manufacturing cost 
reduction. 
'Last year I put in an application for some money to improve the lighting system in the 
workshop. My proposal stated that the investment would payoff in only 2 to 3 months. They 
(senior managers) told me to wait for my proposal to be discussed at the group level - for 
heaven's sake all I askedfor was 7,000 yuan (less than 1,000 USD)! .. .1 was never given an 
answer since.' (Mr Xie Mingfang, Line Manager, June 2006) 
4) High priority for dependent technology strategy and high-visibility activities 
It became clear during the interviews with the CEO of South Electro that, when 
considering introducing a new technology, the senior managers' instinct was to buy 
from world-leading multinationals: 
"When we realised that we need to update our technology (from CRT to LCD and Plasma 
[added by author)}, we tried to seek technology imports from Japan. Unfortunately, as a 
monopolist in the industry NEC holds its technical details so tightly that it is impossible for 
South Electro to do so. Then we thought about buying machines from them, so that at least 
they can provide some production training. However by that time we were already in deep 
debt and couldn't afford to do so either. " (Mr Chen Song, CEO, June 2006) 
As mentioned before, South Electro also bought state-of-the-art machineries for its 
production of chip resistors. During the site visit, the factory line manager was eager to 
show the flashy chip-placement machines they imported from Mitsubishi, and referred 
them as signs of the firm's technical strength. However, these machines are 'highly 
automatic and don't require specific training to operate, and Mitsubishi provides 2417 
on-call technical support' (Mr Jiang, Deputy Director). In other words, South Electro 
did not have the opportunity to learn by operating or maintaining the machinery 
independently, and its production capability remained static and completely dependent 
on those foreign machinery vendors. 
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6.4.3 Corporate Governance and Finance 
Corporate Governance 
South Electro retained many legacies of a typical Chinese MASOE. For example, 
despite stipulation of the Company Law, after South Electro's senior managers 
collectively resigned in 2002, all replacement members were assigned by South Group, 
rather than being nominated by the board and elected at the shareholders' meeting (Mr 
Qian, Deputy Director, June 2002). 
South Group as the biggest shareholder had overriding power and control over South 
Electro 76, and their intervention was perceived to have been 'over-simplified, 
inconsiderate and often detrimentaf (Mr Jiang, Deputy Director, August 2007). South 
Electro's performance was measured by the Group against uniform criteria with 
financial performance as a priority. Not truly appreciating the difficult situation South 
Electro was in, the Group demanded an unrealistic target of 10%-15% annual asset 
value increase. According to South Electro's CEO Mr Chen Song: 'there is no way we 
can manage that given the current situation, but the report determines how much 
funding we can get from the Group next year, therefore we must meet these targets. 
So ... you know, if there is a will, there is a way.' (It was later indicated by R&D director 
that South Electro could meet these targets through fraudulence of financial accounts). 
Irregular inspections were conducted by the Group management; however, it only 
involved financial reporting to the Group chief finance director and the chief 
accountant (which had already been 'tailored' to meet their expectations). Sometimes 
the Group executive in charge of production also comes to the workshops to inspect, 
but he normally did not stay for more than 30 minutes. Afterwards, expensive 
'souvenirs' and dinner at luxurious hotels were always arranged by South Electro as 
part of the routine (Mr Jiang, Deputy Director, June 2006). 
76 South Group on the other hand, had its ownership exercised by SASAC at the provincial level (just 
like SAIC and GTC). 
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All of the inte~iewees were very reluctant to gIve specific comment on the top 
managers' involvement in innovation-related activities. Meanwhile, CEO Mr Chen felt 
that he had better things to worry than technological improvement: 
' ... Oh, I simply don't have the energy and time to go over all the details of daily operations -
relationship management with external officials for our company is definitely of higher 
priority - otherwise we would have no money to pay and keep the workers, without workers 
how can we be innovative?' (CEO Mr Chen Song, August 2007). 
It can be seen that with the corporate governance typical in a major SOE, South 
Electro's senior managers were not motivated to look after their company. Rather, the 
highly quantified appraisal enforced by the main shareholder had forced managers to 
go out of their ways to fabricate immediate financial gains. Also, the time spent to keep 
government officials happy meant that the CEO would not have the chance to learn 
about the firm's technological strengths and weakness. Nor was he aware of, or 
concerned about the long-term price to be paid by the company by totally relying on 
foreign technology. 
By the same token, it became clear during the fieldwork that little was done in the firm 
to harness stakeholders' input in the technological development. There was no well-
defined and implemented scheme to promote healthy management-employee 
relationship in the firm. Also, relationship between lower-ranking managers and senior 
managers was highly hierarchical. The CEO of South Electro, Mr Chen, refused to 
comment on the situation. However, Mr Xie and Mr Wu, two of the production line 
managers, expressed their discontent: 
'Our managers .. , are very stubborn and closed-minded. They don 'I seem to be bothered 
about what their staffs think. Many of the younger senior managers also deliberately keep 
distance from the lower-level employees to preserve their image of authority. I can say 
there is a/ways an air of tension between upstairs and downstairs (meaning between the 
managers and workers, author).' (Mr Xie Mingfang, June 2006) 
'Many of my colleagues actually have a lot of ideas to improve their jobs and to improve 
the workshop's performance. However they often choose to keep it to themselves - what's 
the point? There have been occasions that, whenever things go wrong, a witch-hunting then 
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begins and it's always workers and junior supervisors who get the blame'. (Mr Wu Can, 
June 2006) 
On the other hand, like many other old-fashioned SOEs, South Electric had an 
apprenticeship system to train new workers, where tacit experience was passed on 
through life-long apprenticeship. It was particularly evident in South Electro's 
maintenance work force that such close mentoring and coaching relationship had 
cultivated a highly skilful and innovative team. In the team each new worker was 
allocated to a Shifu (master worker). Whenever a problem occurs, (e.g. a minor 
technical hiccup) the master worker would gather all of his apprentices around to brain-
storm a solution. Everyone was encouraged to build on or challenge other people's 
ideas. According to the Chief of R&D (Mr Yang), most maintenance workers had great 
understanding of the machines/equipments, and shared a pool of knowledge and 
experience among them. In the past they had made many important contributions to the 
production department's innovation. For example, Mr Sun, director of the maintenance 
team, found out that on three key equipments the boring bar and boring sheath does not 
match. This situation was reported to the CEO and a budget worked out. A set of 
matching bar/sheath costs at least 30,000 RMB. Sun suggested that the cost could only 
be around 5,000 Yuan for each machine if right changes can be made on site. At the 
time of site observation his team was experimenting on one of the equipments. 
Site observations showed that front-line operatives were mainly middle-aged skilled 
workers. 'They are well trained. responsible and loyal to the company. we are very 
grateful to them' (Mr Xie, Production Line manager and Mr Yang, Chief of R&D, 
2006). However, with more and more of them retiring or leaving, young workers were 
recruited and could hardly match their old peers in experience and work ethic. 
Managers described them as 'irresponsible. lazy cry babies' (Mr Xie). In order to 
discipline the new workers, harsh measures were initiated. For example, the main gate 
was kept locked and guarded to prevent workers from leaving earlier than they should. 
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Finance 
As a MASOE with long-standing connection with the state, South Eletro used to enjoy 
a privileged financial status. As mentioned in the previous section, up till the mid 1990 
it could easily secure cheap or interest free loans from State-owned banks to purchase 
expensive foreign-made machinery. However, since South Electro started to show 
signs of loss-making, it gradually fell out of favour by the banks and governmental 
funding authorities. The situation continued to deteriorate especially after state-owned 
banks were required to tighten up their lending and carry out credibility scrutiny in the 
late 1990s. 
' ... we used to be the 'star' company in the group - we were outstanding in all aspects -
technology, sales, profit, staff income, and tax contribution ... and all banks were eager to 
lend to us - because they know we didn't really need money, and even if we couldn't repay 
the group could always bail us out ... sadly it's all history now. Our financial situation 
started to dip when the government stopped providing direct finance in the late 1990s ... and 
then the banks started to ask difficult questions. You know, nowadays without a good 
project in the horizon we can't bid for government money, even when South Group agreed 
to be our guarantor.' (In a separate interview, the R&D director commented that the firm 
was not able to bid for any large-scale projects due to lack of technological competence) 
Direct financial support from the government has been rare and limited since the mid 
1990s. The latest infusion dated back to 2004 when South Electro received 150,000 
RMB (20,000 USD) from the Provincial Committee of Economy and Trade for its 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) project and another few wan (10,000 RMB) for its 
product improvement project. 
6.4.4 Summary 
To sum up, South Electro struggled to survive due to lack of capability to keep up with 
the demand of product upgrade and development dictated by the market. Its corporate 
governance conformed to that of old-fashioned MASOEs, which largely caused its 
failure. Top managers were appointed on basis of relationships with their superiors but 
not merit. They were pushed by the state shareholder to pursue immediate financial 
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perfonnance and cared more about guanxi with officials than what was best for the 
company. Although starting off well-equipped and favourably-financed, South Electro 
failed to preserve the momentum and adopted a highly dependent, high-visibility 
technological strategy. Meanwhile, little did its employees feel valued for their effort 
and ideas for technical improvement and innovation - the only exception was with the 
maintenance team, however the positive experience was based on tradition and was not 
disseminated outside of the department. 
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6.5 Discussion, hypotheses generation and further insights 
In Chapter 4, Section 4.2 we developed 3 propositions: I) In Chinese firms, different 
types of ownership (e.g. MASOE, MISOE and POE) entail different patterns of 
corporate governance and level of access to finance; 2) Firms with intelligent 
engagement will excel (other things equal) in capability types which are sensitive to 
low-visibility activities. 3) Firms with better access to finance will excel (other things 
equal) in capability types which are sensitive to high-visibility activities. 
After initial findings of each of the case studies are analysed in the previous four 
sections, it is important to develop an integrated overview of all five cases. This will be 
used to identify patterns which can be related back to the three propositions, and to 
generate testable hypotheses for stage two of the empirical research. 
A synthesized summary of the five cases are presented in Table 6-7. In order to show 
how these cases illustrate the theoretical framework, three types of factors were 
selected, namely capability factors (Manufacturing, R&D and Organisational), 
visibility of technological activities; and corporate governance and finance factors 
(CEO's time-horizon/autonomy, quality of shareholder engagement, inclusion, pressure 
for shareholder value, and ease of access to finance). When ascending scores from 
low/short to high/long (with matching colour labels from green to red) were assigned to 
the above factors, some interesting patterns start to emerge 77. Below each of the 
propositions will be discussed with reference to patterns in the table, and 8 
corresponding hypotheses will be generated. 
77 Scoring of the finns' capabilities and CGFS factors was based on author's own assessment during the 
case studies, and was individually verified by each firm's respondents to the questionnaires survey 
conducted at a later stage. The survey results are reported in Chapter 7 and 8. 
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Based on the case studies, only lout of 5 finns has scored 'High' in Manufacturing 
Capability, another 1 scored 'High' in R&D Capability, and none has 'High' scores in 
Organisational Capability (for definition and elements ofthese capabilities, see Chapter 
4, Section I). Although the sample size is too small to produce a generalisable 
conclusion, the finding enables us to tentatively infer that the situation of Chinese finns 
in tenns of dynamic capability development is not optimistic. 
6.5.1 Proposition 1 and Hypothesis 1 &2: Ownership and CGFS 
It was proposed in PI that different types of ownership entail different patterns of 
corporate governance and finance. This was mainly based on our literature review of 
past research in the Chinese context (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2). Moreover, Cai, 
Tylecote et al (2005; 2008) argue that MISOEs (Minority State-Owned Enterprises) in 
China enjoy better corporate governance than MASOEs (Majority State-Owned 
Enterprises), and easier access to finance than POEs (Private-Owned Enterprises), and 
therefore outperfonn the other two in capability development. Our case studies 
partially supported such argument, as a MASOE South Electro exhibited worrying 
signs of poor corporate governance and quickly diminishing access to favourable 
financial support. Moreover, all of its 3 types of capabilities scored the lowest of the 5 
finns: Medium-Low for Manufacturing and Low for both R&D and Organisational. On 
the other hand, Chery and GTC as 2 of the 4 MASOEs appeared have healthier CG and 
have become successful. Arguably, they could have done even better had they had the 
amount of cash enjoyed by the big favoured SAlC, but this was mainly due to their 
geographical disadvantage - with their hands tied, the official of local authorities 
simply could not have done more. 
The finding hence begs two questions: is ownership a good indicator of governance? Is 
there a better indicator of CG for capability development? 
Cai and Tylecote pointed answers in the direction of selection method for top 
management. They suggest that for Chinese SOEs, it is a better predictor of their 
technological capability than is ownership type (2008). Specifically, they found that in 
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the telecommunication sector, firms with senior managers selected by the shareholders 
out-perform firms with managers appointed by authorities. 
To what extent does selection method influence CG for capability development then? 
As the case study shows, for the four MASOEs, since SASAC was the main 
shareholder as well as governing authority (for explanations see Chapter 3, Section 
3.3.1), it requires a closer examination to understand whether the CEOs were selected 
by the shareholders according to the law, or appointed as officials. We did so by 
looking at the selection and appraisal procedure: 
Yin Tongyao from Chery had been head-hunted by the local authorities for his 
industrial expertise, and stayed in effective control from the beginning in 1997; Ma 
Shichun had served GTC for 25 years. Although none of the supervisory authorities of 
Chery and GTC displayed superior expertise, they compensated for this by giving the 
real experts - the CEOs - full autonomy to pursue their goals. They both had every 
opportunity and motivation to aim for real technological capability development, and 
they did so. In sharp contrast, SAlC displayed the typical form of CEO rotation in 
Chinese SOEs: firm executives were hand-picked by Shanghai government, with a 
short-term target to deliver. Once failed, they were either forced to resign (Hu 
Maoyuan), or moved to another company (two former CEOs). South Electro obviously 
had a mechanism of authority-appointed senior managers, which is typical of old-
fashioned MASOEs (see Section 6.4). It then explains why senior managers in SAIC 
and South Electro could not think long - why would they risk their careers to undertake 
long-term capability building, when the authorities were breathing down their necks for 
immediate profitability? 
It is therefore reasonable to infer that, for the two firms with better CG, their 
management selection method resembled what is defined as 'shareholder-selection' -
selection based on expertise and competence. As for SAIC and South Electro, the 
management selection conformed to 'appointed by the authority'. Two Hypotheses are 
then developed: 
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RIa: In China, different types of ownership lead to different corporate governance for 
the purpose of capability development. RIb: In China, in getting access to financial 
resources, different types of ownership lead to different treatment. 
R2: In China, different selection methods for top management in SOEs lead to 
different corporate governance for the purpose of capability development. (There is no 
R2b because theoretically, there is no reason why selection method should affect 
finance). 
6.5.2 Proposition 2 and Hypothesis 3, 4 &5: engagement, visibility 
and technological capability development 
In Chapter 2, the existing Western-developed theory was adapted for the Newly 
Industrialised Economies, that four corporate governance factors - 1) Quality of 
shareholder engagement 2) Stakeholder Inclusion 3) Pressure for shareholder value and 
4) Management autonomy - are each influential to four aspects of technological 
learning and capability development: 1) Visibility of technological activity; 2) 
Stakeholder spill-over; 3) Need for configuration and 4) Technological opportunity. 
After the situation of Chinese firms was reviewed in Chapter 3, the framework was 
further refined in Chapter 4. Specifically, since most unsuccessful technological 
learning in Chinese firms has been in the form of highly dependent, high-visibility 
activities, we proposed that firms with higher quality of shareholder engagement will 
excel (other things being equal) in capability types which are sensitive to low-visibility 
activities. Proposition 2 thus has the highest weight in all of the three propositions, that 
if it holds, then any degree of improvement in engagement quality should have a 
significant and positive impact on capability development in Chinese firms. 
It is obvious that the case studies confirmed our prediction: in Table 6-7, the two firms 
(SAIC and South Electro) with 'Low' scores of engagement quality had implemented 
technological strategy/activities that were high-visibility. Consequently, they scored 
'Mid-low' and 'Low' respectively in the type of capability (Organisational Capability) 
that are most sensitive to low-visibility activities. The other three firms had higher 
quality of engagement, and all had low-visibility technological capabilities, and 
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therefore exhibited higher dynamism in their capabilities, especially in Organisational 
Capability. Three more hypotheses are thus developed: 
H3: there will be a positive relationship between the quality of shareholder engagement 
and the firm's technological capability. 
H4: Poor engagement leads to strategy prioritising high-visibility activities; intelligent 
engagement leads to strategy prioritising low-visibility activities. 
H5: Strategy prioritising high-visibility activities leads to lower dynamic capabilities 
than strategy prioritising low-visibility activities, does. 
6.5.3 Proposition 3 and Hypothesis 6 and 7: Corporate governance, 
finance and technological capability 
Proposition 3 predicted that firms with better access to finance will excel (other things 
equal) in capability types which are sensitive to high-visibility activities. This is again 
proved to be true for the case studies. As demonstrated in Table 6-7, SAIC enjoyed 
very high access to finance, and scored the highest in Manufacturing Capability in all 5 
firms. (According to the framework set out in Chapter 4, Manufacturing Capability is 
most sensitively to high-visibility activities, compared to the other two capability 
types). On the other hand, the two firms with low access to finance both had medium to 
low dynamism of manufacturing capability, whilst Chery and GTC were favoured by 
the local governments, but had medium financial advantage due to the finical constraint 
intrinsic to their location, and each scored 'Medium' and 'Medium-high' in 
Manufacturing capability. Therefore, if combining Proposition 1 with 3, and if the 
previous six hypotheses all hold, two further hypotheses can be developed: 
H6: Ownership form affects technological capability; more specifically, (H6a) 
ownership forms giving more intelligent engagement will excel (other things equal) in 
capability types which are sensitive to low-visibility activities. It would also be 
expected (H6b) that ownership forms giving better access to finance will excel (other 
things equal) in capability types which are sensitive to high-visibility activities. 
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H7: Technological capability in SOEs is affected by selection method for top 
management. (H7a) Selection methods giving more intelligent engagement will excel 
(other things equal) in capability types which are sensitive to low-visibility activities. 
(There is no H7b because there is no reason why selection method should affect 
finance.) 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 can be seen to address the overall aim of this research, that is, to 
identify the most influential factors of corporate governance and finance for 
technological capability development in Chinese firms. 
6.5.4 Further Insights: Unbundling, inclusion and technological 
capability 
In addition to the above 7 hypotheses developed for testing in the questionnaire survey, 
there are also a number of further insights from the case studies. Below each of them 
will be discussed to explore opportunities for future research. 
Unbundling and dynamic capability 
In the case studies most successful firms have shared a pattern of behaviour which can 
be termed as technological unbundling. As the word indicates, it refers to firms' 
endeavour to acquire the capability to produce each component and sub-system, and 
system, separately, and indeed at the extreme involves separate acquisition of each 
element. Three key characteristics of unbundling have been identified: 
1) As a commonplace example of low-visibility activity, unbundling may take either or 
both of two orthogonal forms: tangible/component unbundling, such as acquisition of 
machinery from one supplier and parts from another (Chery with SEAT, and GTC with 
the Tianjin machinery supplier), and intangible/process unbundling, such as training 
from a third party; or joint R&D (Chery with AVL). In terms of their effects on 
dynamic capability development, tangible/component unbundling directly benefited the 
case study finns' development of dynamic manufacturing and R&D capabilities; whilst 
intangible/process unbundling required higher-level coordination of intra- and inters-
organisational activities and strategic planning, and hence pushed the firm to improve 
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dynamism of its organisational capability. Although limited sample size is not 
sufficient to test how the two forms of unbundling compare with each other, more can 
be revealed with further study focused on such issue. 
2) Firms in our case studies were mostly 'forced' to unbundle to tackle financial 
constraints; however unbundling should not be considered exclusive to poor, small 
firms. Just as other technological learning endeavour to enhance dynamic capabilities, 
unbundling requires not only the intensity of effort, but also existing capability and 
knowledge base to be able to learn (see discussion of the literature in Chapter 2). 
Therefore firms with higher degree of static capabilities and better financial stance 
could be in a better position to unbundle, and benefit even more from it. Likewise these 
firms could execute unbundling at a much more advanced starting point - just as SAIC 
did. The key to success - as argued in this thesis - is a sound corporate governance 
mechanism to see the process through. 
3) The applicability of unbundling and its benefit on capability development is 
dependent on the sectors and the characteristics of technology. Clearly for firms in the 
auto and electronics industries, unbundling provides them a unique opportunity of 
learning by doing, and to understand systems integration. These two industries involve 
assembly of components, to subsystems, to systems, then to final products. For those 
that don't (chemical, plasma, etc), there is less scope for unbundling and less need for 
systems integration. But the intangible unbundling is still relevant. 
Inclusion, guanxi and dynamic capability 
In the case study we confirm that although it is not a sufficient condition, stakeholder 
inclusion is positively associated with dynamic capability - again shown in Table 6-7. 
We also found that for firms with high quality of engagement, such as GTe and 
Longertek, their quality of inclusion was equally higher, and the same pattern applies 
to South Electro and SAlC where there was poor engagement, hence inclusion and 
engagement tend to go together. 
Two more findings from the case study enrich the existing theory. Specifically, 1) 
intelligent inclusion benefits not only technological activities, but also flow of 
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information for innovation; 2) in the Chinese context, the convention of guanxi, which 
often involves relationship between the government officials and the firm, may be 
necessary for a firm's survival and sales growth in the short run, but in the long term 
could be destructive to firms' other inclusion activities. 
Our cases have shown that close and constructive relationship with stakeholders - such 
as suppliers with Chery and GTC, skilled workers and technical staff with GTC and 
Longertek, and 'lead' industrial customers with Longertek, are vital. Whilst some of 
these relationships are based on transaction of commodities or collaboration of 
activities, many focus on facilitation of information flow. Take Longertek as an 
example: while accepting that their tougher resource constraints did inhibit formal 
training, information scanning and formal R&D, most product development was 
achieved through constant and open communication - not only within the firm, but with 
external sources. Longertek's technological competitiveness depends on key 
employees, including the owner/manager, bringing together the knowledge they have 
gained by experience, and making the routines developed within the firm explicit: 
thereby they are able to share knowledge, combine it, and create new knowledge. 
Unfortunately, the CEO's time must be spent elsewhere - much more than he would 
like to - to cultivate and expand his guanxi wang with officials. On the other hand, 
South Electro's case was a different side of the story: its CEO's enthusiasm in guanxi 
building reveals his incompetence and ill-willed motivation, which is largely attributive 
to the selection method of official appointment (see 6.5.1). 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, findings from five in-depth case studies were described and analysed. 
After integrated discussion was made based on the theoretical framework, seven 
corresponding hypotheses were developed for testing through questionnaire survey in a 
later stage: 
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Hla: In China, different types of ownership lead to different corporate governance for 
the purpose of capability development. Hlb: In China, in getting access to financial 
resources, different types of ownership lead to different treatment. 
H2: In China, different selection methods for top management in SOEs lead to 
different corporate governance for the purpose of capability development. 
H3: there will be a positive relationship between the quality of shareholder engagement 
and the firm's technological capability. 
H4: Poor engagement leads to strategy prioritising high-visibility activities; intelligent 
engagement leads to strategy prioritising low-visibility activities. 
H5: Strategy prioritising high-visibility activities leads to lower dynamic capabilities 
than strategy prioritising low-visibility activities, does. 
H6: Ownership form affects technological capability; more specifically, (H6a) 
ownership forms giving more intelligent engagement will excel (other things equal) in 
capability types which are sensitive to low-visibility activities. It would also be 
expected (H6b) that ownership forms giving better access to finance will excel (other 
things equal) in capability types which are sensitive to high-visibility activities. 
H7: Technological capability in SOEs is affected by selection method for top 
management. (H7a) Selection methods giving more intelligent engagement will excel 
(other things equal) in capability types which are sensitive to low-visibility activities. 
Moreover, further insights from these cases which were not included in the hypotheses 
have been identified and discussed. 
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Testing of Hypotheses 1 • 2 
This chapter is dedicated to descriptive findings of quantitative surveys which 
evaluated the technological capabilities and corporate governance lfinance of Chinese 
electronics firms. Section 7.1 draws a general picture of the data collected from the 
survey, such as firm size, age, location and sub-sectors. It also gives an overview of the 
variables used in the survey. Section 7.2 gives a general assessment of firms' 
technological capabilities and their technological endeavour. Section 7.3 evaluates the 
firms' corporate governance and finance. Section 7.4 summarises the chapter. 
7. 1 Data profile and variables 
7.1 .1 Data description - general profile 
The target population of this research comprised 11655 domestic firms in the Chinese 
electronics industry. From March to September 2007, paired questionnaires were 
circulated among 527 firms through post and email (for details about the circulation see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4). 195 sets of valid responses generated a response rate of 36.3%, 
which is reasonably high for a multi-questionnaire survey. In the questionnaire survey, 
89 firms (45.6%) were MASOEs, 68(34.9%) were MISOEs and the remaining 38 
(19.5%) were POEs. About 76% of the respondents to questionnaires had worked in 
the surveyed firm for a minimum of 5 years. This indicates that most informants had 
sufficient firm-specific knowledge to answer these questions. The average age of the 
firms was 25.64 years. (SD=15.24 years). The youngest firm was established in 2005 
and the oldest in 1959. 72 firms (37 %) had more than 1000 full-time-equivalent 
employees, which is large-scale according to the criteria of State Statistic Bureau 
(http://www.stats.gov.cnltjsj/ndsil2007/indexce.htm. last accessed June 2008), 22 
(13.9%) had between 500 to 999 staff, and 96 (49.2 %) had less than 499 staff, which is 
small-scale. Among the 195 firms, 72 firms (36.9%) were located in developed coastal 
region, and 53 (27.2%) in less-developed western regions. The three sub-sectors with 
most respondents were: telecommunications (38, 19.5%), computers and related 
products (33, 16.0%), and consumer electronics (24, 12.3%). 
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Table 7-1 gives detailed infonnation about the distribution of sample finns by region 
and by sub-sector. 
At the time of survey, 63.6% of the finns (124) had sales growth rates between 3 -
20% over the past three years, with only 2.6% finns suffering from sales reduction. 
These percentages were comparable to the industrial figures reported in the Yearbook 
of China Infonnation Industry 2006 (pp.94-98). In order to gain further insights into 
the validity of the data set, especially its industrial characteristics, comparisons were 
undertaken with industry statistics. For instance, we correlated the SOE sector's 
general sales growth with that of the SOEs in our survey (POE data at the macro level 
was not available) and observed a low but significant Pearson ratio of 0.12 (P<O.OI). 
This again con finned that our data was representative of the population. 
Sales increase however did not necessarily reveal how competitive the finns were. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, innovation rates were collected in the survey to measure finns' 
innovation strength - proxied by the average percentage of revenue from newly 
introduced products to total revenue in the company over the last 3 years (Yam et al., 
2004). More than a quarter of the finns had less than 9% of sales generated from new 
products in a 3-year period, and the top quartile was between 30-49%. This 
perfonnance compared poorly to developed countries such as Sweden, Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Switzerland, Ireland, Netherlands and Gennany with innovation rates above 
60%. It is also unsatisfactory compared to another BRIC78 country - Brazil- with 31 % 
in 2000 (Cassiolato, 2001). Bearing in mind that newly introduced products were not 
always innovative products (the latter was often a fraction of the fonner), the actual 
strength of innovation in the surveyed finns would even be arguably lower. This 
finding supported our prediction that despite the superficially satisfying sales data, 
most electronics firms were faced with lack of sustainable growth propellers. 
78 A tenn referred to the combination of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 
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Table 7-1 Sample distribution by region and industrial sub-sector 
Location Percent Sub-sector Percent 
BeijJ.!!g 40 20.5 Telecommunication 38 19.5 
-- ---_._----
----.----
Consumer 
Guangdong 62 31.8 electronics 24 12.3 
-._--------_. __ . 
_______ '_._H 
._.-._---
TV& broadcasting 
Sichuan 30 15.4 e U1 ments 17 8.7 
Computers and 
Guizhou 48 24.6 related product~_. __ . 33 16.9 
--_._-----
---.. _---------
Electronic 
Shandon 9 4.6 ~~ments 21 10.8 
-----
Integrated circuits 
Zhe'ian I 0.5 & semi-conductors 16 8.2 
-------
._--_.-
Sealed vacuum 
Shaanxi 5 2.6 electronic devices 17 8.7 
Electronic parts and 
. components ____ 18 9.2 
-----._--------
Electronic material 6 3.1 ---------~ ._-----
Photo-electronics 5 2.6 
,-------lr-------t-------J-=....:..:..:-.:..:....----.. --.--.--.--.--.... ---.. -----.----- --'---'---
Total 195 100% Total 195 100% 
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7.1.2 Measuring variables 
In order for analysis and hypotheses testing to be conducted through use of the survey 
data, a series of variables were devised when the questionnaires were designed. 
According to their definitions and the theoretical framework, these variables can be 
categorised into four types: 1) dependent; 2) independent; 3) intennediate and 4) 
control variables. 
1) Dependent variables - Technological capability 
Past research on innovation management (see Chapter 2 and 4 for discussions of the 
relevant literature and theoretical framework) and initial findings from the case studies 
inspired the content of technological capability measurement. Considering the 
feasibility of data collection method and the target respondents' job responsibility and 
knowledge about the finn (firm chief executives and R&D managers), the four types of 
capabilities set out in Chapter 4 were condensed into three in the questionnaire survey, 
where Organisational capability covered both Internal and External Organisational 
Capabilities (see below). A brief description of the three types of capabilities is given 
below, and a list of elements for each capability is presented in Table 7-2: 
• Manufacturing capability (MANCAP) refers to a finn's ability to convert R&D 
results into products in accordance with design request, which caters for market 
needs, and cost effectively (Yam et aI, 2004). 
• R&D capability (R&DCAP) refers to a finn's ability to integrate customer/market 
desired functions into product design/development process, to carry out necessary 
process/product improvement and innovation, and to respond to market and 
manufacturing feedbacks about design and manufacturing. 
• Organisational capability (ORGCAP) refers to a finn's ability manage both 
internal and external relations, to secure organizational mechanism, to cultivate 
distinctive and strong organizational culture, and to adopt good management 
practices to facilitate technological change. 
R&D capability and organisational capability are assumed to gain more from low-
visibility strategies than high-visibility ones (see explanation in Chapter 4, Section 4.1, 
and case-based illustration in Chapter 6, Table 6-7). Any such differential effect is 
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likely to be less with manufacturing capability, since successive improvements in static 
manufacturing capability could be bought with bundled foreign technology (see the 
cases of SAIC and South Electro in Chapter 6). Moreover, manufacturing capability 
should be most sensitive to the availability of finance, organisational capability least. 
2) Independent variables: Corporate Governance factors 
According to the hypotheses generated from the case studies (see Chapter 6, Section 
6.5), three corporate governance factors were included in the quantitative study as 
independent variables: i) Ownership Type; ii) Management Selection Method; and iii) 
Quality of Shareholder Engagement. 
i) Ownership Type. Firms' ownership was categorised according to the theoretical 
framework: Majority State-Owned [State share ~ 50%] (MASOE); Minority State-
Owned [0 %< state share<50%] (MISOE); and Private-Owned (POE). 
ii) Management Selection Method. Selection methods of management mainly take 
through broad forms: selected by administrative authorities (ADMINS), recommended 
or approved by administrative authorities (RECIAPPS) and selected by firms' 
shareholders (SHARHS) (Cai & Tylecote, 2008). 
iii) Quality of Shareholder Engagement. The findings from the case studies showed 
that, shareholder assessment criteria are good proxies of the level and extent of their 
engagement. Based on the case studies and SASAC's portfolio of performance 
measurement in large-scale SOEs (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1), four of the most 
representative criteria are selected to measure quality of shareholder engagement in the 
survey. Profit rate (MEAS_PFT) and sales revenue (MEAS_SALES) are two of the 
indicators most commonly used by Chinese authorities to evaluate firms' financial and 
overall performance. Although containing some overview of firm's past financial and 
market position, they do not show how these profits and sales have been generated (by 
selling more new, innovative products, or by simply cutting down R&D to reduce 
cost?), nor do they say anything about the firms' potential to sustain profits and sales. 
Hence over-reliance on these figures can be seen as a sign of lack of engagement or 
inappropriate engagement. Market share (MEAS_MKT) is a slightly better indicator, 
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as it reflects the finn's product competitiveness in the market and indirectly infonns the 
finn's longer-tenn competence. Shareholders caring more for market shares can 
therefore be regarded to have higher level of engagement. Finally, the innovation rate 
(sales revenue from products introduced in last 3 years/total revenue) (MEAS_INNO) 
is a new adoption from the western world at the tum of the century, among the four it 
requires the highest expertise to prepare and understand, moreover, it best indicates the 
finns' current technological capabilities - the capability to develop new products, and 
the capability to profit from innovation. Close attention to, and emphasis on improving 
this ratio can mean high level of engagement by the shareholders to enhance finns' 
technological capability. In the questionnaire, finn executives were asked to rate the 
weight of the above shareholder assessment criteria on a 5-point Likert Scale (there 
was no cross-criterion ranking). 
3) Intermediate variables - Technological Strategy/Activity 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter and in the literature review (Chapter 2, Section 
2.3), technological activity/strategy can be influenced by a finn's corporate governance 
and finance, and meanwhile is liable to detennine its technological capability 
development and perfonnance. Therefore, they could be referred to as intermediate 
variables - the ones which mediate the effects of corporate governance and finance on 
technological capability development. In the survey three types of intermediate 
variables were included as inspired by the literature and the case studies, namely: 1. 
Technological strategic priority; 2. Technology-related financial input; 3. Non-
financial technological endeavour. 
1. Technological strategic priority variable. Firm executives were asked to report 
their preference between choosing the most advanced technology, given sufficient 
funds (high visibility strategy [HVS]), and choosing the most appropriate technology 
according to the finn's current situation (low-visibility strategy [LVS]). 
2. Technology-related financial input - In light of the complexity of relationships 
among different investment activities, the focus is on two types of technology-
related investments which are most relevant to the research questions (average of last 
three years): 
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Investment in tangible asset as percentage of total revenue [INV _TAN]; 
Investment in technology absorption as percentage of total revenue 
[INV _ABSB]. 
High intensity of investment in tangible asset can be associated with high-visibility 
strategy, which according to the hypothesis indicates poor engagement; whereas 
high level of investment in technology absorption can be read as outcome of low-
visibility strategy - deriving from intelligent engagement. 
3. Non-financial technological endeavour - 7-point Likert scales were used to 
measure firm's technology-related activities in the past five years. 
Reliance on foreign technology supply (FRGN) 
Reliance on reverse engineering (REVS) 
Reliance on staff training (TRNG) 
Reliance on networking activities both internally and externally (8-item 
average, Cronbach's a=O.868, for item description see Table 7-2) (NTWK) 
As observed, a high score for FRGN indicated HVS, whereas high scores for REVS, 
TRNG, and NTWK indicated LVS. 
4) Control variables 
In the regression analysis, firms' R&D investment was treated as a control variable 
(INV _RD), measured by the proportion of investment in R&D to total sales revenue 
over the last 3 years. There are two explanations, first, the positive effect of R&D 
intensity on technological capability development has been thoroughly studied and 
widely proved (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Deeds, 2001), hence it is not pertinent to re-
test the hypothesis. Moreover, since R&D activities are relatively easy to quantify and 
fairly high-visibility, it does not effectively reflect the strength of shareholder 
engagement. 
Firm age and size were also control variables. Studies in the past have shown that older 
firms may have cumulated experience that facilitates technological development; yet 
they may also encounter difficulties in keeping in line with developments in the 
external world (Hanson, 1992; Audretsch, 1995; Toby, 2000), therefore, Firm Age 
(AGE) is controlled for. Likewise, larger firms may have more resources but lack the 
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necessary organisational flexibility; hence Firm Size (SIZE) was controlled for by 
including the total number of full-time employees of the firm. Geographic location has 
been confirmed as an important factor for a firm's development, particularly in the 
Chinese context (Demurger et al., 2002), two regional dummies are created for the 
three geographic locations in which the data was collected (RIG_DUM). In addition, 
dummy variables for 9 of the 10 industrial Sub-sectoral Categories are included 
(SECT_DUM). 
Definitions of the variables and the questions designed to gather relevant data have 
been summarised in Table 7-2 below: 
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Variables and I Definition and Measurement I Informant 
labels 
,control Variables 
Age 
AGE 
Region 
(6 Region dummies) 
REG DUM 
I In what year was your firm established? 
What province is your firm based (main body) 
Dependent Variables 
I CEOQ* 
CEOQ 
Size 
SIZE 
Sector 
(9 sector 
dummies) 
SECT DUM 
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Measurement i Informant 
I 
'I About how many full time employees does CEOQ 
your firm have? 
What sub-sector does your firm belong to? CEOQ 
(select from 10 sub-sectors according to CSB 
criteria) 
Technological 
Capabilities 
Multiple-item response scales, ranging from 1 ='below the average of the nation' to 6= 'advanced in the world' R&DQ** 
Manufacturing 
capabilities 
[MANCAPI 
MANCAPI 
MANCAP3 
MANCAP5 
MANCAP7 
R&D Capabilities 
[R&:DCAP]: 
R&:DCAPI 
R&:DCAP3 
7 types of manufacturing capabilities measured, average used in regressions, Cronbach's a=O.93 
~ Overall capability of equipment I MANCAP2 => Ability to ensure smooth functioning of 
equipments and routine production 
=> Ability to comply with the generic request of ! MANCAP4 => Manufacturing cost control 
R&D 
=> Total quality control MANCAP6 => Ability to make improvement in the 
manufacturing system 
~ Level of contribution to the innovation process 
6 types of R&D capabilities measured, average used in regressions, Cronbach's a=O.94 
=> The overall R&D capability I R&:DCAP2 ! => The ability to carry out process I improvement R&:DCAP4 I ~ The ability to carry out new product I development => The ability to carry out process innovation 
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from manufacturing about design and 
engineering 
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=> Ability to incorporate market 
customer feedback in 
improvement/innovation process 
and I 
the i 
.1 
Organisational 
Capabilities 
[ORGCAP) : 
4 types of organisational capabilities measured, average used in regression, Cronbach's a=O.93 
ORGCAPI 
ORGCAP3 
=> Flexibility in adjusting organisational structure 
according to the need for technological 
developments 
=> Co-ordination and control of the major functions 
within the company 
Independent variables 
Ownership 
variables: 
MASOE 
MISOE 
POE 
Shareholder 
Engagement 
variables: 
MEAS PFT 
MEAS SALES 
MEAS_MKT 
MEAS INNO 
I What is your ownership type (100% state-owned, I CEOQ 
I state-shareholding, collective, or private)? What is the nature of your first and second shareholders (if 
shareholding); what are their shareholding 
percentages? (Final categories by own-calculations 
to insure accuracy) 
I 
Rank on a 5-point scale each of the strategic 
priorities of fum's major shareholders: 1 = least 
I 
important, 5= most important: 
=> The fum's profit rate 
=> The fum's sales growth 
=> The fum's market share 
=> The proportion of revenue from recently 
introduced products 
CEOQ 
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ORGCAP2 
OR GCAP4 
Management 
selection 
variables: 
ADMINS 
RECIAPPS 
SHARHS 
=> The culture and mechanism to encourage 
and reward inventiveness and creativity 
=> Initiative of sub-units within company 
strategy 
I 
How is the 
the fum: 
senior management selected in 
I => 
I => 
I => 
Appointed by authorities 
Selected by the finn but approved or 
recommended by authorities 
Selected bv shareholders 
CEOQ 
Intermediate dependent variables 
Strategic Priority I Is your strategic priority to : 
variable: I I CEOQ 
AD V_TECH I ~ . I Choose the most advanced technology, given I 
sufficient funds 
MATCH TECH 
N on-Financial 
technological 
endeavour: 
FRGN 
REVS 
TRNG 
~ Choose the most appropriate technology I 
according to the firm's current situation 
i Self-reported sources of technological development I R&DQ I in the past five years. 5-point Likert scale to measure 
i level of reliance on various activities: 
I ~ Foreign technology supply 
I ~ Reverse .e~gineering 
i ~ Stafftrammg 
I 
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10. 'I on average, in the past three years: 
Technology-
related fmance 
R&DQ 
investment 
variables: 
INV TAN 
INT ABSB 
NTWK 
~ Investment in tangible assets/revenue 
~ Investment in technology absorption 
/revenue 
8 types of networking activities, internal and 
external; average used in regressions, 
Cronbach's a=O.868 
R&DQ 
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7.2 Firms' technological capabilities and technology activities 
7.2.1 Sampled firms' technological capabilities 
This section describes degrees of technological capabilities developed by all sampled 
finns. By using the framework introduced in Chapter 4, it explains briefly why these 
finns have (or have not) developed these capabilities. Before proceeding, it is worth 
repeating briefly that technological capabilities (Manufacturing Capability, R&D 
Capability, and Organisational Capability) are evaluated by elements. A scale of 
'Degrees' from 1 to 6 was used to assess the level of a finn's achievement in each 
element. Sample finns would select Degree 4 if they believed that their capability in 
question was 'advanced in the nation', or Degree 6 if it was 'advanced in the world'. 
Given that respondents may lead themselves to believe that higher degree was more 
'desirable', which is commonplace in self-reports (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986), and there 
may hence be a upward shift in the distribution of response. Only those reached 
'Degree 5' or higher are regarded as fully dynamic in the element of capability. 
Fortunately such bias is not going to jeopardise the interpretation of correlations 
involving the scales. 
There are respectively 7, 6 and 4 elements for the 3 types of technological capabilities 
measured in the questionnaire survey. Cronbach's a (Cronbach, 1951) was calculated 
to checked the elements' internal consistency and the values are 0.74, 0.73 and 0.73, 
which are all above the 0.70 cut-off value of being acceptable (Reynaldo & Santos, 
1999). 
Findings for the general assessment are presented below. Table 7-3 to Table 7-5 
provides detailed assessment of all capability elements. 
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Manufacturing Capability 
Table 7-3 ManufacturiDl~ capability of Chinese electronics manufacturin2 firms - the survey result 
, 6 
Elements of 2 4 Advan~ed 1 Average · in 3 Advanced in 5 
capabiUty ,. . in tbe 
I' tbe nation tbe nation world .J I- . ., 
-
1- ,-
Equipment* 9 63 64 15 20 23 
(4.6%) (32.3%) (32.8%) (7.7%) (10.3%) (11.8%) 
-----... 
____ M.M_M_ 
--
-
-_ .... _ ..... __ ... __ .. _--_ .. 
--.--- --.-.---.---
Routine 8 62 54 40 20 10 
(4.1%) (31 .8%) (27.7%) (20.5%) (10.3%) (5 .1%) 
.... _ .. __ .. " .... _ ........ _ ... -_ ........... ----_ .... __ . . _---_. ...... __ ._ .. _ ... _-------_ .. , -._ .. _---
. __ .... _ .._._._, ..... __ .. _--_._ .. 
.. _-.. _--_ .... _ .._ ...... _-_ ... _-_ ... _. __ . __ . 
Capability to 
comply with 2 59 51 53 17 11 (1.0%) (30.3%) (26.2%) (27.2%) (8.7%) (5 .6%) 
R&D 
Total quality 5 62 61 37 14 15 
control (2.6%) (31 .8%) (31.3%) (19.0%) (7.2%) (7 .7%) 
-Manufacturing 
10 67 44 48 24 1 
cost (5.1%) (34.4%) (22.6%) (24.6%) (12.3%) (0.5%) 
control 
----
---
----_._---_ .. . _--_ .. _ ... _ .._---_._--.. __ .. _--_ .... .... _---_ ........ _-- _ ........ _--. __ .. __ .-.-
Process 7 74 30 64 11 9 
improvement (3.6%) (37.9%) (15.4%) (32.8%) (5.6%) (4.6%) 
-f------ _. __ ... _---_ .. ..... _ ... _--- _ .. _. __ ._ ... _-_ ... _ .._-_ .... _ ...... ---.... __ ... _- _ .. _-.. ,_ .... __ .... _-
Contribution to 16 92 33 39 7 8 
innovation (8 .2%) (47.2%) (16.9%) (20.0%) (3.6%) (4.1%) 
Note: * The first row IS the number of firms . The figure In the second row IS the percentage of finns 
claimed over the total sampled firms (195 finns). For example, 9 firms have evaluated their Equipments 
at 'degree l' and they make up 4.6% of the total firms sampled. 
There are 7 elements measured in the manufacturing capability. The element that has 
been best developed was the capability to maintain routine operation - 15.4% of the 
firms have ranked themselves 'degree 5' or '6', of which 5.1% believe their routine 
operation was advanced in the world. The next best was the firms' equipments. 22.1 % 
firms had ranked their equipment to be approaching or at world standard. The poorest 
assessment was with manufacturing department's ability to contribute to innovation, 
only 7.7% of the firms think they have developed this capability to degree 5 or 6. The 
findings indicate that Chinese electronics firms have developed some manufacturing 
capabilities, but these were mainly static capabilities which were more sensitive to 
high-visibility input. For example, the element of equipments in manufacturing 
capability may be relatively easily enhanced by acquiring bundles. Just as discussed in 
Chapter 4 and 6, the idea of depending on purchasing bundles particularly appeals to 
short-termist managers - the reasons included quick turnover from new products and 
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(accounting) profits to please the disengaged shareholders. However, after bundles 
were acquired, the buyers' activities were likely to be limited to utilization and 
maintenance of the bundled technology, which explained why finns scored highest in 
their capability to maintain routine operations. In the long run, although the finns may 
have extended their production capacity or learned to operate the established 
production systems efficiently, they may still have limited capabilities to carry out 
planning, product design, and evaluation of alternative design and plans, which was 
represented as the ability to contribute to innovation in the questionnaire. The data 
supported such argument - nearly 70% of the 43 finns which scored 5 or above in 
equipments have scored 3 or less in their capability to contribute to the process of 
innovation. It is evident that possession of sophisticated equipments does not 
automatically generate dynamic manufacturing capability. 
R&D Cqpability 
Table 7-4 R&D capability of Chinese electronics manufacturing firms - the survey result 
Elements 
capability 
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3 Advance 5 Advanced d in' the in the 
nation . nation world 
R&D in General 8 -'--- 5-5----- 5-7-----48-----'- 12 -15--' ....... -~ .. -
_. __ ., .. __________ J!l.ill._ 28.2~ ___ Q2.2~L-+-,----'-'-'_'_::J.'___+-{6.2%) . __ . _(7.7CYO 
Process 16 53 61 18 3 
_~mErov~m~nt (8.2%) (27.2%) _ ,2~%) (9.2%) _(1_. 5°_%~ ___ _ 
Process 24 77 40 39 12 3 
innovation (12.3%) (39.5%) (20.5%) (20.0%) (6.2%) (1.5%) 
-_ ... _. __ ._-------- ----- ._--_. 
New product 7 52 
_~~~~_!~.Ement _ _ (3~6%) (26.7%) 
Response to 
feedback from 13 61 
manufacturing (6.7%) (31.3%) 
._ d~p!:'_. ___ ---f- --
Response to 10 
market feedback (5.1 %) 
62 
(31.8%) 
37 
(19.0%) 
--
60 
(30.8%) 
42 
(21.5%) 
-------
71 
(36.4%) 
----
44 
(22.6%) 
------
63 
(32.3%) 
--------- ---_.-
16 12 
(8 ,2%) (6.2%) 
--_. __ . 
----
14 3 
(7.2%) (1.5%) 
---, ----_. __ .-
9 9 
(4.6%) (4.6%) 
On average, 10.7% of the sampled firms have fully developed dynamic R&D 
capability (degree 5 or 6): 10.7% and 7.7% scored degree 5 and 6 respectively in 
'process improvement' and 'process innovation'; 14.4% of the firms scored degree 5 or 
6 for 'new product development'. Although 13.9% finns believed that they have fully 
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developed dynamic capability in 'R&D in general', their capabilities to 'respond to 
feedback from manufacturing department' and 'respond to market feedback' were two 
of the weakest elements: only 9.7% and 9.2% have scored degree 5 or more 
respectively. Such weakness clearly reflected the lack of coordination among the three 
key functions of the finns. It is argued that well integrated and networked functional 
departments within a finn could contribute more to technological success (Gupta et aI., 
1986; De Meyer & Van Hooland, 1990). Unfortunately this kind of behaviour, which 
again is low in visibility, has not been widely observed in Chinese finns. On the other 
hand, the poor scores in 'process innovation' can be seen as an outcome of over-
reliance on high-visibility activities, such as bundled equipment acquisition - the more 
and the better that is bought externally, the less there is left for internal effort to make 
improvements on, hence the less likely is such capability cultivated through learning by 
doing. 
Qrganisational Capability 
Table 7-5 Organisational cal!abilit~ of Chinese electronics manufacturing firms 
2 4 6 
Elements 3 Advanced 5 Advanced 
capability In the In the 
n~tlon orld 
Organisational 
flexibility for 26 60 57 31 12 9 
technological (13.3%) (30.8%) (29.2%) (15.9%) (6.2%) (4.6%) 
development 
Atmosphere and 
mechanism to 20 72 51 40 12 3 
encourage (10.3%) (36.9%) (26.2%) (20.5%) (6.2%) (1.5%) 
innovation 
Coordination 
and control 17 85 53 28 9 3 
among major (8.7%) (43.6%) (27.2%) (14.4%) (4.6%) (1.5%) 
functions 
Initiatives of 
sub-units within 26 81 47 29 9 3 (13.3%) (41.5%) (24.1%) (14.9%) (4.6%) (1.5%) 
strategy 
232 
Chapter 7: Testing of Hypotheses 1 - 2 
More than 50% the finns believed that their capability to 'coordinate and control major 
junctions' was average or below average in the nation (degree 2 or 1), and the situation 
of 'sub-units initiatives within strategy' was similar (54.8%). Only 10.8% of all finns 
acquired the dynamic level of degree 5 or 6 for 'organisational flexibility for 
technological development', and only 7.7% thought their finns to have fully developed 
the 'atmosphere and mechanism to encourage innovation'. It has been argued that, 
organisational capability is the one to benefit least from high-visibility strategy/activity, 
and also the one to benefit the most from low-visibility strategy/activity (Chapter 4, 
Section 4.1). Assessment of the sample finns' technology activities below will 
reinforce the argument. 
7.2.2 Technological activities 
Following the framework set out in Chapter 4, we now look at the sample finns' 
technological strategy. In partiCUlar, three types of strategies are examined: 1) general 
strategy; 2) investment strategylbehaviour; and 3) technology-related activity. 
General technological strategy 
When acquiring new technology from outside, 58.7% of finns choose to buy 'most 
advanced technology (if junded)' as opposed to 'appropriate technology compatible to 
their existing technology'. Equally, over 57.2% of finns consider 'purchasing discrete 
package of technology (such as equipment)' to be their first choice when upgrading 
their existing technology; and only 4.6% finns prioritised 'training'. 
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Techn%gica/lnvestment 
Table 7-6 Investment in technology-related activities in Chinese electronics firms 
, 1 nvestme'1t in~e".~ity ~~8 percentage ~f revenue) over the la~t 3.years 
." ",-
I 
<1% 
, 
1%~3% 3.1%-5% 1"5.1%-7% ' 1'7.1%-9% >9% I 
. "~ 
" '" 
Investment on tangible 12.3%'Y 26 .2% 26.7% 7.2% 7.7% 20.0% 
technology such as 
equipments 
-investmenT-ill- intangible ' 36,90/0- 321fiir-- ------,-----13.3% 6.7% 9.2% 1.5% 
technology such as patent 
and licences 
MM .. _ •• _._._ •• _______ ·_· ____ ·M ____ _ •• 
. _----_. 
- 39.5% .,- ------_. ------- ,-,------- -----_ .. -Investment in technological 16.4% 10.4% 16.9% 5.6% 5.1% 
absorption 0 
~:----'-'-'- -------, 
- rnvestmeniin R&D ' 29.50;-;-- 16.4% 23:6%----- 10.8% · 13.8o/~--'-- -5.9-%----'---'-
.. 
°Note: Technological absorption expenditure IS the money spent on activities m asslmllatmg newly 
acquired technology, which include various training (on the job training, course based training etc.), 
inviting experts or engineers from outside for problem solving, trials, experiments and so on. 
Table 7-6 summanse the finns' investment in technology-related activities. Before 
looking into the findings, the official statistics can put the survey data into perspective. 
According to National Bureau of Statistics, the R&D intensity of medium-large scale 
enterprises in general (most of which SOEs) was 0.71 % in 2000 and 0.77% in 2006, 
which has not been a significant improvement. Moreover, in 2000 the intensity of 
foreign technology introduction (such as patents and licenses, measured as investment 
in intangible technologylrevenue in our survey) was 13 times higher than that of 
technology absorption (same sort of data for 2006 was not available). As shown in 
Table 7-6, the investment behaviour of electronics firms are not exceptional - R&D 
intensity is higher than investment in intangible technology and absorption - this is 
understandable as high volume of R&D input is inevitable for most electronics finns 
operating in medium-high technology sectors- nearly 1/3 of them have invested less 
than 1 % of their revenue on 'R&D' over the last three years, and another 1/3 clustered 
79 The figure is the percentage of firms claimed over the total sampled firms (195 firms) . For example, 
24 firms have reported to invest less than 1 % of their revenue in purchasing tangible technology, and 
they make up 12.3% of the total firms sampled. 
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at the other end (invest more than 5%) of the spectrum. Several patterns identified in 
the official data are equally distinctive in the survey. Generally, firms are inclined to 
pay more for high-visibility activities than for the opaque ones. More than 115 of firms 
spend at least 9% of their revenue on purchasing technology externally, and most of the 
money was spent on 'buying tangible assets such as equipments'. On the other hand, 
more than half (55.9%) of the firms have very limited budget for 'technology 
absorption' «3% of revenue). Finally, investment in intangible technology is clearly 
not favoured by the firms. Why? 
The answer lies in how investment and return are measured and appreciated in the 
current system. In 2004 SASAC introduced a portfolio of accounting ratios (see Table 
3-8 in Chapter 3) to evaluate senior managers' performance in SOEs. In the portfolio 
'net return to asset' accounted for 14%; and 'technological input' as a modification 
indictor only accounted for 3.5% of the overall score. When their remuneration and 
career are directly connected to ratios, managers no doubt strive to make the ratios look 
good, and the most straight forward way is increasing profit and cutting costs -
expenditure on licences/ patents (intangible technology) and training/experiments 
(technology absorption) should be economised as it reflects accounting costs; while 
money spent on equipments is transformed into assets, it would then contribute to 'ratio 
of firm asset value added', which accounts for 7% of the assessment portfolio. 
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TechnQlogical activity 
Table 7-7 Degree of reliance on various technological activity and the impact on technological 
capability development 
~ None or very little Moderate reliance Very heavy reliance reliance (Degrees 1 (Degrees 3 to 5) or indispensable and 2) (Degrees 6 ~d 7) Type of activity -'"- ,,;. c- ,,-, i. ~"::.. ;'!. 
Receiving foreign technology 
2080 supply 95 24 
10.3% 48.7% 12.3% 
Reverse engineering 
24 108 63 
12.3% 55.3% 31.5% 
Own R&D 
37 99 58 
19.5% 50.8% 29.8% 
,---" .--. 
- __ • ___ 0 __ , __ -
Training 
89 88 17 
45.7% 45.2% 8.8% 
Four types of technological activity commonly practised in Chinese firms were 
investigated here: 1) reliance on foreign technology supply; 2) reverse engineering; 3) 
own R&D; 4) training. The visibility of acquiring foreign technology, as discussed in 
the previous chapters, is much higher than that of reverse engineering and own R&D, 
and training has the lowest visibility - having no direct and immediate pay back in the 
short term, and is recorded as a current accounting cost; therefore the demand of 
engagement and expertise ascends: foreign technology acquisition the lowest and 
training the highest. Meanwhile, purchase of technology from foreign firms normally 
involves bundled deals, in which little input is required from other stakeholders, such 
as employees or related firms, who also gain little from it - there is no obvious need for 
stakeholder inclusion. By the same token, training has to be organised and managed in 
the sense that trainees' (employees') needs and suggestions are considered. In other 
words, they are the subject of such activity and ought to be included, and will gain 
directly from the activity. Less inclusion can be linked with reverse engineering and 
own R&D. 
80 The number in the first row is the number of firms claimed, and the second row is the percentage of 
the total sample (195). 
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Table 7-7 reports the finns' reliance on different activities for technological 
development over the past 5 years (from 2002 to 2007). Nearly half of the finns have 
relied moderately (degrees 3 to 5) on all four kinds of activities. 12.3% and 19.5% of 
finns did not or hardly rely on (degrees 1 and 2) 'reverse engineering' or 'own R&D', 
and 45.7% on 'training' - yet all of the three activities are important vehicles for 
technological learning in NIEs (Kim, 1997; Lall, 2000). On the other hand, less than 
113 of finns have relied heavily on reverse engineering or own R&D for developing 
their technological capability and only 8.8% have utilised training for technological 
development (degree 6 and 7). Whilst 10% of all finns hardly bought any foreign 
technologies, another 1/8 have depended heavily (degrees 6 or 7) on foreign 
technology supply as a crucial source of technical upgrading. 
Table 7-8 Engagement in reverse engineering, own R&D and training by firms relying heavily on 
forei2n technol02Y supply 
~ None or very little Moderate Very heavy reliance (Degrees reliance reliance or 1 and 2) (Degrees 3 to 5) indispensable Type of activity _ .... (Degrees 6 and 7) .~ 
Receiving foreign technology 
2481 supply 
--- --- 100% 
Reverse engineering 
5 16 3 
20.3% 66.7% 12.5% 
.1----------. ----.--.~-.---
Own R&D 
9 15 
37.5% 62.5% 0 
Training 20 4 
83.3% 16.7% 0 
It is obvious that although explicit technological activities such as reverse engineering 
and own R&D have been fairly widely practised in the finns, the more tacit elements, 
e.g. staff training, have been largely over-looked. Many finns preferred the much more 
straightforward way of acquiring bundled technology from foreign multinationals. 
81 The total number of firms relying heavily on foreign technology supply is 24. 
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However, technological knowledge and capability cannot be wholly embodied in the 
bundle of equipment or instructions, patents, designs or blueprints. We have argued in 
the previous chapters that successful development of capabilities requires not just 
transactions but also local learning; and learning can be a prolonged, sometimes 
opaque process. We therefore suspect that those firms which have relied more on 
foreign technology supply would have undertaken less of opaque (low-visibility) and 
time-consuming activities. A cross-tabulation is sufficient for the initial insight: as 
shown in Table 7-8, for the 24 firms regarding foreign technology as very important or 
essential for their technological development (Degree 6 and 7), the proportion of firms 
actively engaging in other activities is much lower than the whole sample. In fact 
except for 3 firms (12.5%) which have also relied on reverse engineering, none of the 
firms have considered own R&D and training as indispensible paths to technological 
capability development. One-Way ANOVA tests have been carried out to verify our 
argument and the results are presented in Table 7-9. Again, except for reverse 
engineering (p ~ .10), the values of the F tests for the other two activities are highly 
significant (p<.05), indicating negative associations between bundled foreign 
technology acquisition and the more self-reliant approaches. 
Table 7-9 Comparison of reliance on other technological activities with level of reliance on foreign 
technology supply: One-Way ANOVA test 
Sum of 
Squares df -~, Mean Square F Sig. 
Reverse Between Groups 27.870 7 3.981 1.734 .103 
Engineering Within Groups 429.279 187 2.296 
Total 457.149 194 
.~ 
Own R&D Between Groups 81.050 7 11.579 4.572 .000 
Within Groups 473.534 187 2.532 
Total 554.585 194 
Training Between Groups 54.346 7 7.764 3.146 .004 
Within Groups 461.470 187 2.468 
Total 515 .815 194 
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We also evaluate firms' endeavour to network to understand what internal and external 
links have been harnessed by the firms, and how that impacted their technological 
capability development (see Table 7-10). The extent of network utilisation is assessed 
in 5 levels, from '1: no links' to '5: links centred on knowledge flows to innovate'. (See 
Section 7.1.2 and Table 7-2 for details of variable and question design). 
Successful product innovation is vital to many firms, and an effective design requires 
that market possibilities for a product are linked with technological possibilities, e.g., 
Who are the users? What will they use the product for? What do the requirements mean 
technically? Therefore collaboration among the technical, marketing, and 
manufacturing departments is very important to a new product's success (Dougherty, 
1992). For internal networks, around 10% of the firms claim that the linkages between 
their internal departments were almost non-existent or only centred on day-to-day 
operations. 56.4% of the firms believed that the communication of manufacturing and 
R&D department encouraged minor technological changes (level 3), and significantly 
fewer firms (36.9%) felt the same about the linkage between R&D and marketing 
departments. On the other hand, 26.7% of the firms gave credit to the network between 
R&D and marketing for the major technological changes (level 4), and 23.1 % for the 
development of their innovative capabilities (level 5), both outnumbering the linkage 
between manufacturing and R&D departments. This means that whilst it is harder to 
cultivate close collaboration between marketing and the technical (R&D and 
manufacturing) departments, once its importance is realised and fully utilised by the 
firm, it could make an even more significant contribution to innovation than intra-
technical team collaboration. 
For external domestic (and local) networks, around 1/3 of the firms did not deal with 
domestic suppliers of key parts and components at all (level 1); another 24.6% felt such 
dealings were pure business transactions and did not involve new skills (knowledge) 
transfer (level 2); The firms' relationships with domestic equipments suppliers and 
customers were equally underutilised for technological capability development -
16.4% and 21.5% of firms ranked themselves levelland 2 for linkage with domestic 
equipment suppliers, and 24.1 % of the firms believed their relationship with domestic 
customers were purely transactional and did not enhance pre-existing capabilities 
(Level 2). 
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As for networks with foreign finns, around 20% of the surveyed finns did not have 
connections with foreign finns at all (Levell). Among the other finns the majority 
claimed that their networking with the foreign suppliers (of equipments or 
parts/components) encouraged little or minor technological changes (Level 3); 8% of 
them believed that they have benefited from such relationships by involving substantial 
knowledge flow to build up innovative capabilities (Level 5). 
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Table 7-10 Internal and external linkages of Chinese electronics firms and their impacts on technological capability development 
-
- lIiternal ~xtemal (domestic) ~ E~emal (foreign) - -
oL ~ -
:. '"'.' ;. co:' J ~ " ~ j,: ,,~~ -~ 17" ~ ~; ... .. , t:t·;-.. ~ - - .': ~1 ~ U ~, ' ... ' 7: •... 
'''. ::"! 
.Type. ofnetwo~ - ":, .. /'t' _ . ~ .... ~ . .. r,,..: - ~ . :._ :tr .. - -~ -~~~< - rf" MariufactUririg ,R&Dwitli Domestic - Domestic ~ Domestic ForelgIl Foreign Forc::ign I ~~ _." .c- '''~.~'"". '. .,-~~}~;, 1 ~ department with niark~ting Stlppliers of suppiiers of 'buyers ~uppliers of suppliers of buyers .. -
Extent. of utilisation ~; 
·-.-·:--n ~D department .Equipments Key parts & Equipments Key Parts & 'I , 
-
components ri~·~\:· " r !='omponents I r, rijJ~ ..... "i d91artment ...:,11;,' 
,;'<1." J ~ - __ ~ ~ ~_ ... ~~~:_,l~ ~. _;.~'~~ ~ "'-... " ~.: - : ~ -: "i.:" ) ... ' '.' ~ ••• _~,: o· ' , ~~~ .; 
" 
'Ii>- , "L. ...... ~ 
Levell: No links 282 
, 
/ 6 135 
1
56 5 32 i 65 38 
1.0% 2.6% 16.4% 1 33.1% 1 3.1% 19.5% 1 17.9% 28.7% 
Level 2: Links centred on market transaction or I 
147 
I I 
day-to-day work. It doesn't involve new skills or 27 21 42 148 55 ! 43 134 knowledge transfer which will enhance pre- 124.6% I 1 22.2% 1 17.4% 13.8% 10.8% 21 .5% 124.1% 28.2% existing technological capability; ! 
1 I I i i ; 
Level 3: Links centred on knowledge flow to ! I 
172 
, 
improve existing technology. It involves I 154 110 72 69 183 78 54 
substantial information flow which encourages 56.4% 36.9% 35.4% 142.6% 40.0% 27.7% 1 27.7% 1 36.9% minor technoloJ:,ical cbanJ:,es i 
I I I 
Level 4: Links centred on knowledge flow to I I I 
137 
I improve existing technology. It involves 141 
I 
31 52 35 57 31 I ~~.9% substantial information flow which encourages 15.9% 26.7% 17.9% 121 .0% 29.2% 15.9% 119.0% 
major tecbnoloJ:.!cal cbanJ:,es I I I I 
Level 5: Links centred on knowledge flows to I ! i 
innovate. It involves substantial flow to build up 25 45 16 117 7 17 I 14 14 
innovative capabilities. 12.8% 23.1 % 8.4% 1 8.7% 3,6% 8.9% 1 7.2% 12.1% I , 
82 The figures are the number of percentage of furns claimed over the total sampled firms (195 firms) . For example, 2 firms have reported no linkage between their 
manufacturing and R&D departments, and they make up 1 % of the total finns sampled. 
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7.3 Sample firms' corporate governance and finance, and 
hypotheses 1 and 2 
7.3.1 Corporate governance 
According to the framework and the current situation in China, four aspects of 
corporate governance that are potentially influential to firms' technological capability 
development are evaluated in the survey. Namely, they are 1) ownership type; 2) 
management selection method; 3) performance measurement criteria; and 4) measures 
of penalty to managers. 
Ownership 
The classification of ownership types is based on the theoretical framework (see 
chapter 4). In the questionnaire survey, 89 firms (45.6% of 195) are MASOEs, 34.9% 
are MISOEs and the remaining 19.5% are POEs. 
Management Selection 
In the 195 surveyed firms, 30.3% have their managers appointed by the administrative 
authorities (ADMINS), 27.2% say they select their own managers but the candidates 
are either recommended or approved by the authorities (RECIAPPS), the rest 42.6% 
firms have shareholder selected managers (SHARHS). There is a clear-cut although 
imperfect correlation between management selection methods and ownership types 
(Table 7-11): 59.6% of MASOEs are administrative-selected, 37.1% are authority-
recommended/approved, and only 3.4% are shareholder-selected. For MISOEs, the 
percentages are: 8.8%, 27.9% and 63.3% respectively. None of the POEs have 
administratively selected managers, 1 (2.6%) of them have managers who were 
recommended or approved by the authorities, and the rest 97.4% have shareholder-
selected managers. 
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Quality Q/engagement 
Managers in 152 firms (77.8% of 195) rank claim that profit rate is a very important, if 
not only, criterion for their performance evaluation. 37.9% and 36.4% of the firms 
believed their shareholders care equally about sales growth and market share; only 
22.5% of the firms are evaluated according to their innovation rates. 43.1% of the 
firms' innovation rates are barely considered by their shareholders (degree 1 and 2 on 
scales of 5). Pursing sales revenues and net profit leads managers to focus on those 
Static Capabilities. The quickest way to increase sales revenue and profit in the short 
run is to make as little change to the design as possible and get as quickly as possible to 
market. 
The effect of ownership and management selection method on the quality of 
engagement is summarised in Table 7-11. 85.2% of MASOEs are evaluated primarily 
with profit rate, a slightly smaller proportion ofPOEs claim the same (81.6%); and less 
so with MISOEs, with 66.2%. Meanwhile for SOEs with shareholder selected 
managers, only 45.7% of which use profit rate as one of the more important evaluation 
criteria. As for the two longer-term and lower-visibility criteria (Market share and 
Innovation rate), much fewer firms believe they are specially evaluated according to 
their 'Market Share' (50.6% of MASOEs, 27.2% of MISOEs, and 21.0% of POEs). 
POEs lead the ownership types in using innovation rate as the key performance 
indicator (38.2% compared with 11.2% of MISOEs and 11.2% of MASOEs). Their 
owners, often also CEOs who are fully engaged, have every incentive to improve 
processes and develop new products as fast as possible, since this is the way to profit 
and wealth. However the tougher constraint on finance means they have to constantly 
worry about their immediate profitability - hence a high propensity for profit-focused 
evaluation (see top of the page). 21.1 % of shareholder-selection SOEs emphasize 
innovation rate in evaluation. Clearly shareholder-selection firms tend to have the 
highest level of engagement of all SOEs. 
From the above analysis one can see that the type of ownership shapes the quality of 
engagement in a firm, but the practise of management selection displays a stronger 
signal of influence. Chi-Square tests are conducted to compare these corporate 
governance variables among ownership types and management selection methods, as 
shown in Table 7-12. Statistically, the difference of corporate governance among 
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management selection methods are all more significant than ditto among ownership 
types, especially with Innovative Rate, which is the lowest-visibility and longest-term 
variable. These findings are consistent with Hypotheses Ia and 2: 
In China, different types of ownership lead to different corporate governance for 
capability development (HI a). Meanwhile, the effect of selection method is a' good 
indicator of corporate governance in SOEs (H2). Specifically, compared to authority 
appointed or approved SOEs, those with shareholder-selected managers have much 
higher quality of shareholder engagement. The effect of ownership and management 
selection method on firms' technological activity and capability will be further 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
Table 7-11 Ownership and management selection method, and their effects on corporate 
governance 
Selection of management 
Selected by the administrative 
authorities 
Recommended or approved by 
administrative authorities 
Selected by the shareholders 
Ownership types 
(N=195) 
I MASOE I MISOE I POE 
59.6% 8.8% 0 
37.1 % 27.9% 2.6% 
3.4% 63.3% 97.4% 
Shareholder engagement proxied by assessment criteria ** 
Profit rate 85 .2% 66.2% 81.6% 
Sales revenue 76.4% 40.9% 55.3% 
Market share 50.6% 27.2% 21.0% 
Sales revenue from products 
introduced in last 3 yearsf total 11 .2% 17.9% 38.2% 
sales revenue 
Management Selection Method* 
(N=157) 
I ~Mm I ~C/APP I ~HARH 
84 .7% 51 .9% 45.7% 
1--- M. ______ 
25.4% 44.2% 44.2% 
8.5% 17.3% 26.1% 
5.1% 5.8% 21.1% 
.. 
*. (ADMINS): Selected by admimstratJve authorities, (RECfAPPS): recommended or approved by 
administrative authorities, (SHARDS): selected by ftrms' shareholders. 
**. Assessment criteria: percentage presented are those of: 4 'important' and 5 'very important' for each 
criterion. 
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Table 7-12 The comparisons of corporate governance among types of ownership and management 
selection methods by Chi-square test 
Test Statistics (a, b) 
Profit rate Sales revenue Market share [nnov. rate 
Chi-Square (a) 37.505 26.994 21.702 7.278 
df 16 16 12 16 
Sig. 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.507 
Chi-Square (b) 40.942 72 .896 32.805 68.579 
.... - .. -_ .. -
df 8 8 · 8 8 
-_._-_._----
------_._---
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
a. Groupmg vanable: Ownershlp type, N=195 
b. Grouping variable: Management selection method N=157 
7.3.2 Finance 
Ownership and access to finance 
In the questionnaire company CEOs were asked to list the sources of finance for 
business expansion over the past three years83, the most popular source of funding is 
from state-owned banks (chosen by 90 firms, 46.2%). In sharp contrast, only 32 
(16.4%) firms use non-state-owned banks. 76 firms claimed to use own savings 
(38.9%), and 5.6% all firms said they access funding from the venture capital market. It 
is a good reflection of the lack of dynamism in the Chinese VC market (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.2), and is also due to lack of awareness (and confidence) among the firms. 
Stock market is chosen by a small proportion of firms - 17.9%. Again, this is consistent 
with our observation in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.2), that stringent entry requirements for 
Chinese stock market are responsible for the lack of equity funding by most firms. On 
the other hand, following the loosening of restrictions on foreign direct investment 
after WTO entrance in 2001, many multinationals have adopted a much more 
aggressive strategy in China - rather than partial investment in established domestic 
firms as in the 1990s, foreign firms are setting up their own full-funded subsidiaries or 
branches. This explains the relatively small number of foreign investments received by 
the surveyed firms over the last 3 years (21 and 13.3%). 
83 Since the survey mainly targets established firms, it does not ask for sources of finance for start-up 
business. 
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Cross tabulation and Chi-Square tests are conducted between the three ownership types 
and their use of financial sources (Table 7-13). The poor access to finance suffered by 
most POEs becomes very obvious: 60.5% of them have to rely on own savings for 
funding. Only 5.3% of the private firms have used the sources of state-owned banks, 
compared with 60.7% ofMASOEs and 13.4% ofMISOEs which have used it. A very 
small number of private firms have sought foreign investors (7.5%) and some have 
turned to the venture capital market (23.1%). None of them have received direct 
government or subsidy, and only 1 private finn, out of 39, has used the stock market 
for financing. In comparison, loans from state-owned banks dominate MASOEs' 
primary financing choice - 60.7%. None of them used the venture capital market, and 
13.4% have had government funding. On the other hand, MISOEs have a more 
diversified finance portfolio - 43.3% chose to use own saving, 13.4% and 11.9% 
approached state-owned and non-state-owned banks, around a quarter are listed on the 
stock market and a similar number of them received foreign investment. It is worth 
noticing that MISOEs do not seem to share a same level of financial privilege as 
MASOEs, a situation once observed in 2003 (Cai, 2003). Nevertheless, the fact that 
MISOEs are utilising a more balanced portfolio of funding channels than the other two 
ownership types can indicate higher financing capacity and stronger competence in 
strategic investment. 
Results from the Pearson Chi-Square test show a statistically significant difference in 
access to finance between the three ownership types [z=79.099, p = .000 which is less 
than 0.05]. These findings therefore are consistent with Hypothesis Ib: 
HIb: In China, in getting access to financial resources, different types of ownership 
lead to different treatment. 
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Table 7-13 The comparison of financial sources used by different types of ownership (N=195) 
Finance for business expansion· 
~ All MASOEs MISOEs POEs Financial sources used ownership 
Firm's own savings 27.0% 43.3% 60.5% 38.9% 
---_. 
-- .----------_.-
_ _ _ ._.M __ 
State-owned banks 60.7% 13.4% 5.3% 46.2% 
-_. ._._- e---------
Non-state-owned banks 2.2% 11.9% 31.6% 16.4% 
-------. --~---.---
Stock market 16.7% 25.4% 2.6% 17.9% 
----_. 
---' 
H. __ ,""-_ 
Venture capital market 0 2.9% 23 .1% 5.6% 
.----r-.. ··--_ .. ·-.. -·-
Foreign investment 6.7% 24.4% 7.5% 13.3% 
-
---_. __ .. _.-. 
Government subsidies 13.4% 6.0% 0 3.6% 
• Sum of these percentages could be greater than 100%, as some finns would have access 
to more than one sources of funding. 
Guanxi and access to finance 
During the generation of hypotheses we argue that there is no reason why selection 
method should affect finance, although comparisons of financial resources used by 
SOEs with different management selection methods say otherwise. Particularly, as 
shown in Table 7-14, SOEs with shareholder-selected managers rely mostly on stock 
market (57.8%), they are also the only group of three that has actually used venture 
capital market for financing (23.3%). Roughly 1/3 of these shareholder-selection firms 
still reply on own savings for business expansion, however in general this type of firms 
appear to have a much diversified portfolio of finance. In contrast, 10.2% of 
administrative-selection SOEs still enjoy government subsidies; 64.4% of them rely on 
state-owned banks; and none of them use either non-state-owned banks or venture 
capital market. As for SOEs with authority-recommended managers, almost half of 
them borrow from state-owned banks, and only 3.4% borrow from non-state-owned 
banks. Why has this happened? 
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Table 7-14 The comparison of SOE's financial resources used by different types of management 
selection methods (N = 157) 
Finance for business expansion· 
~ ADMINS RECiAPPS SHARHS Financial sources used 
Firm's own savings 16.9% 46.2% 37.8% 
--_. 
---------------. 
-----_ .. _. 
_._._-_ .. _-
State-owned banks 64.4% 46.2% 6.7% 
----- ---------- .. _---------
Non-state-owned banks 0 3.4% 17.8% 
---
--_._---_.- . __ ._-_._ .. _._._---
-_ .. __ ._._._ .. _ .. _-_._-
.---_ .. __ ._-----_ .. -
Venture capital market 0 1.4 % 23 .3% 
-_._ .. _---------- --1-----------. -------.--------------
Foreign investment 16.7% 14.4% 17.5% 
--. 
Stock market 5.1% 5.8% 57.8% 
f--.-----
------.-
Government subsidies 10.2% 1.9% 0 
* Sum of these percentages could be greater than 100%, as some firms would have access to more than 
one sources of funding . 
** (ADMINS) : Selected by administrative authorities, (REC/APPS): recommended or approved by 
administrative authorities (SHARHS): selected by firms' shareholders. 
The explanation of financing variance among management selection methods lies in 
the managers' relationship with government officials and authorities. Review of the 
reality in China (Chapter 3, section 3.3.1) and the case studies in Chapter 6 (especially 
those of South Electro and SAlC) have already shown that the conventional corporate 
governance in Chinese SOEs features a heightened importance of the managers' 
Guanxi with government officials. Managers count heavily on officials for promotion, 
marketing resources, policy favours, insider intelligence, and most importantly, 
financial help. Particularly, in addition to government subsidies, the local governments 
still exert decisive power over lending decisions made by state-owned banks (Zhang, 
2007). It is therefore easy to understand why firms with administratively-selected 
managers have best access to the above two sources (followed closely by authority-
recommended ones) - these managers could well have been officials themselves, or at 
least have already established a good rapport with them. On the other hand, 
shareholder-selected managers are probably not chosen for their political merit, but for 
their competence to run a business. They are therefore not necessarily favoured by 
officials. The combination of their entrepreneurship and the lack of political privilege 
hence pushed them to look elsewhere, which explain why these firms have a much 
more market-led and diversified financing landscape. 
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7.4 Summary 
This chapter describes the primary findings from the questionnaire survey in Chinese 
electronics industry. 
The general evaluation of firms' technological capabilities shows that all sampled firms 
have developed better Static than Dynamic Capabilities. Firms are more likely to invest 
in tangibly advanced technology, which extends the process of technology absorption. 
Problems in corporate governance cause managers' poor engagement, which we argue 
inhibits firms' Dynamic Capability development, particularly in R&D and 
Organisational Capabilities. 
The comparison among different kinds of ownership reveals that different ownership 
type entails different ease of access to finance. Particularly, private firms are 
disadvantaged in terms of access to finance. Moreover, although theoretically there is 
no reason why management selection method should affect finance, the survey result 
shows that SOEs' relationship with officials and authorities does influence their finance. 
This is because the latter still have great influence over key financial resources, such as 
government subsidy and loans from state-owned banks. 
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Testing of Hypotheses 3 -7 
After general evaluation of the sample firms' technological capability and their CGFS 
in Chapter 7, this chapter presents the results of regressions used to test Hypotheses 3-5, 
and the tests of hypothesis 6 and 7. 
All Hypotheses are supported. Section 8.1 reviews the correlation matrix and explains 
the regression models. In Section 8.2, the regressions results are found to be consistent 
with Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, that corporate governance factors, especially quality of 
engagement, are positively associated with technological capability, and part of the 
correlation is achieved via its impact on technology strategy/activity. Section 8.3 goes 
on to present and discuss the results of ANOV A tests for Hypotheses 6 and 7. It 
compares the firms' capabilities among different types of ownership, and among 
different methods of management selection. The conclusion also supports these two 
Hypotheses, that ownership type affects technological capability, and there is an even 
stronger impact on technological capability from management selection methods. 
Section 8.4 summarises this chapter. 
8.1 Correlation matrix and regression models 
This chapter tests 5 more hypotheses generated in Chapter 6, which are based on the 
theoretical framework and findings from the previous stage of case study: 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a positive relationship between the quality of shareholder 
engagement and the firm's technological capability. 
Hypothesis 4: Poor engagement leads to strategy prioritising high-visibility activities; 
intelligent engagement leads to strategy prioritising low-visibility activities. 
Hypothesis 5: Strategy prioritising high-visibility activities leads to lower dynamic 
capabilities than strategy prioritising low-visibility activities, does. 
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Hypothesis 6: Ownership form affects technological capability; more specifically, (H6a) 
ownership forms giving more intelligent engagement will excel (other things equal) in 
capability types which are sensitive to low-visibility activities. It would also be 
expected (H6b) that ownership forms giving better access to finance will excel (other 
things equal) in capability types which are sensitive to high-visibility activities. 
Hypothesis 7: Selection method for top management in SOEs affects technological 
capability. (H7a) Selection methods giving more intelligent engagement will excel 
(other things equal) in capability types which are sensitive to low-visibility activities84• 
H3, 4 and 5 are tested through mUltiple regressions, and since H6 and H7 involve 
crosstabulation between categorical and ordinal data, ANOVA tests are used. 
In order to facilitate the hypothesis testing, the elements of each capability are summed 
and averages are taken (for definitions of these elements see Table 7-2, for summary of 
firms reaching each degree, see Table 7-3, Table 7-4, and Table 7-5). The average 
values are used to represent levels of corresponding capability type in the regressions. 
Before developing the final regression models for testing H3, H4 and H5, correlation 
matrix is created for all ordinal and scale variables and then examined for significant 
relations. The correlation matrix in Table 8-1 computes correlation coefficients which 
represent the linear relationship between two variables, and the significance level for 
each correlation provides primary information about the reliability of the correlation. 
Since the sample size of our study is more than 100, normal distributions of the 
residual values of the dependent variables can be assumed. Therefore it is safe to make 
inferences based on the significance values in the matrix (Greene, 2007). While 
interpreting the correlation matrix, scatterplots are also employed to help detect any 
potential outliers which may have a significant influence on the slope of the regression 
line and therefore on the value of the correlation coefficient. 
84 In the previous chapter we found that firms' finance does differentiate among selection method, 
therefore there should be an HTh, that that selection methods giving better access to finance will excel 
(other things equal) in capability types which are sensitive to high-visibility activities. However since 
this finding only emerged after the questionnaires were designed and circulated, there are no devisable 
variables to facilitate testing of the hypothesis. Future research could consider including that issue. 
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The correlation with the greatest magnitude between the variables was .533 (.614), 
which is lower than the threshold of .80 that indicates a serious multicollinearity 
problem (Kennedy, 1979; O'Connor et ai, 2006). However, in reality the relationship 
among competing strategies and activities is mixed A solution for the resulting intrinsic 
multicollinearity is needed. 
Split-model multiple regressions are developed for testing hypotheses 3 to 5 and to 
tackle the issue of multicollinearitl5• There are two parallel models; Model 1 consists 
of independent variables representing poor engagement and high-visibility 
strategy/activity, which are common in typical state-owned Chinese enterprises. It is 
predicted that this model contributes to a very limited extent, but positively, to a firm's 
manufacturing capability, and negatively to its R&D and organizational capabilities. 
Model 2 contains independent variables that are proxies for intelligent engagement and 
low-visibility strategy/activity. As explained in the next paragraph, such an 
arrangement is theoretically feasible as well as reasonable according to the correlations. 
Model 2 is predicted to serve better than Model 1 in explaining success of all three 
types of capabilities (H3). 
The matrix shows positive and significant correlations between the intelligent 
engagement variable (MEAS_MKT, MEAS_INNO) and all LVS variables. The lowest 
coefficient is between MEAS_INNO and TRNG,a = .l39,p = .002, and the highest is 
between MEAS_INNO and NTWK, a = .388,p = .000. These engagement variables, 
however, are not related to HVS variables (passive reliance on foreign tech. transfer 
and investment in tangible assets). On the other hand, poor engagement variables' 
(MEAS_PFT and MEAS_SALES) correlations with all HVS variables are positive and 
significant, but with lower strength; and their correlations with L VS turned out to be all 
negative and mostly significant. These primary findings support our predictions that 
L VS tends to be associated with intelligent engagement; and poor engagement leads to 
less L VS - if not leading to doing less of all. They also strengthen the validity of the 
split-model approach in the regression that combines poor engagement variable with 
HVS and ditto with intelligent variables and LVS. 
8S Alternative econometric analysis (e.g. LooIT regressions and structural equation modelling) were 
conducted to verify the robustness of the regression model, and the results were all significant. 
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Table 8-1 Correlations of variables 
V 'abl I Mean 'I; S.D. Age size-T INV-='-T MAN R&D I ORG I MEAS I MEAS I MEAS 
an es i R&D I CAP CAP I CAP I PFT I SALES I MKT MEAS !NV lNNO TAN I INT I FRGN REVS TRNG ! ABSB ! 
{
I. Age 25.64 15.24 I I I . I I I I n T - I I I I 
2. Size 2.81 1.30 I : ~~~ I I J I I I I . I I 
. I " I I 'I I _~ I " --I 3. fNV _R&D 3.48 2.03 ~o~: ~3~~6 I .. I Iii ' . I I . __ , 
{ 
4. MANCAP 3.12 1.07 .188 .122 .223 I I ! I I I ,I i 
.009 .091 .002 i I I I ! 
5 R&DCAP 293 101 .163 .118 .250 1.567' 'I I I I i 
. .. .023 •. .099 .0~~~2... . i I 
106 -.268" -.093 .277 I .541 i .614 ! I -1 ! 6.0RGCAP 
7. MEAS PFT 
2.72 
4.20 
. ~ .197 1 .000 1 .. 000 n 1.000 ...j L- J. I 
. 094 .303 .106 -.076 I -.315 I -.331 ~ I I I I I I ' .000 .141 .295 ! .000 I .000 I ~O~lS I I ---------l i 
8. MEAS_ 278 140 .322 -.043 -.059 1 -.181 ' I' -.241 " -.223'~· I III I 
SALES . . .000 .557 .416 L .012 .001 .002 I .000 I I 
9. MEAS _ 3.01 1.22 .281 .007 .101 1.104 1.122 1 .180 I .268" , 1 .368' : 
MKT .000 .927 .169 : .157 .. I .097 .. I .014 .. ' .000 . .000 .. , I I I I 
10. MEAS_ 2.68 I 1.10 -.250 -.003 .038 I .421 I .533 I .408 1 -·388 -.325 1-.147 1 1 1 
\I INNO i .000 .969 .595 .-J. .000 i .000 . . 000 i .000 I 000 i .045 
II. INV JAN 3.32 I 1.69 -.231 .061 .336" I ~ I .029 .107 I .130 I -.003 I -.300· · I -.05 I 
I . : .001 .395 .000 •.• I .030. : .683 .135 j .002 I .971 I " .000 .476 .. 
12. INV_ 271 1 136 1 -.412 -.155 .610 i .334 I .2 ..84 .316 I -.155 ! -.262 I -.163 1.257 1-.259 ABSB .. .000 .031 .OOO ! .000 . j ,OQO .000 I .031 I .000 I .000 .000 .000 
13.FRGN 318 i 158 I -.014 1.086 I -.129 Ii .127' I -.085 ! -.098 I .194' i .021 I .028 I .000 T .166" .073 I I I 
. ! ' i .848 .234 I .071 , , .005.. I .238.. i .175.. I .003 .. I .076 ,..-!-.707 .996 .020 .309 I ! ---11 
14.REVS 14.64 i 1.54 1-.150 1-.028 1.179 1.395 1 .477 1 .438 1-.224 I -.232 1.212 .298 1.003 .076 1-.232 I I 
\I -l----l .038 .698 I .012 i .000 , I .000.. I .000, I .002 .001 : .004 .000.. I .965 I .292 .001 .. I ... ---; 
I -.119 1 .017 I .2 ...4. 7 1 .356 I .381 I .327 I -.006 -.063 I .268 I .139 I -.075 1.·.0 .. . 6 .. 9.... 1 .. -.·.281 I .204 1 
I .100 . . 809 I .001 .000 .000 I .000 ! .932 .386 I .005 1-002 .. i .299 335 . . 000 I .004 . 15.TRNG 3.03 1.63 
16.NTWK 2.95 ! 0.77 I -.359" .238" I .282" I .437" I .508" I .501 " I -.17Y-T=:29i"'--r-335" 1.388" I .254" '1 .187" 1-.005 I .215" ! .170 
! .000 .001 .000 I .000 I .000 I .000 I .013 I .000 ; .000 .000 I .000 .009 .994 I .000 I .018 
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Hierarchical multiple regressions are also used to test the mediating effect of strategy 
on capability development (H4 and 5). Three equations were developed for each type 
of technological capability, each with all control variables as the base. The first is a 
regression between capability and the engagement variables; the second a regression 
between capability and the strategy variables; the third a hierarchical regression in 
which the engagement variables were put in first, then the strategy variables. If strategy 
mediates between engagement and capability, then any significant relationships 
identified between engagement and capability in the first equation will drop to 
insignificance in the third equation: 
Modell: 
CAP = Ao + ~MEAS _ PFT + ~MEAS _ SALES + & 
CAP = Ao + A)MEAS _ PFT + A2MEAS _ SALES 
+ Ac ADV _TECH+A4INV _TAN+AsFRGN+E 
Model 2: 
CAP = Bo + B)MEAS _MKT + B2MEAS _INNO + E 
CAP=Bo +BJMATCH_TECH+B2INV _ABSB 
+B3REVS+B4TRNG+BsNTWK +E 
(1.2) 
CAP = Bo + BJMEAS _MKT + B2MEAS _INNO+ B3MATCH _TECH 
+ B4INV _ ABSB + BsREVS + B6TRNG + B7NTWK + E 
Where: 
(1.1) 
(1.3) 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
(1.1) and (2.2) are regressions between capability and the engagement variables; (1.2) 
and (2.2) regress capability and the strategy variables; (1.3) and (2.3) are integrated 
regressions between engagement, strategylbehaviour and capabilities. 
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8.2 Testing of Hypotheses 3- 5 
As discussed in the previous section, hierarchical split-model regressions are used to 
test Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5. The detailed results are provided in Table 8-2 to Table 8-4. 
By comparing all the hierarchical equations, it is found that the relationship between 
Capability and Engagement variables became slightly weaker once strategy variables 
were entered into the regression. This can be taken as evidence that the impact of 
engagement is not an entirely direct one. In other words, engagement influences 
capability partly through the effect on strategy preference, while strategy has a direct 
impact upon capability. This is again confirmed in all equations (3) of Model 2, where 
the incremental contribution of strategy variables to total R2 increased significantly. 
It is also noticed that in equations (3), the relationship between engagement and 
capability has not been completely shadowed out by strategy variables. Especially for 
MEAS_PFT in Modell and MEAS_INNO in Model 2 - even when the variance in 
capability accounted for by strategy was factored out, MEAS_PFT still relates to all 
three capabilities negatively and strongly (f3 = -.294,-.293 and -.300 respectively, all 
p values <.01). The same applies to MEAS_INNO in Model 2, which contributes to 
capabilities significantly positively. This indicates that both short-sighted (profit-
oriented) and long-sighted (innovation-driven) engagement would have independent 
impact on capability development, although the effects work in opposite directions. 
This is consistent with Hypothesis 4: Intelligent engagement is positively related to 
higher dynamism in capability. 
Hypothesis 5 is supported through comparing the explanatory power of Model I and 
Model 2. In Modell, poor engagement predicts high-visibility strategy/activities, 
which hardly explains the development of dynamic capabilities (as shown in). The best 
prediction is for manufacturing capability, where R 2 = .290 . On the other hand, Model 
2 exhibited much stronger explanatory power for dynamic capability: R2 is highest for 
R&D capability (0.547) as opposed to 0.228 in Modell, indicating a strong causal link 
between low-visibility strategy and the successful development of dynamic capability. 
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Other interesting features in the regression are noted: the positive contribution to 
capability dynamism by networking activities within and outside the firm (NTWK) is 
particularly strong. In sharp contrast, FRGN (passive reliance on foreign technology 
transfer) contributes little to a firm's manufacturing capability, and hinders one's R&D 
and organisational capabilities development. This was once mentioned by one of the 
interviewees in our case study ' ... originally the government hand-picked the best 
performing SOEs to set up joint ventures, hoping that advanced technology and 
management style can be brought in by these multinational partners, but 10 years on, 
many of those former stars have found themselves actually trapped in the deal - little 
gained and little transferred, the lesson was learned the hard way ... ,86. The obvious 
explanation is that whilst necessary machinery and product blueprints were brought in 
to facilitate operation, many of the Chinese firms either voluntarily or were encouraged 
to gave up their own technological endeavour - the rumoured closure of one of 
Dongfeng Auto's own R&D divisions after joint-venturing with Citroen is an example 
in point. The limited introduction of static capability by foreign partners is easily 
understood and preferred by a disengaged shareholder and appeals to his agents. 
However, without active learning, which requires intelligent engagement coupled with 
clever strategies, such superficial advantage will not be sustained. 
86 Interview with R&D director of South Electro, May 2007. 
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Table 8-2 Hierarchical regressIOns 0 fM d I o e 1 and Model 2 with Manufacturin2 Capability 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Regression 1.1 1.2 1.3 Regression 2.1 2.2 2.3 Equation Equation 
Control Control 
Variables Variables 
INV_R&D .176- .196- .189-- INV_R&D .227- .223- .12t 
Other Included Included Included Other Included Included Included 
control control 
variables variables 
Engagement Engagement 
variables variables 
MEAS_ -.304 _. -.294-- .107- .095 
PFT MEAS MKT 
MEAS_ -.096 -.083 .294-- .205·· 
SALE MEAS_INNO 
Strategy I 
variables 
ADV .059 .065 MATCH .213- .21 t· 
TECH TECH 
INV_TAN .076 .085 INV ABSB .274" .337"-
FRGN .002 .005 REVS .204-· .210·-
TRNG .25t- .268·-
NTWK .196·- .259-· 
R2 
.197 .129 .290 R2 .264 .421 .457 
Adjusted R2 .175 .101 .254 Adjusted R2 .243 .396 .433 
Standard error .988 I 1.01 .901 Standard error .948 .833 .816 
257 
Chapter 8: Testing of Hypotheses 3 - 7 
Ta bl 83H' h' I c - Icrarc Ica rC2rCSSJOns 0 fMdl! dMdl2 o c an o c with R&D Capability 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Regression 1.1 1.2 1.3 Regression 2.1 2.2 2.3 Equation Equation 
Control Control 
Variables Variables 
INY_R&D .267-- .249" .248" INV_R&D .273" .167" .112' 
Other Other 
control Included Included Included control Included Included Included 
variables variables 
Engagement Engagement 
variables variables 
MEAS 
-.385" -.293"' MEAS .101' .085 -PFT MKT 
MEAS 
-
-.153 • -.146' MEAS .339" .320" -SALE INNO 
Strategy Strategy 
variables variables 
ADV_ 
.008 .061 MATCH .197'· .214" TECH TECH 
INV_TAN .019 .059 INV_ABSB .206' .220·' 
FRGN -.046 -.074 REVS .226·· .261·· 
TRNG .180· .230·' 
NTWK .185- .267·· 
R2 
.221 .142 .265 R2 .377 .490 .567 
Adjusted R2 .200 .114 .228 Adjusted R2 .360 .467 .547 
Standard error .945 .990 .899 Standard error .853 .769 .712 
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Table 8-4 Hierarchical regressIOns 0 fM d I o elan dM d 2 o el with o TI~anisational Capability 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Regression I Regression 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 Equation Equation 
Control Control 
Variables Variables 
INV R&D .273 '" .247"" .172"" INV_R&D .274"· .114 .025 
Other control 
Other 
Included Included Included control Included Included Included 
variables 
variables 
Engagement Engagement 
variables variables 
MEAS 
- -.348"" -.300"" MEAS MKT .174" .129 
PFT -
MEAS 
-
-.150" -.145" MEAS !NNO .249"" .191"" 
SALE -
Strategy Strategy 
variables variables 
ADV 
.065 .073 MATCH - .174"" .183"" -
TECH TECH 
INV_TAN .044 .058 INV ABSB .150" .176"" 
FRGN -.083 -.100 REVS .114" .187"" 
TRNG .113" .157"" 
NTWK .258"" .358"" 
R2 
.205 .147 .225 R2 .262 .459 .543 
Adjusted R2 .145 .119 .191 Adjusted R2 .241 .435 .523 
Standard error 1 1.077 1.10 1.047 Standard error .911 .800 .778 
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8.3 Testing of Hypotheses 6 & 7 
Hypothesis 6 and 7 involve working with non-parametric data (ownership types and 
management selection methods). hence we used descriptive tables and ANOVA as well 
as Welch & Brown-Forsythe tests to check the robustness of the findings. 
If H6a and H7a are true, then we should expect the ownership form and management 
selection form giving more intelligent engagement will excel in capability types which 
are sensitive to low-visibility activities. Table 7-11 has shown that MISOE and 
SHARHS have the highest scores of their own category in intelligent engagement 
(MEAS_INNO). On the other hand, as clearly presented in Table 8-5 to Table 8-7, 
MISOEs and SHARHS do outperform in R&D and organisational capabilities which 
are more sensitive to low-visibility activities than does manufacturing capability. 
ANOV A tests are used to verify the findings. In case of variances of the capability 
variables not being equal across groups, Welch & Brown-Forsythe tests are used as 
alternatives to the usual F test. Table 8-8 and Table 8-9 list the ANOV A tables. All F 
tests are significant (p < .05), and the equivalent p- values from Welch & Brown-
Forsythe tests are also well below the .05 level. It supports the hypothesis that 
capabilities differ among ownership types and management selection methods. The 
same applies to H6b, where MISOEs (well-governed and well-financed) outperform 
MASOEs (well-financed), which narrowly lead POEs (well-governed) on 
manufacturing capability. This form of capability is most sensitive to finance and 
benefits most among all capabilities from high-visibility strategy - that is why 
MASOEs lead POEs. The ANOV A tests again demonstrated the significance of such 
difference. 
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Table 8-5 Comparison of Manufacturing Capability among ownership types and management 
selection methods 
Manufacturing Capability 
Elements of capability Type of Degree 4 Degree 5 Degree 4 Degree 5 MGT 
ownership or 6 or 6 selection 
Equipment MASOEs 10.1% 14.6% 13.6% 15.3% ADMINS 
MISOEs 4.5% 38.8% 1.9% 20.8% REC/APPS 
POEs 7.9% 10.5% 7.3% 20.4% SHARHS 
------
Production routine MASOEs 13.5% 10.1 % 20.3% 16.8% ADMINS 
MISOEs 30.9% 26.8% 24.5% 15 .1% REC/APPS 
POEs 13 .2% 7.9% 18.3% 20.0% SHARHS 
------ 24.1 % ---Ability of the MASOEs 21.6% 9.1 % 6.9% ADM INS 
manufacturing MISOEs 40.3% 25 .3% 34.0% 12.2% REC/APPS 
department to comply 
with the request of R&D POEs 18.4% 7.9% 25.6% 20.7% SHARHS 
Total quality control MASOEs 6.7% 12.4% 15.3% 8.5% ADMINS 
MISOEs 40.3% 22.4% 17.0% 18.9% REC/APPS 
POEs 10.5% 7.9% 23.2% 17.1 % SHARHS 
--
16.9% 
._------
Manufacturing cost MASOEs 13.5% 8.9% 6.8% ADMINS 
control MISOEs 34.3% 17.9% 18.9% 5.7% REC/APPS 
POEs 34.2% 13.2% 34.1% 22 .0% SHARHS 
__ .H ________ 
--
._-_._-_._-_._--
------_._ .. ----_ .... _. __ ._. ._----_ .. _--- -~--.---,--
Ability to make MASOEs 29.2% 9.0% 28 .8% 3.4% ADMINS 
improvement in the MISOEs 45 .6% 12.7% 49 .1% 5.7% REC/APPS 
manufacturing system 
POEs 18.4% 7.9% 25.3% 7.2% SHARHS 
Level of contribution MASOEs 13 .5% 3.4% 23 .7% 0 ADMINS 
made by manufacturing 
department to the MISOEs 29.4% 13.2% 17.0% 7.5% REC/APPS 
innovation processes POEs 18.4% 7.9% 19.3% 13 .2% SHARHS 
• Ownership types: N = 195; MASOE: n= 89 (45.6%), MISOE: n =68 (34.9%), POE: n =38 (19.5%) 
• Management selection: N=157; ADMINS: n = 59 (37.6%), REC/APPS: n= 52 (33.1 %), SHARHS: 
n=46 (29.3%) 
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Table 8-6 Comparison of R&D Capability among ownership types and management selection 
methods 
R&D Capability 
Elements of capability Type of Degree 4 Degree Degree Degree Selection of 
ownership 5 or 6 4 5 or 6 management 
~-.-. -----.~-.. --------.. ----.. ---.. -.-.---
The overall R&D MASOEs 18.0% 11 .3% 23 .7% 6.8% ADMfNS 
capability MISOEs 41.2% 20.6% 24.5% 17.0% REC/AFPS 
POEs 10.5% 7.9% 25.3% 14.9% SHARHS 
The ability to carry out MASOEs 13.5% 3.4% 20.3% 0 ADMfNS 
process improvement MISOEs 33.8% 23 .5% 26.4% 1.9% REC/APPS 
POEs 23.7% 5.3% 21.7% 24.1% SHARHS 
The ability to carry out MASOEs 10.1 % 3.4% 16.9% 0 ADMfNS 
process innovation MISOEs 38.2% 13 .2% 17.3% 1.9% REC/APPS 
POEs 10.5% 7.9% 34.8% 23.9% SHARHS 
The ability to carry out MASOEs 34.8% 10.1% 10.2% 0 ADMfNS 
new product development MISOEs 33.8% 23.5% 5.8% 1.9% REC/APPS 
POEs 44.7% 7.9% 8.7% 23 .9% SHARHS 
Quality and speed of MASOEs 13.5% 3.4% 13 .6% 6.8% ADMfNS 
response to feedback from MISOEs 32.4% 19.1% 25 .0% 1.9% REC/APPS 
manufacturing about 
design and engineering POEs 26.3% 2.6% 28 .3% 17.4% SHARHS 
-28.8% --0 ---.-Ability to incorporate MASOEs 19.1% 6.8% ADMfNS 
market and customer MISOEs 
feedback in 
51.5% 13.2% 28.8% 7.7% REC/APPS 
improvement/innovation POEs 28.9% 7.9% 43 .5% 23 .9% SHARHS 
• OwnershIp types: N = 195j MASOE: n= 89 (45.6%), MISOE: n =68 (34.9%), POE: n =38 (19.5%) 
• Management selection: N=157j ADMINS: n = 59 (37.6%), REC/APPS: n= 52 (33.1 %), SHARHS: 
n=46 (29.3%) 
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Table 8-7 Comparison of Organisational Capability among ownership types and management 
selection methods 
Organisational Capability 
Elements of capability Type of Degree 4 Degree Degree Degree Selection of 
ownership 5 or 6 4 5 or 6 management 
--
._------------_._-----_._-- --.--.----.. -.-... --.---.. -------.--.-.---.--.-~.---.. 
Organisational MASOEs 11 .1 % 6.5% 5.1 % 0 ADMINS 
flexibility to meet the MISOEs 22 .0% 22.0% 23.1 % 7.7% REC/APPS 
need for technological 
development POEs 18.9% 8.1 % 17.4% 30.4% SHARHS 
_._----------------_. 
The culture and MASOEs 10.1 % 3.4% 0 0 ADMINS 
mechanism to MISOEs 20.6% 22.0% 46.2% 7.7% RECIAPPS 
encourage and reward 
inventiveness and POEs 22.1% 7.9% 26.1% 10.8% SHARHS 
creativitr 
._---------_._------_. 
Co-ordination and MASOEs 6.7% 0 10.2% 0 ADMINS 
control of the major MISOEs 22.1% 10.1 % 7.7% 11.6% REC/APPS 
functions within the 
company POEs 18.4% 7.9% 23.9% 6.5% SHARHS 
----- ---'---'-'--
. __ ._-_._-_._-_._._--_._-- ----_ .. _-_ ... __ ._--_. 
Initiative of sub-units MASOEs 3.4% 6.7% 0 0 ADMINS 
within company MISOEs 17.6% 8.8% 11.5% 13.4% RECIAPPS 
strategy 
POEs 36.8% 0 19.6% 10.8% SHARHS 
• Ownership types: N = 195; MASOE: n= 89 (45.6%), MISOE: n =68 (34.9%), POE: n =38 (19.5%) 
• Management selection: N=157; ADMINS: n = 59 (37.6%), REC/APPS: n= 52 (33.1 %), SHARHS: 
n=46 (29.3%) 
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- - - -- - - -
- - -- -
- - ----- -- ----- -
- - -- - - - --_ ..... -
- -- --- 'b~ -- - --- -- -- --.------ .., 
Ownership df Mean Square F Sig. MGT df Mean Square Sig. 
selection F 
Between Groups 2 28.856 16.514 .000 Between 2 14.849 8.230 .000 Equipment Groups 
Within Groups 191 1.747 Within Groups 153 1.804 
Total 193 Total 155 
Between Groups 2 20.198 14.934 .000 Between 2 14.163 10.037 .000 Production routine Groups 
Within Groups 191 1.352 Within Groups 153 1.41 I 
Total 193 Total 155 
Capability to comply with Between Groups 2 23.373 19.877 .000 Between 2 17.724 13.935 .000 
R&D requests Groups 
Within Groups 190 1.176 Within Groups 152 1.272 
Total 192 Total 154 
Between Groups 2 20.444 14.923 .000 Between 2 11 .357 7.538 .001 Total Quality Control Groups 
Within Groups 191 1.370 Within Groups 153 1.507 
Total 193 Total 155 
Between Groups 2 16.307 13.742 .000 Between 2 18.801 17.909 .000 Manufacturing cost control Groups 
Within Groups 191 1.187 Within Groups 153 1.050 
Total 193 Total 155 
Between Groups 2 15.171 1\.314 .000 Between 2 1\.135 8.639 .000 Process improvement Groups 
Within Groups 192 \.341 Within Groups 154 1.289 
Total 194 Total 156 
Between Groups 2 11.169 8.206 .000 Between 2 5.703 4.246 Contribution to innovation Groups .016 
Within Groups 192 \.361 Within Groups 154 1.343 
Total 194 Total 156 
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Table 8-9 ANOV A tests - comparing means of R&D and organisational capabilities between 
I h d ownership types and management se echon met o s 
df Mean F Sig. MGT df Mean F Sig. Ownership S..!luare selection Square 
Between 192 18.432 13.093 .000 Between 12.377 12.377 9.183 .000 R&D Capabil ity - overall Groups Groups 
capabi lity Within 2 1.408 Within 1.348 1.348 Groups Groups 
Total 192 Total 
. Between Between 
R&D Capability - process Groups 194 24.848 22.694 .000 Groups 21.82 1 21.82 1 20.209 .000 
improvement Within 2 1.095 Within 1.080 1.080 Groups Groups 
Total 192 Total 
Between 194 26.976 23 .689 .000 Between 25 .214 25 .214 22 .890 .000 R&D Capabi li ty - process Groups Groups 
innovation Within Within 
Groups 2 1.139 Groups 1.102 1.102 
Total 192 Total 
Between 194 12. 189 8.626 .000 Between 15.792 15.792 11.1 30 .000 R&D Capability - product Groups Groups 
innovation Within Within 
Groups 2 1.4 13 Groups 1.41 9 1.4 19 
Total 192 Total 
R&D Capability - quality Between 194 15.899 14.675 .000 Between 12.732 12.732 11 .235 .000 
and speed responding to Groups Groups 
feedback Within 2 1.083 Within 1.133 Groups Groups 1.1 33 
Total 192 Total 
R&D Capability - ability to Between 194 17.864 14.126 .000 Between 18.094 18.094 13.833 .000 
incorporate Groups Groups 
market/customer feedback Within 2 1.265 Within 1.308 1.308 Groups Groups 
Total 192 Total 
Between 194 20.934 14.483 .000 Between 28.655 28.655 22 .081 Organisational Capability - Groups Groups .000 
flexibility Within 2 1.445 Wi th in 1.298 1.298 Groups Groups 
Total 192 Total 
Between 194 11.481 9.945 .000 Between 21.988 21.988 23 .786 .000 Groups Groups 
Organisational Capability - Within 2 1.154 Within .924 .924 culture and mechanism Groups Groups 
Total 192 Total 
Between 194 4.412 3.955 .021 Between 15.579 15.579 16.598 .000 Organisational Capability - Groups Groups 
coordination and control Within Within 
Groups 2 1.115 Groups .939 .939 
Total 192 Total 
Between 194 10.032 8.503 .000 Between 16.34 1 16.34 1 15.230 .000 Organisational Capability - Groups Groups 
initiative of subunits within Within 2 1.180 Within 1.073 1.073 
strategy Groups Groups 
Total 192 Total 
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8.4 Summary 
In this chapter five more hypotheses are tested and supported. Through split-model 
hierarchical regressions, a positive relationship between the quality of shareholder 
engagement and the firms' technological capability is established. Moreover, the 
relationship is partially mediated by the visibility level of technology strategy/activity. 
In other words, poor engagement leads to strategy prioritising high-visibility activities, 
which leads to lower dynamic capabilities. 
Based on the above findings, ANOV A tests show that ownership type affects 
technological capability. Minority-state-owned-firms, which combine the advantages 
of both state-owned firms (good access to finance) and privately owned firms (good 
corporate governance), can and did do better in dynamic capability development. On 
the other hand, the degrees of dynamic capabilities developed in firms differ even more 
significantly among different management selection methods. Compared to 
administrative-selected or approved managers, shareholder-selected managers are 
much better incentivised to prioritise low-visibility strategy/activity, which as H4 and 
H5 show, will lead to higher dynamic capabilities. It is suggested that a much more 
diversified financing portfolio by shareholder-selection SOEs also contributes to higher 
dynamism of capability building. 
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This chapter summarises the major findings, contributions and limitations of this study. 
Section 9.1 discusses the findings related to the four research questions set out in 
Chapter 1. Following theoretical frameworks developed from literature review and past 
research, empirical work in the Chinese auto and electronics industry has generated 
answers to these research questions: 1) What is the situation of technological 
capabilities developed in the firms in Chinese Auto and Electronics Industry? 2) How 
has the development process of technological capabilities been? 3) What is the 
situation of corporate governance and finance in the firms in Chinese Auto and 
Electronics Industry? 4) How can the capabilities developed be explained from the 
finance/corporate governance point of view? Section 9.2 concludes this chapter with 
contributions and limitations of this study. 
9. 1 Main findings 
This thesis sets out with the following aims: 
(From the perspective of corporate governance and finance), explain why have the 
majority of the Chinese firms failed to develop technological capability such that 
would enhance their competitiveness; explain how have the minority succeeded 
and why there are not more of them; and identify influential elements of corporate 
governance and finance on a firm's technological capability; and how these 
elements take effect. It is hoped that findings and new theories developed from the 
Chinese context will shed light on dynamic capability development in NIEs in 
general. 
In order to achieve this aim, four research questions are developed to be answered in 
this thesis. Through empirical research composed of both qualitative (case studies) and 
quantitative (questionnaire survey) stages, all four research questions are answered: 
1) What is the situation of technological capabilities developed in the firms in China, 
especially medium-high/high technology industries? 
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In this research, a paired questionnaire survey in 195 Chinese electronics finns was 
conducted in 2007 using a capability evaluation framework inspired by previous 
research. The aggregated result shows that in general, Chinese electronics firms have 
developed better Static than Dynamic capabilities. In particular, finns have achieved 
higher dynamism in capability type (Manufacturing) that is more sensitive to strategy 
that prioritises high-visibility activities, and much lower dynamism in Organisational 
Capability, which is more sensitive to low-visibility technological activities. 
2) How has the development process of technological capabilities been? 
This question is answered through five in-depth case studies in both auto and 
electronics industry carried out between 2006 and 2008. It has found that finns' 
strategies which prioritise low-visibility activities lead to higher dynamic capabilities 
than strategies prioritising high-visibility activities, does. In addition, finns with better 
access to finance will excel (other things equal) in capability types which are sensitive 
to high-visibility activities. Three hypotheses are developed for testing in the 
quantitative stage of empirical research: 
H3: there will be a positive relationship between the quality of shareholder 
engagement and the firm's technological capability. 
H4: Poor engagement leads to strategy prioritising high-visibility activities; intelligent 
engagement leads to strategy prioritising low-visibility activities. 
H5: Strategy prioritising high-visibility activities leads to lower dynamic capabilities 
than strategy prioritising low-visibility activities, does. 
Split-model hierarchical regressions using data from the questionnaire survey support 
these findings. 
3) What is the situation of corporate governance and finance in the firms in Chinese 
Auto and Electronics Industry? 
Again, rich qualitative data collected from the case studies has been analysed to answer 
this question. In the five case study firms, different corporate governance and finance 
are observed in different ownership types. MASOEs, especially those with 
administration- selected managers have enjoyed privileged access to finance, including 
state subsidy and cheap loans from state-owned banks (South Electro and SAIC up till 
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2001). However they tend to have deeply flawed corporate governance. Government 
parachuted its officials into the company who did not necessarily have industrial 
expertise, and they were moved away not long after. Managers came to their posts with 
assigned tasks, either to increase capacity or to enhance profit; anyway, both are 
quantitative, highly visible and easy to measure. 
Moreover, based on observations of the other two MASOEs (GTC and Chery), we 
argue that MASOE can too have better corporate governance - provided the 
shareholders/governing officials are prepared to make it happen. They may not be 
industrial experts themselves, yet they compensate with high quality engagement. 
Failing that, they take some trouble to pick the right person, highly experienced in the 
industry, and then gave him time, and possibly other key resources (including financial 
ones) to think and act long-term. In other words, these are the SOEs with managers 
selected for their entrepreneurship, not their guanxi with the officials. And whatever 
the formal ownership position, in practice the management team are treated as though 
they are co-owners, and behave as though they were. Thus in effect in these 
(exceptional) SOEs there are highly engaged owners. On the other hand, POEs have 
fully engaged owners/managers; however they struggle to access necessary finance to 
support their business and technological development. Two corresponding hypotheses 
are developed: 
H 1 a: In China, different types of ownership lead to different corporate governance for 
the purpose of capability development. H 1 b: In China, in getting access to financial 
resources, different types of ownership lead to different treatment. 
H2: In China, different selection methods for top management in SOEs lead to different 
corporate governance for the purpose of capability development. 
Hypotheses testing in the quantitative research supported above findings. Particularly, 
MISOEs enjoy a combined advantage of better corporate governance than MASOE, 
and better finance than POE 87. Moreover, different selection methods for top 
management in SOEs lead to different corporate governance for the purpose of 
capability development. Specifically, compared with SOEs with administration-
87 Unfortunately case studies of MISOEs were not undertaken in this research, and the corresponding 
hypothesis is partly inspired by previous research (Cai & Tylecote, 2008). 
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selected or approved managers, SOEs with shareholder-selected managers display 
significantly higher quality of shareholder engagement and more diversified portfolio 
of finance. 
4) How can the capabilities developed by the firms be explained from the perspective 
of corporate governance and finance? 
This question is answered by both case studies and questionnaire survey. As shown in 
the case studies, the lack of dynamism in firms' capability development is largely due 
to their situation of corporate governance and finance. Particularly, POEs normally 
have highly engaged shareholders/owners and well included employees, which enable 
them to choose technology strategy that prioritises low-visibility activities, which in 
tum lead to higher dynamic capability. However, their poor access to financial 
resources inevitably constrains their scope of static capabilities, which are necessary 
for more radical innovations. On the other end of spectrum are MASOEs. As 
mentioned above, their managers are often administratively-selected for their political 
merits, or their guanxi with the officials. Poorly motivated and evaluated by short-term 
quantitative performance criteria, it is not hard to see why the majority of them choose 
highly dependent strategy that prioritises high-visibility activities, often in the form of 
bundled technology. Consequently, they develop better Static than Dynamic 
capabilities. Although no case study was undertaken in any MISOEs, one would expect 
that by combining the advantage of better finance (than POEs) and better corporate 
governance (than MASOEs), they should outperform technologically in all ownership 
types. These findings are again consistent with hypotheses tested in the quantitative 
study: 
H6: Ownership form affects technological capability; more specifically, (H6a) 
ownership forms giving more intelligent engagement will excel (other things equal) in 
capability types which are sensitive to low-visibility activities. It would also be 
expected (H6b) that ownership forms giving better access to finance will excel (other 
things equal) in capability types which are sensitive to high-visibility activities. 
H7: Technological capability in SOEs is affected by selection method for top 
management. (H7a) Selection methods giving more intelligent engagement will excel 
(other things equal) in capability types which are sensitive to low-visibility activities. 
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9.2 contributions, policy implications and limitations of this 
study 
9.2.1: Contributions and policy implications 
The contributions ofthis study are significant in several respects: 
1) This study provided a thorough account of how finns with different corporate 
governance and finance (CGFS) in the Chinese auto and electronics finns develop their 
technological capabilities. Through mUltiple case studies, this study explained why the 
majority of Chinese finns failed to acquire dynamic capabilities, and why the minority 
of them succeeded. It finds that finns which succeeded have adopted an independent 
technological strategy, where a lot of low-visibility learning activities took place. On 
the other hand, trust and mutual loyalty from lower-level employees, local suppliers, 
and lead customers made it possible to draw inputs from them during the process of 
technological learning. It therefore indicates that in order for Chinese finns to 
successfully develop sustainable competitiveness, a more independent approach to 
technological capability development needs to be implemented. Specifically, in order 
for the independent, low-visibility learning strategy to work, it is highly important for 
shareholders (especially the state shareholders) to have a great interest in, and develop 
an understanding of the industry in general, and the finn they own in particular. They 
also need to align their interests with the management, possible through fonnal (in the 
case of POEs and MISOEs) or de facto (in the case of MASOEs) co-ownership, or 
through trust and decent autonomy; they also need to encourage their managers to think 
long-tenn. 
2) This study gives a thorough evaluation of finns' technological capabilities in 
the Chinese electronics industry. For finns, they could learn from this study where their 
efforts have been mostly put in so far, and where they should have endeavoured instead. 
For policy makers, they could learn from the empirical results of how high-tech finns 
develop and generate their capabilities under the current mechanism of corporate 
governance and finance system. Based on findings from the case studies as well as 
questionnaire survey, strong evidence has been established on the effects of corporate 
governance on finn's technology development. This is has crucially important policy 
implications for China's SOE refonns as well as the refonn of the corporate 
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governance and finance system. China's SOE reform so far has been focusing on the 
privatisation of small and medium SOEs. Those which remain (mainly large SOEs, 
especially central enterprises under SASAC) are being controlled in an even more 
conventional fashion. Clearly the trend is to increasing measure firm performance with 
Wester-style financial accounting measures (Tylecote et aI, 2010). In particular, the 
SASAC website in 2006 revealed the governing bodies' enthusiasm in using Economic 
Value-Added - which, broadly speaking is a fair measure of a firm's profitability. 
Clearly, the challenge for SASAC is to realize the potential (or inevitable) conflict 
between long-term goals and the availability of any immediate measure of profitability. 
It is particularly problematic with the new emphasis on circulation of outside top 
managers (see Figure 3-9). Both of these developments can be highly effective in 
bringing about short-term efficiency and return. However argued in the thesis, if a CEO 
is under pressure to impressive in a relatively short time, and if the impression will 
mainly be measured financially, low visibility investments in technological capability 
will be discouraged. 
On the other hand, it is found in the thesis that for most POEs and some small SOEs, 
the lack of access to necessary finance has unduly impeded their technological 
development. Although there have been some formal steps taken by the policy makers 
to address this problem - such as the foundation of a dedicated Start-Up Board in the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in summer 2009 (China Daily, 02/09/2009) - it remains to 
be seen to what extent will these measures actually benefit the development of POEs 
and less favoured SOEs. 
3) As for theoretical contributions, this thesis contributes to the literature on 
technological capability by creating a better understanding of firm-level technological 
capability in the Chinese Electronics Sector. It also provides a new framework for 
measuring firm-level technological capabilities in similar sectors in either China or 
other NIEs. More importantly, this study has modified, enriched and tested Tylecote's 
framework (see Chapter 2) in the Chinese context. Therefore it will provide guidance 
for confident and skilled applications of such theories to other NIE contexts. 
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9.2.1 Limitations and Reflection 
This study has a number of limitations. Its quality could have been further improved if 
a parallel survey had been conducted in the auto industry. However due to the fact that 
study of technology development in any Chinese high-tech (or medium-high-tech) 
industry has become increasingly sensitive to foreign-based scholars 88. attempts to 
access the Chinese auto industry at a larger scale has thus not been successful. 
As for generalisation of findings, some caution needs to be taken when generalising 
findings to some other high-/medium-high-tech industries. As discussed in the 
literature review (Chapter 2) and in the discussion of case studies (Chapter 6), low-
visibility technological activities in general, and unbundling in particular, are more 
applicable to sectors where product assembly and systems integration are central. It 
would therefore be slightly harder to generalise (in high-tech) from electronics to 
pharmaceutical industry, and (in medium-high-tech) from cars to chemicals -since for 
those with non-assembled products, there is less scope for unbundling and less need for 
systems integration. 
This study looks at only one country. Further insights could be gained by conducting 
comparative studies between countries/regions, for example, South Korea and Taiwan. 
South Korea caught up with the technology frontiers 10 to 20 years ago, with highly 
supportive industrial policies and firms' indigenous efforts focussed on incremental 
improvement in process and product technologies. Taiwan is a thriving economy based 
on strong family business, especially in the electronics industry. It would be highly 
relevant and important to carry out similar studies on CGFS and technological 
capability development in these two economies to shed more light on the current 
theoretical framework. 
In the empirical study, there may also be some problems that are intrinsically 
associated with questionnaire-based data collection. For example, all multiple 
regressions were performed with the assumptions that differences between each degree 
88 ~uring an interview in one of the auto ftrms, the author was shown the offIcial notice issued by the 
Ministry of Commerce on protection of national business and technology secrecy. The document 
specified that any information provided to foreign-based institutes or scholars has to be carefully 
scrutinised and signed offby supervisory authorities. 
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of capabilities were equal, which in reality is deemed impossible to guarantee. In 
addition, although further analysis was conducted with the survey population to verify 
representativeness of the data set, it has main drawn on second-hand data (NBS 
statistics, see Chapter 7.1.1). Alternatively, a follow-up study of the non-respondents 
would be an optimum approach. 
One further limitation of this study is that, apart from the engagement dimension of 
corporate governance, it has not fully explored - through hypotheses testing - the 
effects of the other three CGFS dimensions on the capability development of firms: 1) 
need for competence-destruction! reconfiguration and pressure for shareholder value; 2) 
technology opportunity and expert risk capital and management autonomy; 3) spill-
overs and stakeholder inclusion. Some attempts have been made on one aspect of 
stakeholder inclusion, i.e. the positive effect of networking activities on capability 
building. However more studies need to be done, to find out more about: 1) How much 
pressure do shareholders in Chinese firms exert for shareholder value and is it possible 
to measure it? 2) How do inter-firm relationships (both with domestic firms and 
international firms) impact on strategy and capability development? And is it possible 
to measure it? 
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Appendix I. Sample questionnaire 1: Questions for CEOs about 
Corporate Governance 
Questionnaire for Corporate Governance and Technology Strategies 
To be filled out by company managing director or board member 
By answering this questionnaire, you give consent to the researcher to coUect, integrate, and analysis the 
information they provide, and to disseminate the findings in an aggregate manner 
1. 
AJI data and information will be used for research purposes only and 
no specific names or details will be revealed to a third party 
without the informants ' knowledge and consent 
Section One: The Company 
Please indicate how many years you have been working in the company: 
o Less than 1 year o 1 - 3 years (including 3 years) 
D 3 - 5 years (including 5 years) D 5 - 10 years (including 10 years) 
D More than 10 years 
2. 
Your position within the company: 
Yes D NoD Board-level management 
Yes D NoD General management 
Yes D NoD Production Management 
Yes D NoD R&D/ Technical Management 
Yes D No D Sales & Marketing Management 
Yes D No D Others (please specify) 
3. 
Approximately in what year was this company established? _______ _ 
4. 
Approximately how many employees are in your company? 
o <99 o 100 - 499 o 500 - 999 
D 1000 - 4999 D > 5000 
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5. 
Which sub-sector is your company in? 
o Telecommunication 0 Consumer electronics 
o TV & broadcasting equipments 0 
o Electronic equipments 0 
o Electronic parts and components 0 
o Electronic material 0 
Computers and related products 
Integrated circuits & semi-conductors 
Sealed vacuum electronic devices 
Photo-electronics 
Section Two: Corporate Governance 
6. 
What is the current type of ownership of your company? 
o Private firm 
o Collective firm 
o 100% State-owned firm 
o Share-holding firm ( including state-shareholding, domestic joint venture and foreign 
joint venture) 
o Foreign firm, from which country/economy? ______ _ 
7. (P/ease answer this set of questions if your firm IS share-Iw/dillg company) 
7.1 What is the nature of your first shareholder? 
o SASAC central office 
o Local government, SASAC local office, or state asset administration company 
o State-owned firm or state-shareholding firm 
o Individual or private firm 
o Foreign-owned firm or foreign multinational company 
7.2 What is the percentage of shareholding by the first shareholder? 
o 1%-29% 0 30%-49% 0 50%-69% 0 70%-99% 0 100% 
290 
7.3 What is the nature of your second shareholder? 
D Local government, SASAC local office, or state asset administration company 
D State-owned firm or state-shareholding firm 
D Individual or private firm 
o Foreign-owned firm or foreign multinational company 
(end of question 7) 
8. 
How are your top managers selected? (please choose one as appropriate) 
D 
D 
9. 
By administrative authorities 
By firm but candidates are 
recommended by administrative 
authorities or the final potential 
candidate need to be approved by 
administrative authorities 
D By shareholders 
D Others (please specify) 
Appendix I 
How many people hold the positions of: 1) Chair of board; 2) CEOI Chief Operating manager; 
4) Party secretary (cross this out if not applicable)? 
o o 2 o 3 
10. 
How much pressure does your company feel from the performance evaluation conducted by 
the administrative authority? 
Level of pressure 
from evaluations 
by administrative 
authority 
Little 
pressure 
o o 
Medium High 
pressure pressure 
o o o 
(if your answer to this question is 'Medium' or above, please go to question 11, otherwise 
please go to question 12) 
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11. 
(Only answer this if your answer to guestion 10 is MEDIUM or above l otherwise (!Iease 
20 to guestion Il} 
Please order from 1 to 5 the weight of the following indicators that are used in the authority 's 
evaluation (1 - the lightest, 5 - the heaviest weight) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Gross profit rate 0 0 0 0 0 
Taxation 0 0 0 0 0 
Sales revenue 0 0 0 0 0 
Employment 0 0 0 0 0 
Firm's technology 
development 0 0 0 0 0 
Patents 
received/applied for 0 0 0 0 0 
Sales revenue of 
innovative product 0 0 0 0 0 (within the last 3 years) 
Market share 0 0 0 0 0 
Other, please specify: 
0 0 0 0 0 
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12. 
Only answer this if you believe that the I!ressure from the authority's evaluation is 
BELOW MEDIUM 
In your major shareholders' evaluation of the firm's performance, order the degree of the 
following factors from 1 to 5 when (1- the lowest de ee, 5- the hi hest : 
1 2 3 4 
Gross profit rate 0 0 0 0 
Sales revenue 0 0 0 0 
Firm's technology 
development 0 0 0 0 
Sales revenue of 
innovative product 0 0 0 0 (within the last 3 years) 
Market share 0 0 0 0 
Other, please specify: 
0 0 0 0 
Section Three: Finance and Success in Project Application 
13. 
What have been the MAIN channels for your business expansion finance? 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Firm' s own savings 
Non state-owned banks 
Rural cooperative foundations; 
financial centres/capital 
rotating credit associations; 
mutual association 
Government subsidies 
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o State-owned banks 
o Stock market 
o Joint venture 
o Others (pIs specify) 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Appendix I 
14. 
Do you feel any difficulty when applying for official approvals for new projects? 
o Yes o No 
IS. 
If your answer to question 14 is 'Yes', then which of the following factors would help you to 
obtain the approval (choose all that apply)? 
State Ownership o Relationship with government 
authorities o 
[J Firm's commercial performance o Others (please specify) 
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Section Four: Technological Strategy 
16. 
When considering acquiring new technology from outside, what is the strategy most likely to 
be chosen? 
o Choose the most advanced 
technology given sufficient capital 
o Choose appropriate technology 
which is compatible to firm's 
existing technology 
o Others (please specify): ___________ _ 
17. 
What is the average proportion (in the last 3 years) of the following categories of technological 
expenditure to total revenue? (please tick as appropriate) 
Tangible 
technology 
purchasing 
such as 0 <1% 0 1% -3% 03.1%-5% 0 5.1%-7% 0 7.1 % -9"10 0 10%-19"10 020% -29"10 030% -39 0 
equipment 
Intangible 
technology 
such as 
0 <1% 0 1%-3% 0 3.1%-5% 05.1% -7% 0 7.1% -9% 0 10%-19% 0 20%-29% 0 30% -39. patent, 
licences 
Process 
technology 
0<1% 01%-3% 03.1%-5% 0 5.1%-7% 0 7.1% -9"/. 0 10%-19% 020%-29% 030% -39' 0 improvement 
Technological 
absorption . 0 <1% 0 1% -3% 0 3.1 %-5% 0 5.1% -7% 0 7.1%-9% 0 10% -19% 0 20% -29% 030% -39 0 
R&D 
0<1% 0 1% -3% 03.1% -5% 05.1% -7% 0 7.1%-9"10 0 10% -1 9"10 020% -29"10 030% -390 
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18. 
How important are the following factors in hampering firm's technological development? 
Factors hampering 
technological development 
Lack of appropriate finance 
Lack of skilled technical 
personnel 
Lack of skilled managerial 
personnel 
Lack of government support 
and assistance in initiating 
R&D activities and/or 
innovation projects 
Others (pIs specify): 
Unimportant Neutral 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
Important Crucial 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
°Note: Technological absorption expenditure is the money spent on activities in assimilating 
newly acquired technology, which include various training (on the job training, course based 
training etc.), inviting expert or engineers from outside for problem solving, trials, experiments 
and so on. 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this survey! 
If you want to expand on any of your answers to one, or more, of the questions please do 
add them here: 
If you have any additional comments that you would like to add, or comments about the 
survey then please add them here: 
If you would like to receive a copy of the report please add your name and company 
address here. 
Name: 
-----------------------------------Address: 
-----------------------------------------
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Appendix II. Sample questionnaire 2: Questions for R&D 
Managers about Technological Capbai/ity 
1. 
Questionnaire for evaluation of technological capabilities 
and strategies 
(To be filled out by the R&DITechnical director) 
By answering this questionnaire, you give consent to the researcher to 
collect, integrate, and analysis the infonnation they provide, and 
to disseminate the findings in an aggregate manner 
All data and information will be used for research purposes only and 
no specific names or details wi ll be revealed to a third party 
without the informants' knowledge and consent 
Section One: The Company 
Please indicate how many years you have been working in the company: 
D Less than 1 year D 1 - 3 years (including 3 years) 
D 3 - 5 years (including 5 years) D 5 - 10 years (including 10 years) 
D More than 10 years 
2. 
Your chief position within the company: 
Yes D No D Board-level management 
Yes D No D General management 
Yes D NoD Production Management 
Yes D NoD R&D/ Technical Management 
Yes D NoD Sales & Marketing Management 
Yes D NoD R&D/ Technical project supervisor 
Yes D NoD Others (please specify) 
3. 
Approximately how many employees are in your company? 
D <99 D 100 - 499 D 500 - 999 
o 1000 - 4999 o > 5000 
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Section Two: Technological Capabilities 
5. Evaluating manufacturing capability 
Please circle the most appropriate number to the right of each statement. 
Manufacturing Capability 
Elements of manufacturing 1 2 3 4 5 6 
capabilities (average (advanced (advanced in the in the in the 
country) country) world) 
Ability to ensure smooth 
functioning of equipments and 0 .0 0 0 0 0 routine production 
Ability of the manufacturing 
department to comply with the 0 0 0 0 0 0 request of R&D 
Level of total quality control 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing cost control 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Overall technical capability of 
equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ability to make continuous 
improvement in the manufacturing D D D D D 0 system 
The level of contribution made by 
manufacturing department to the 0 0 0 [J 0 0 innovation processes 
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6. Evaluating R&D capability 
Please circle the most appropriate number to the right of each statement. 
R&D Capability 
Elements of R&D 1 2 3 4 5 6 
capabilities (average (advanced (advanced in the in the in the 
country) country) world) 
The overall R&D capability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The ability to carry out process 
improvement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The ability to carry out process 
innovation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ability to incorporate desired 
functions in product 0 0 0 0 0 0 design/development process 
Quality and speed when 
responding to feedback from 
manufacturing about design and 0 0 0 0 0 0 
engineering 
Ability to incorporate market and 
customer feedback in the 0 0 0 0 0 0 improvement/innovation process 
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7. Organising Capabilities 
Please circle the most appropriate number to the right of each statement. 
Organising Capabilities 
Elements of Organising 1 2 3 4 5 6 
capabilities (average (advanced (advanced 
in the in the in the 
country) country) world) 
Flexibility in adjusting 
organisational structure according 
to the need for technological 0 0 
developments 
0 0 0 0 
The culture and mechanism to 
encourage and reward 0 0 0 0 0 0 inventiveness and creativity 
Co-ordination and control of the 
major functions within the 0 0 0 0 0 0 company 
Initiative of sub-units within 
company strategy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Section Three: Technology Strategy 
8. 
What are the internal and external links which have been forged and what are their impacts on 
your firm's technological development? 
NL1 Mr ET-1 3 ET-23 IL4 
Production department with 
R&D department 0 0 0 0 0 
R&D department with 
marketing department 0 0 0 0 0 
Equipment 0 0 0 0 0 
Domestic 
suppliers of Key 
components 0 0 0 0 0 and parts 
Domestic buyers 0 0 0 0 0 
Equipment 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign key 
suppliers of 
components 0 0 0 0 0 and parts 
Foreign buyers 0 0 0 0 0 
1. NL: No links; 
2. MT: Links centred on market transaction or day-to-day work. ]t doesn ' t involve new 
skills or knowledge transfer which will enhance pre-existing technological capabilities; 
3. ET 1&2: Links centred on knowledge flow to improve existing technology. It involves 
substantial information flow which encourages either minor technological changes 
(ETl) or major technological changes (ET2) 
4. IL: Links centred on knowledge flows to innovate. It involves substantial flow to build 
up innovative capabilities. 
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9. In your company, in the past 5 years, how heavily have you relied on the below 
activities to change the situation of your technological capabilities (l-least heavy, 5-
heavist)? 
1 3 5 Least 2 4 
heavy Medium Heaviest 
Technology supply 
by foreign D D D 0 0 partner(s) 
Reverse D D 
engineering 
0 0 0 
Collaboration with 
outside experts or D D D D D 
universities / 
institutes 
Own R&D D D D D D 
Recrui tment of new D 0 0 0 0 
staff 
Training of various D D 0 D 0 kinds 
Other methods, 
please specify: D 0 0 0 0 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this survey. 
If you want to expand on any of your answers to one, or more, of the questions please do 
add them here: 
If you have any additional comments that you would like to add, or comments about the 
survey then please add them here: 
If you would like to receive a free copy of the report please add your name, email address 
and company address here. 
Name: 
Address: 
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Appendix III. China's current S& T Programmes 
Prograrrune I Initiating I Objective . Progranune characteristics 
L~e<l1" I 
Key Technology R&D Program 1983 Concentrate resources on key and common The program target set in 10th five-year plan from 200 I to 200S is: I) By 200S the general agriculture 
(Gong Guan Ji Hua) technologies that direly needed by industrial technology is increased to the level that lags behind international advanced level 5 years; 2)The technology and 
upgrading and social sustainable equipment level in several key industry sectors like ICT and manufacturing sector matches the level of 
development. developed countries in the mid of 199Os; 3) Develop the technology related to environment protection and 
sustainable develo ment; 4 Su rt the ente rises to be the ma·or technolo ical innovators. 
State Key Laboratories Program I 1984 Support selected laboratories at public or I This program is intended to promote the research and advanced training in the 159 laboratories (2002 data) 
(Guo Jia Zhong Dian Shi Yan ! private facilities . belonging to universities and R&D institutions and establish a string of national engineering research centers. 
Shi Ji Hua) I I 
Spark Program I 1986 Support technology transfer to rural area to In I 990s the government appropriation for this program hardly surpassed 5%. The bank loan and enterprises 
(Xing Huoji Hua) I promote the rural area development. own capital occupied the majority investment of the projects. In fact, the projects sponsored by this program 
i altain the government credit for the bank loan application. In 2000, 16.8% of total investment of this program 
, came from bank loans. 
I 
National Natural Science 1986 Support basic research through directly From its establishment of 1986 to 2000, the NSFC has funded over 52,000 research projects of various 
Foundation of China (NSFC) funding the projects. categories by investing a total sum ofRMB 6.6 billion. More than 60,000 scientists are supported by NSFC to 
(Guo Jia Zi Ran Ke Xue Ji Jjn) 
High Technology R&D Program 
(863 Program) (863 Ji Hun) 
National New Product Program 
(Guo Jia Zhong Dian Xjn Chan 
PinJi HULl 
Torch Program (Huo Ju Jj Hun) 
Key Basic Science R&D Program 
(973 Program) (973 Ji Hun) 
1986 
1988 
1988 
1997 
Enhance China's international 
competitiveness and improve 
China's overall capability of 
R&D in high technology. 
conduct basic research. In 2004, the NSFC received over 40,000 funding applications. 
The Program is concentrating on mid to long-term development in both civilian and mil itary areas. This 
Program is co-managed by MOST and the Commission ofS&T and Industry for National Defense. The 
Program covers 20 subject topics selected from eight priority areas: Biotechnology, Information, Automation, 
Energy, Advanced Materials, Marine, and Space and Laser. Recent years 863 program continuously increased 
the funding for R&D projects undertaken by enterprise. 
Compile the annual list of new and high In 2002, 71.86% of the program 's funding is by the means of grants and 28.14% is through interest subsidiary. 
technology product and fund those products 
selectively through the grants and interest 
subsidiary. 
Support high technology industry sector By the end of2oo3, through Torch Program the governments have established the structure such as science 
development through setting up science park park, incubator, software park, university science park etc. Inside these science parks and incubators, 28,504 
and incubator, funding projects, and human high technology enterprises had been founded and created 3.49 million jobs. The program had funded 10,261 
resource training etc. projects. 
Support basic science research. The 973 Program's specific tasks are to support-the implement3ii(;;;-()fkey basic research in important scientific 
areas related to agriculture, energy resources, information, resources & environment, and population & health; 
to provide a theoretical basis and scientific foundation for innovation; to foster human resource.; and to establish 
__________ . a number of high level scientific research units. 
The Innovation Fund for Small 1 1999--------- Support the establishment of I The financial support includes interest subsidiary, grants and capital investment. The fund connects to Key 
Technology Based Firms I Newly Technology Based Firms. I' Technology R&D Program, 863 program and Torch Program to facil itate the technology transfer from the R&D 
(IFSTBF) (Ke Ji Xing Zhong J . projects funded by them. 
Xiao Qi Ye Chuang Xin Ji Jin) I I 
Source: Huang, et al (2004) 
303 
Appendix N. The formal corporate governance system of China 
Legal 
component 
The general 
shareholder 
meeting 
Legal rights and responsibilities 
The highest authority within the company 
• Determination of company strategy and operational business and investment 
plans 
• Appointment and dismissal of representatives of shareholders as members of 
the supervisory board, and their remuneration 
• Examination and approval of annual reports as well as the operating budget 
for the following year 
• Examination and approval of the firm's profit distribution and dividend 
policy and of plans for meeting any losses. 
• Approval on the decisions related to registered capital, on issuance of 
company bonds, and on matters relating to mergers, de-mergers, dissolution 
and liquidation 
• Shareholders present at the meetings are entitled to one vote for each share 
held. A two-third majority is required for the approval of issues on merger, 
de-merger and dissolution or on the amendments of the company charter 
The board of The decision-making body of China's shareholding companies. The size of the board 
directors ranges from 5 to 20 members 
The 
supervisory 
board 
• Calling and hosting the annual or special shareholder meeting and reporting 
to shareholders 
• Executing resolutions passed by shareholders 
• Preparing the company's operating and investment plans, dividend policies 
and debt and equity financing plans 
• Drafting any plans for mergers, de-mergers or dissolution of the company 
• Appointing, dismissing and deciding on the remuneration of the company's 
general manager. 
Comprise a minimum of three members, with a minimum of one-third of members 
representing the company's employees 
• Review and examine the company's finances 
• Supervise and oversee directors and managers to ensure non-violation of law, 
regulations and the company charter in the course of their duties 
• Require any director manager to correct any act that is harmful to the 
company 
• Propose an extraordinary shareholding's meeting, when necessary 
Source: Translated by author from Company Law (2006) 
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Appendix V. Tyre technology and the Chinese tyre industry'9 
A radial tyre is a particular design of automotive tyre. Michelin developed the original 
design in 1964, and has now become the standard design for essentially all automotive 
tyres (http://dictionary.sensagent.comlradial +tire/en-enl). 
Tyres are not fabricated just from rubber; within the rubber are a series of plies of cord that 
act as reinforcement. In the past, the fabric was built up on a flat steel drum, with the cords 
at an angle of about +60 and -60 degrees from the direction of travel, so they criss-crossed 
over each other. They were called cross ply or bias ply tires. By comparison, radial tires 
lay all of the cord plies at 90 degrees to the direction of travel (that is, across the tire from 
lip to lip). This design avoids having the plies rub against each other as the tire flexes, 
reducing the rolling friction of the tire. This allows vehicles with radial tyres to achieve 
better fuel economy than vehicles with bias-ply tyres. It also accounts for the slightly "low 
on air" (bulging) look that radial tire sidewalls have, especially when compared to bias-ply 
tyres. 
Radial tyre has been widely produced and used as the main-stream product; the average 
radial rate of tyres used in car manufacturing has reached 90% worldwide, while in 
developed countries this figure is nearly 100%. In China research projects on radial tyre 
can be traced back to the mid 60s, however, mass production only started in 1996. Within 
7 years of development, by 2003 total radial tyre production has reached 75 million units, 
of which 11 million were steel-belted (Guizhou Tyre Co., Ltd., as described in the case 
study Chapter 6, produced over 14 per cent of the national total in 2003). In the same year 
China's radial rate of car tyres reached 60%. 
89 This part has been published in Liu & Tylecote (2009). 
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Figure 0-1. Structure of Tyre Production in China in Year 2005 (100 million units) 
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Figure 0-2. Production of Radial Tyres in China, Years 2003-2005 (100 million units) 
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Source: Data from Heading Century Consulting Co., Ltd (http://www.heading-century.com) 
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